Going wrong in Afghanistan? Show, don't just tell...

The latest story to hit the top headlines around the world: “Obama to send in 30,000 more troops to Afghanistan.” Well, it certainly has many implications, but I’ll focus more on the strategic communication aspect, especially in light of our recent class material.

(Photo courtesy of Defenselink)

Public diplomacy and strategic communication are increasingly criticized for not being responsive to the recent trends of globalization: they have grown increasingly ineffective, they are not engaging enough, and in many instances, they are even counter-productive, if not detrimental, only fuelling the extremist discourse. Many various solutions have been suggested to address the problem, and from all these, I think Daryl Copeland’s approach sounds as the most comprehensive one. He suggests having guerilla diplomats – agile, acute, and autonomous – as “network-builders” and “knowledge-workers” to be able to maneuver better in the increasingly “bazaar-like” horizontal power-dynamics and to manage the challenges of globalization more effectively. What I like most in his argument, however, is the emphasis on the fact that underdevelopment is the major cause for insecurity, and the need to have guerilla diplomats actively contributing to sustainable development so as to successfully address the problem in societies with chronic instability and lack of governance.
   Development as an instrument for stability has been among the key American strategies in Afghanistan and Iraq (CERP just one of them), with increasing resource commitments, which are sure to rise with the tentative date of withdrawal now set.  In a recent article in Foreign Policy, Wilder and Gordon say their research has shown, however, that “there was very little evidence of aid projects winning hearts and minds or promoting stability,” and that the Afghans themselves explained the increase in insurgency by increased disenfranchisement with their own government, seen as largely “corrupt and unjust.” The Afghans were also very critical of all the foreign development aid, which was perceived as fuelling massive corruption and undermining the “positive impacts it may otherwise had.” The more interesting fact is that the U.S. is itself actually paying millions of dollars to ensure security – or at least, not to create insecurity – to Afghan officials, tribal leaders, security forces… and insurgents, including the Taliban.

There goes credibility - the much-acclaimed element so vital to strategic communication - down the drain... Should we blame the money-driven mindset that somehow missed the target in a fundamentally different society?

In the same article, Wilder and Gordon say that the only development-related case that the Afghans perceived as successful was the National Solidarity Program, where the local communities played a greater role in planning, designing, implementing, monitoring, and evaluating the projects.  A tribal leader quoted in the end of the article states: “Money can't win hearts and minds. If you give an Afghan a great meal but insult him he will never come again. But if you treat him with respect but only give him a piece of bread he will be your friend forever.” 

Therefore, Copeland is only right. Development – but, real and sustainable development, that can ensure the existence of proper institutions and governance (unlike the small-scale short-term projects envisioned by CERP, for example) – coupled with increasing trust from the local people, can prove to be the key to achieving stability in Afghanistan. To build trust, NATO needs to listen and involve the Afghan people themselves - NOT only the Afghan officials – to gauge the effect of its programs, formulate more appropriate strategies, and SHOW (and not just TELL) that it really cares about the Afghan future. If anything, they would only benefit from the Pragmatic Complexity Model, and the recognition that sustainable long-term stability (or, especially, democracy) cannot be imposed, but rather, has to be cultivated and nurtured together with the Afghans themselves. After all, a stable Afghanistan will only contribute to a stable world and thus, national security.

The failure of the “diplomatic” argument

“And I call upon the Iraqi people to reject violence, band together to insist that the country move toward a peaceful tomorrow. Iraq is changing for the better. I mean, look at the soccer team.”

– G. W. Bush, Interview with Al Zaman, May 20, 2004

Ethos. Pathos. Logos: the three Aristotelian pillars of successful argument still very much relevant today, but, for some reason, also very much neglected by several major states in their international affairs.

Modern-day conduct of foreign affairs heavily depends on communication, especially when it comes to public diplomacy and non-traditional warfare. After all, it’s about perception management and “manufacturing consent,” be it domestic, or within a foreign public: control over info. That’s the key.

A government cannot purge all unfavorable discourse from the public, excommunicate all “unorthodox” thinkers, or, for that matter, hunt down and burn all their writings: fortunately we have been out of the Middle Ages for a while, now. Yet, governments still get entangled in their attempts to literally control information, spin it to work in their interest, or improve their “international ranking” in terms of appeal. This is especially true when the government is also desperately trying to win a war of ideas, which essentially constitutes multiple communication battles.

To continue with the over-abused example of the American “War on Terror”… It indeed has a major ideological component. Yet, again, the US ended up in a situation where it had to learn the hard way. You cannot bomb ideas. You have to bend them, or you might even have to disprove them altogether. To do that, you need persuasion. Persuasion requires argument; cohesive argument. The US has been trying to persuade the Middle Eastern public for most of the last decade, and yet, its persuasion tactics have been far from even resembling a true Aristotelian argument (rather, they involved military invasions, consequent humanitarian crises, attempts to clamp down on the local media, and disaster cases such as the corruption in the “Oil for food” program or the Abu Ghraib controversy). So what is wrong, exactly?

Ethos: the ethical appeal, i.e. credibility. - The Western arrogance towards the region, and the invasion already established a “bad name” back in 2001. The outburst against Al Jazeera  (and other “uncensored” media, which freely covered the TRUE nature of the war) and the support of corrupt local regimes provided further proof that the US was unable to practice what it preached. Not to mention the constant negative framing of the Muslims and their culture by Western media – at least as perceived by the Muslims themselves. There goes credibility, down the drain. 

Pathos: the emotional appeal, i.e. sympathy and compassion. - I don’t think it is fair to expect many people in the Islamic world to feel enough compassion towards any of the coalition forces in light of the Afghanistan or Iraq invasions, and the events that followed. The local media – successfully providing counter-frames that worked – undermined all American effort to make a “sweeping victory” over the hearts and minds of the population. 

Logos: the reasoning of the argument, including cohesiveness and supporting evidence. - In this case, the initial rhetoric was that of hostility, and although it changed later on, it was far from being cohesive. As in the case of ethos, the US and its coalition partners showed, time and again, that they were unable (or were simply unprepared) to follow the very principles they were supposedly promoting, giving rise to many alternative explanations, that (at least seemingly) made more sense, especially to the local public.

This all in light of an incompetent speaker as president and a new media environment, where there is an abundance of alternative sources of information, as well as multiple channels of access to it. The US had apparently forgotten to take good note of that, and assumed that just like in the good-ol’ Cold War times the people would unquestioningly internalize whatever they were told, as long as it was coming from America. The flowers and cheers for the “liberators” were not there for the American troops. Did the US fall victim to its own rhetoric and information campaign?

Whatever the root causes and the real reasons behind the “War on Terror,” it is certainly not perceived as a war of “liberation” by the ordinary Iraqis or Afghans, or by most of the people in the region. The US attempts to promote the “democratization” rhetoric have fallen short of actual evidence to support it, while political and economic dealings get increasingly more dirty in both, Iraq and Afghanistan (and the US is conspicuously involved in most of these cases). And certainly, the most prominent example of the US not keeping to its own values is its very attempt to overtly control the flow of information: bashing of “unorthodox” (in American view) media, embedding reporters in the military (thus successfully hampering their chances of some true reporting), and sometimes even preventing journalists from reporting altogether (references can be found in all of this week's readings).

Basically, the Americans have failed to deliver; and even where they have, the means to these achievements were largely disastrous. Given the situation as well as the context, the US might not have many options left. The most promising one, however, remains true understanding of and sensitivity to the local cultures (and figuring out what is that they really value at the time, unlike "soccer," for example), as well as a better demonstration of the true American values through more effective communication and palpable evidence. Yes, openness and true freedom of choice for the people of the region might mean that in the short run the “coalition” might not see friendly governments there (but that’s just the way a true democracy works, right?). And yet, the picture might be different in the longer run, if these governments are engaged and better integrated in an international cooperation system. In the end of the day, despite the importance of communication, it’s not only about words, but deeds as well.

Courtesy of Natural Born Citizen