Showing posts with label public diplomacy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label public diplomacy. Show all posts

Dec 4, 2009

Going wrong in Afghanistan? Show, don't just tell...


The latest story to hit the top headlines around the world: “Obama to send in 30,000 more troops to Afghanistan.” Well, it certainly has many implications, but I’ll focus more on the strategic communication aspect, especially in light of our recent class material.


(Photo courtesy of Defenselink)

Public diplomacy and strategic communication are increasingly criticized for not being responsive to the recent trends of globalization: they have grown increasingly ineffective, they are not engaging enough, and in many instances, they are even counter-productive, if not detrimental, only fuelling the extremist discourse. Many various solutions have been suggested to address the problem, and from all these, I think Daryl Copeland’s approach sounds as the most comprehensive one. He suggests having guerilla diplomats – agile, acute, and autonomous – as “network-builders” and “knowledge-workers” to be able to maneuver better in the increasingly “bazaar-like” horizontal power-dynamics and to manage the challenges of globalization more effectively. What I like most in his argument, however, is the emphasis on the fact that underdevelopment is the major cause for insecurity, and the need to have guerilla diplomats actively contributing to sustainable development so as to successfully address the problem in societies with chronic instability and lack of governance.
   Development as an instrument for stability has been among the key American strategies in Afghanistan and Iraq (CERP just one of them), with increasing resource commitments, which are sure to rise with the tentative date of withdrawal now set.  In a recent article in Foreign Policy, Wilder and Gordon say their research has shown, however, that “there was very little evidence of aid projects winning hearts and minds or promoting stability,” and that the Afghans themselves explained the increase in insurgency by increased disenfranchisement with their own government, seen as largely “corrupt and unjust.” The Afghans were also very critical of all the foreign development aid, which was perceived as fuelling massive corruption and undermining the “positive impacts it may otherwise had.” The more interesting fact is that the U.S. is itself actually paying millions of dollars to ensure security – or at least, not to create insecurity – to Afghan officials, tribal leaders, security forces… and insurgents, including the Taliban.
There goes credibility - the much-acclaimed element so vital to strategic communication - down the drain... Should we blame the money-driven mindset that somehow missed the target in a fundamentally different society?
In the same article, Wilder and Gordon say that the only development-related case that the Afghans perceived as successful was the National Solidarity Program, where the local communities played a greater role in planning, designing, implementing, monitoring, and evaluating the projects.  A tribal leader quoted in the end of the article states: “Money can't win hearts and minds. If you give an Afghan a great meal but insult him he will never come again. But if you treat him with respect but only give him a piece of bread he will be your friend forever.” 
Therefore, Copeland is only right. Development – but, real and sustainable development, that can ensure the existence of proper institutions and governance (unlike the small-scale short-term projects envisioned by CERP, for example) – coupled with increasing trust from the local people, can prove to be the key to achieving stability in Afghanistan. To build trust, NATO needs to listen and involve the Afghan people themselves - NOT only the Afghan officials – to gauge the effect of its programs, formulate more appropriate strategies, and SHOW (and not just TELL) that it really cares about the Afghan future. If anything, they would only benefit from the Pragmatic Complexity Model, and the recognition that sustainable long-term stability (or, especially, democracy) cannot be imposed, but rather, has to be cultivated and nurtured together with the Afghans themselves. After all, a stable Afghanistan will only contribute to a stable world and thus, national security.


Nov 17, 2009

Identity crisis and the shortcomings of “Ice Age” Diplomacy


No, I’m not referring to global climate change here. I’m talking about the cartoon, Ice Age 3, which, according to Amb. Glassman who spoke at SIS on Nov. 5, can do a far better job in getting the foreigners to like America than many other traditional PD techniques (the cartoon is said to have got into the top five record-breakers in terms of worldwide market revenues). I cannot really see how Sid or Scrat are promoting the American image and values abroad… especially to the more conservative of the audiences. And still, it’s better than Britney Spears. That’s for sure.


Image courtesy of All Movie Photo.
In a recent article, R. Reilly, former director of VOA, says the shortcomings of the American PD can primarily be attributed to “lack of clarity about what the West stands for” and the over-reliance on advertising . The first major issue Reilly identifies is the loss of American credibility due to its embrace of pop culture and promotion of “tolerance based upon moral relativism.” He also takes an issue with the fact that the current main objective of the US – the promotion of democracy – requires “the primacy of reason over passion,” while advertising, which is extensively employed to achieve that end, does not appeal to reason or rational calculation, but rather to desire and “emotional impulse.” The result? Lack of clarity and inevitable confusion.
This all in light of the new media environment, the rise of non-state actors, and the boom (at least in the developed world) of the so-called iDiplomacy. Last year, Glassman talked of Public Diplomacy 2.0, network building, and its potential for engaging foreign publics in a conversation: an innovative and effective way of conducting PD and achieving national security interests. But that’s according to the Ambassador. Not only do I agree with Hayden on that it is questionable whether an “open source PD” can ultimately translate into improved public opinion abroad, but I also think that it can further undermine the American message
Both, Nye and Hanson point out that the lack of attention and of credibility are major issues currently impairing the American PD effort. By flooding the foreign publics with PD 2.0 attempts and iDiplomats, the US runs the risk of not only losing the attention of its target audience, but also making further damage to its cause through the haphazard “free market” noise that will only undercut the message AND its credibility. Nye cautions against leaving the PD endeavor completely to the free market, stating that is can project an image of the US that is “too facile.” I could only add that coupled with “open source PD” it might completely confuse the foreign audiences about what the US really stands for and what are its true objectives.
But well, the US itself is unsure as to what its message is. There are national security interests, and there is certainly a need to persuade foreign publics. But when there is no proper argumentation and overt “relativism,” the US is seen as attempting to make others “believe without knowledge” – essentially the definition of “moralist” propaganda (see J. Brown’s discussion on the subject); and well, when recognized as such, propaganda undermines credibility by default.
Reilly says that in order for PD to function, “there must be a recovery of purpose and this purpose must be related to justice.” I think the message would also benefit from abandoning relativism and what can be seen as “double standards.” Certainly, all these cannot be incorporated into the purpose without a proper understanding of the audience and their view of matters. While when it comes to defining a purpose, there should be a core power that can clearly formulate the message and deliver it through multiple channels.  PD 2.0 and iDiplomacy MIGHT be able to do a good job in delivering the message and providing feedback about its perception. However, to have an effect the process should be well organized, otherwise the result is havoc.  To quote Reilly again, “in order to fight a war of ideas, one has to have an idea.”
American PD seems to have entangled itself in the ambiguity and the unmanageable plurality that it, itself, has created. There has to be the realization that no matter the channels and the ways of projection, the American image is still largely perceived by many (particularly in the Middle East, where there are many counter-messages that DO work) as fuzzy and devoid of real substance, at best, while immoral and nihilistic, at worst. This is especially so when there is a multitude of contradictory sources conveying multiple vague underlying promises of freedom, peace, and gradual prosperity that, for some reason, keep failing to materialize.



Image courtesy of Rising Powers.
Whose responsibility it is, then, if not the government’s (that is, just by the way, entrusted with leading the nation and promoting its interests) to make sure that the process of message formulation and delivery is properly administered? Certainly, there has to be input from all the levels of the society, especially from those who manage to think outside the box; however, at the end of the day, the government is still the one that has to deliver on the promises and live up to the cultivated expectations. For all these reasons, without an effective government oversight, there is the risk of further ambiguity and loss of American credibility.
I couldn’t agree more with Nye on that “developing a long-term relationship is not always profitable in the short term.” Leaving PD entirely to the “market” – be it the private sector or the self-branded citizen diplomats – will not only “lead to underinvestment” in what is currently considered a primary concern for American national security, but can also hamper all future attempts to regain what was lost.

Nov 16, 2009

'Obama should speak to Al Jazeera'

On the very same matter that made up the core of our readings this week. Very fresh: published today...

Richard Grenell, director of communications and public diplomacy for the US permanent representative to the UN in the Bush administration, in an AJE interview.



"Like it or not, the most popular network in the Arab World is Al Jazeera and we have a golden opportunity to speak directly to 200 million Arab households through Al Jazeera.

I don't think that this conversation should be just one interview by the Obama administration or by President Obama; I think it needs to be the beginning of a constant flow of information both ways so that the 200 million Arab households who watch Al Jazeera on a regular basis can hear a variety of US policy goals."

Read the interview HERE.