Noömanagement Crisis, continued...
Marwin Bishara and notable "panelists" discuss the problem on Al Jazeera English.
The second part of the program touches upon "glocalization" of Al Qaeda's ideology, and the implications of this for the general "War on Terror."
Highly recommended...
Showing posts with label Al Qaeda. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Al Qaeda. Show all posts
Nov 3, 2009
EMPIRE - The Long War: The US and Al Qaeda (Al Jazeera)
Oct 20, 2009
The Noömanagement Crisis
That information is power or that the media are the space where that power is decided is not news. What is new, however, is the increasingly near-“perfect” information that can be transmitted and accessed by virtually anyone (at least in theory), unquestionably giving power to those with the ability and shrewdness to manage these flows to serve their interests, be it states, companies, civil society groups, or insurgent movements. What they have to do is just to overwhelm the “info market” with the right information, which will then transform into their desired result (propaganda, advertising, public relations, strategic communication, etc…). As Castells put it, “What does not exist in the media, does not exist in the public mind.” So they key is to put the “right” image in the public mind. But that image has to live up to its promises, even if partially.
As all of this week’s readings pointed out, the new media are changing the structures of information flows, robbing the formerly powerful players of their ability to shape public opinion, and making the latter more malleable and susceptible to “counter-power” influence. This is not necessarily bad, but can be used to serve many not-so-friendly goals, too, as the success of various insurgent movements has come to prove. Networks such as Al Qaeda or Hizballah have utilized new media and the communication space not only for achieving financial sustainability and waging their war of ideas (which are among the key components of Mary Kaldor’s “New War” model), but also for achieving legitimacy outside of their own local communities. They have successfully created a new set of goals and ethics – be it the fight against a hostile foreign nation state (US or Israel, in these cases), or the provision of local support networks vital for the day-to-day survival of the local population due to the total absence of functional societal or state institutions (Qandahar or Southern Lebanon) – and have proved to be consistent in matching their deeds with their promises.
As all of this week’s readings pointed out, the new media are changing the structures of information flows, robbing the formerly powerful players of their ability to shape public opinion, and making the latter more malleable and susceptible to “counter-power” influence. This is not necessarily bad, but can be used to serve many not-so-friendly goals, too, as the success of various insurgent movements has come to prove. Networks such as Al Qaeda or Hizballah have utilized new media and the communication space not only for achieving financial sustainability and waging their war of ideas (which are among the key components of Mary Kaldor’s “New War” model), but also for achieving legitimacy outside of their own local communities. They have successfully created a new set of goals and ethics – be it the fight against a hostile foreign nation state (US or Israel, in these cases), or the provision of local support networks vital for the day-to-day survival of the local population due to the total absence of functional societal or state institutions (Qandahar or Southern Lebanon) – and have proved to be consistent in matching their deeds with their promises.
Despite the increasing prominence of non-state actors, the nation state has not lost its status completely – yet – as many states are still attempting to manage the information flows so as to contain the “counter-power” influence over state objectives. Prominent examples of such attempts, to name just a few: the American efforts to embed reporters within military units in Afghanistan or Iraq; Russia (or Georgia and NATO, for that matter) flooding the international media with biased reports on the war in South Ossetia in August 2008; the desperate attempts by the Islamic Republic of Iran to control the web-space in the post-election debacle this June. And when these attempts fail, all the state can do is finding a clearly identified scapegoat to blame: Al Jazeera, NATO, or "The Great Satan."
As it has become increasingly obvious, addressing Noöpolitik with Realpolitik has not only NOT been successful, but has further discredited the attempts of the state to maintain legitimacy. To use the America example – after the alleged “win” in the Cold War, the US simply stopped its efforts in maintaining its international image, and even the eight years of “War of Ideas” have not brought it back to senses. Just as it is currently being discussed - openly - despite all the fluffy names, such as “public diplomacy” or “strategic communication,” effective coordination is nonexistent and the government has no clue as to what is REALLY being done, how to gauge the efforts and their success, or how to manage them more efficiently.
The incumbent “powers” in the international sphere will need to adapt if they want to survive; otherwise, the increasing number and influence of the global “counter-powers” will deem them irrelevant in the Noosphere age. Arquilla and Ronfeld say that this would require rebalancing of relations among state, market, and civil-society actors. But then, why not match the rhetoric with deeds, for starters?
Labels:
Al Qaeda,
Hizballah,
isurgency,
new media,
Noöpolitik,
Realpolitik
Oct 19, 2009
Al Qaeda the Embodiment of Noopolitik?
Arquilla and Ronfeldt talk about emerging state models and communication tools but while reading their ideas for noopolitik and the noosphere I was left with more doubts and questions than anything else.
Like most theories surrounding the ability of communication tools (in particular digital communication) to create societal change, much of the description of noopolitik and the noosphere were very nebulous and almost 'pie in the sky' visions of what states should act like.
However, states simply do not act like that.
In Iran during the summer Presidential election the establishment went to great lengths to disable both outside communication coming in and on the ground information from Iran reaching the globe. The establishment's success in fighting the information war was marginal at best, but the hard power of the Basij and other state forces did prove powerful. For the most part, people did still come out in droves despite violence, but the state was set on maintaining hard power and for all intents and purposes it still does.
When the state did vie for soft power through communication it was Khameini's Jummah prayer sermon full of red herrings and allegations, a method that has been duplicated by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad himself. Though the civil society of Iran may be vying for a noopolitik ideal for their nation, the establishment is still stuck in realpolitik. The establishment wants to maintain control.
In Afghanistan, satellite television stations have proliferated and 25% of the population is cell phone enabled but even with an illegitimate government, the establishment is set on maintaining and maximizing their power.
The reading does eventually refer to Al Qaeda and it seems like they may be one of the only groups that are successful at using noopolitik ideals for their aims. After all, Bin Laden was ousted from Saudi Arabia to the Sudan for being critical of the monarchy much in the same way as he has been critical of Saddam Hussein and other leaders of Muslim states. Al Qaeda has become very adept at using print, broadcast, and online media to disseminate its propaganda. And in the end, Al Qaeda is all about doctrine. So it seems that by definition they have been the most successful at using this method for advancement of their cause and challenging the power of states for what they believe to be a greater societal "good."
In the end, I found the theory to be very interesting and worthy of excitement but one has to wonder what nation-state would give up realpolitik ideals (even if all they possess is negative sovereignty) for a system that would require true collaboration with the people of the nation and the world for a greater good?
Like most theories surrounding the ability of communication tools (in particular digital communication) to create societal change, much of the description of noopolitik and the noosphere were very nebulous and almost 'pie in the sky' visions of what states should act like.
However, states simply do not act like that.
In Iran during the summer Presidential election the establishment went to great lengths to disable both outside communication coming in and on the ground information from Iran reaching the globe. The establishment's success in fighting the information war was marginal at best, but the hard power of the Basij and other state forces did prove powerful. For the most part, people did still come out in droves despite violence, but the state was set on maintaining hard power and for all intents and purposes it still does.
When the state did vie for soft power through communication it was Khameini's Jummah prayer sermon full of red herrings and allegations, a method that has been duplicated by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad himself. Though the civil society of Iran may be vying for a noopolitik ideal for their nation, the establishment is still stuck in realpolitik. The establishment wants to maintain control.
In Afghanistan, satellite television stations have proliferated and 25% of the population is cell phone enabled but even with an illegitimate government, the establishment is set on maintaining and maximizing their power.
The reading does eventually refer to Al Qaeda and it seems like they may be one of the only groups that are successful at using noopolitik ideals for their aims. After all, Bin Laden was ousted from Saudi Arabia to the Sudan for being critical of the monarchy much in the same way as he has been critical of Saddam Hussein and other leaders of Muslim states. Al Qaeda has become very adept at using print, broadcast, and online media to disseminate its propaganda. And in the end, Al Qaeda is all about doctrine. So it seems that by definition they have been the most successful at using this method for advancement of their cause and challenging the power of states for what they believe to be a greater societal "good."
In the end, I found the theory to be very interesting and worthy of excitement but one has to wonder what nation-state would give up realpolitik ideals (even if all they possess is negative sovereignty) for a system that would require true collaboration with the people of the nation and the world for a greater good?
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