SIS 640 Communiacs

A somewhat belated reflection on Erdoğan's talk

2009-12-10T09:54:00.002-05:00

Some thoughts on the "emerging" power's rhetoric...

The agenda of Erdoğan’s visit to Washington this week was clear way in advance. It was not going to be about the relations with Armenia, or Israel, for that matter, despite the wishful thinking of some. Rather, it was going to focus on the current agenda-toppers: Afghanistan and Iran. Of course, we can never know what exactly went on during the private two-hour-long discussion that Obama had with him; but from what the “unnamed officials” are telling the media, the disagreements are still there: Erdoğan refuses to commit more combat troops to Afghanistan, he is still willing to talk with Iran, and he still dislikes – very much – whatever happened in Gaza last winter. Despite all that, he made sure to demonstrate his devotion to the U.S. by talking at the Trans-Atlantic Leaders’ Forum at Johns Hopkins University, after the official part of the day, giving himself another pat in the back, calling for more understanding of his government, and praising the Americans for their support... (continue reading)

Going wrong in Afghanistan? Show, don't just tell...

2009-12-04T12:19:00.005-05:00

The latest story to hit the top headlines around the world: “Obama to send in 30,000 more troops to Afghanistan.” Well, it certainly has many implications, but I’ll focus more on the strategic communication aspect, especially in light of our recent class material.

(Photo courtesy of Defenselink)

Public diplomacy and strategic communication are increasingly criticized for not being responsive to the recent trends of globalization: they have grown increasingly ineffective, they are not engaging enough, and in many instances, they are even counter-productive, if not detrimental, only fuelling the extremist discourse. Many various solutions have been suggested to address the problem, and from all these, I think Daryl Copeland’s approach sounds as the most comprehensive one. He suggests having guerilla diplomats – agile, acute, and autonomous – as “network-builders” and “knowledge-workers” to be able to maneuver better in the increasingly “bazaar-like” horizontal power-dynamics and to manage the challenges of globalization more effectively. What I like most in his argument, however, is the emphasis on the fact that underdevelopment is the major cause for insecurity, and the need to have guerilla diplomats actively contributing to sustainable development so as to successfully address the problem in societies with chronic instability and lack of governance.
Development as an instrument for stability has been among the key American strategies in Afghanistan and Iraq (CERP just one of them), with increasing resource commitments, which are sure to rise with the tentative date of withdrawal now set. In a recent article in Foreign Policy, Wilder and Gordon say their research has shown, however, that “there was very little evidence of aid projects winning hearts and minds or promoting stability,” and that the Afghans themselves explained the increase in insurgency by increased disenfranchisement with their own government, seen as largely “corrupt and unjust.” The Afghans were also very critical of all the foreign development aid, which was perceived as fuelling massive corruption and undermining the “positive impacts it may otherwise had.” The more interesting fact is that the U.S. is itself actually paying millions of dollars to ensure security – or at least, not to create insecurity – to Afghan officials, tribal leaders, security forces… and insurgents, including the Taliban.

There goes credibility - the much-acclaimed element so vital to strategic communication - down the drain... Should we blame the money-driven mindset that somehow missed the target in a fundamentally different society?

In the same article, Wilder and Gordon say that the only development-related case that the Afghans perceived as successful was the National Solidarity Program, where the local communities played a greater role in planning, designing, implementing, monitoring, and evaluating the projects. A tribal leader quoted in the end of the article states: “Money can't win hearts and minds. If you give an Afghan a great meal but insult him he will never come again. But if you treat him with respect but only give him a piece of bread he will be your friend forever.”

Therefore, Copeland is only right. Development – but, real and sustainable development, that can ensure the existence of proper institutions and governance (unlike the small-scale short-term projects envisioned by CERP, for example) – coupled with increasing trust from the local people, can prove to be the key to achieving stability in Afghanistan. To build trust, NATO needs to listen and involve the Afghan people themselves - NOT only the Afghan officials – to gauge the effect of its programs, formulate more appropriate strategies, and SHOW (and not just TELL) that it really cares about the Afghan future. If anything, they would only benefit from the Pragmatic Complexity Model, and the recognition that sustainable long-term stability (or, especially, democracy) cannot be imposed, but rather, has to be cultivated and nurtured together with the Afghans themselves. After all, a stable Afghanistan will only contribute to a stable world and thus, national security.

E-E Campaigns

2009-12-03T21:13:00.001-05:00

I'm all for Dutta's "subaltern critique" of entertainment-education campaigns. To the extent that he exposes the hegemony-reinforcing tactics of E-E campaigns and the need for subaltern voices in the policy-making phases of these campaigns, I support him. However, I take issue with his criticism of population control as the E-E campaign topic of choice to the exclusion of those fundamental needs articulated most by the subaltern voices. Dutta himself notes that this lack of resources and extreme poverty are due to structural issues within the country, rather than issues of individual agency. While I agree that sending kids to bed with a full stomach is a more urgent goal than preventing the birth of more kids, I disagree with Dutta's implication that access to food and water should take the place of population control in E-E campaigns if only for the simple question of how can E-E campaigns resolve structural resource issues? As Singhal and Rogers define them, E-E campaigns by definition, aimed at the masses, are designed to bring about behavioral and social change. For instance, Dutta notes that "As members of marginalized sectors of the world, participants discuss problems of joblessness, corruption, and exploitation that are intrinsically connected with being poor," presumably to argue that such topics should be the focus of E-E campaigns before population control. Yet which of these topics can be affected by the masses (educated through entertainment), non-elites with little to no power to influence the E-E campaigns directed at them, let alone structural or institutional changes, by changing their behavior on an individual level?

I am not so much arguing in defense of population control being the primary focus of E-E campaigns, as supporting the idea that this message and its designed outcomes fit the medium better than the ones Dutta puts forth. There is perhaps an argument to be made that less resources overall should be directed at E-E campaigns, and more to addressing structural inequities. But Dutta's article, while contributing to Melkote's notion of greater grassroots participation in policymaking, takes population control to task yet fails to provide a compelling argument for an alternative topic that is more pressing AND suits the medium of E-E campaigns.

The Greatest Hits and Misses of Obama's Afghanistan Address

2009-12-02T02:03:00.002-05:00

I know this doesn't necessarily have much to do with the reading, but since this is an International Communication course and we just covered Afghanistan in our group presentation I thought it would be interesting to see what people thought of Obama's Afghanistan speech. If this address wasn't international communication put into real world practice I don't know what was.

Below is what I wrote on my Blog:

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Speaking at The United States Military Academy at West Point, U.S. President Barack Hussein Obama finally addressed the American people to provide a clear explanation for the United States' efforts in Afghanistan. Obama also made it a point to remind the American people exactly why the United States is still in Afghanistan 8 years after the 9/11 attacks.

Obama's referencing of the post 9/11 international milieu was an important element in trying to remind the American people precisely why Afghanistan should matter to them. Quite simply, as Obama re-iterated, Afghanistan matters to the American people because of two words - "national security."

However, in his efforts to harken back to 9/11 Obama did not do enough to distance the Afghan people from Al Qaeda and the Taliban. After all, not a single one of those hijackers was Afghan. In fact, the people of Afghanistan had no idea the Taliban were harboring Osama Bin Laden nor did they know what the foreigners were plotting in their nation.

This is a very important to distinction for, the more the American people can identify with the people of Afghanistan, as people and not terrorists, the more likely they will be to accept a U.S. presence in Afghanistan. After all, the Taliban and Al Qaeda were largely foreign forces operating within Afghanistan without the consent, approval, or even knowledge of the Afghan people.

Al Qaeda's base of operations was in Afghanistan, where they were harbored by the Taliban a ruthless, repressive and radical movement that seized control of that country after it was ravaged by years of Soviet occupation and civil war, and after the attention of America and our friends had turned elsewhere.

The vote in the Senate was 98 to 0. The vote in the House was 420 to 1. For the first time in its history, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization invoked Article 5 the commitment that says an attack on one member nation is an attack on all. And the United Nations Security Council endorsed the use of all necessary steps to respond to the 9/11 attacks. America, our allies and the world were acting as one to destroy al Qaeda's terrorist network, and to protect our common security.

Obama's reference to the deferment of attention from Afghanistan to Iraq was also a very important point. It is also a point that many Americans may not have understood or remembered. As Obama stated, the United States was making great strides in the fight against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan until the start of the Iraq War. Also, with the statements about Iraq's impact on Afghanistan and the shifting of American attention after the Soviet Occupation, Obama was able to illustrate to the American people the impacts of abandoning Afghanistan in the past. For better or worse, Obama did not quite hammer that point in directly, but the allusions to such statements can be of great service in garnering support from the American people for an on-going American presence in Afghanistan.

It is enough to say that for the next six years, the Iraq War drew the dominant share of our troops, our resources, our diplomacy, and our national attention and that the decision to go into Iraq caused substantial rifts between America and much of the world…while we have achieved hard-earned milestones in Iraq, the situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated.

Unfortunately, there were also elements of pandering in Obama's statements. Most notable was Obama's pandering to Pakistan and Pakistani interests. Obama referred to America's commitment to Pakistan, Taliban attacks on Pakistani soil, and Pakistan as a partner in the war on terror without putting any real pressure on Pakistan to thwart terrorism within their nation. This unfortunately is a terrible stance to take, because Pakistan's interests and Afghanistan's interests are not the same (at least not within the governments), Pakistan has yet to take a firm stance against terrorism, and because Pakistan is ultimately the real hotbed of terrorism in the world. For the United States to ally itself too closely with Pakistan is quite dangerous, and considering Pakistan's sordid past as the "godfather" of the Taliban not in the best interest of Afghanistan. If Obama is not careful in managing the relationship between the United States and their "ally" Pakistan, this partnership could be the equivalent of giving Saddam weapons to fight the Iranians with. This alliance between the United States and Pakistan becomes all the more dangerous when one takes into account the claims that the Pakistani government is making deals with anti-NATO/U.S. militants in Waziristan.

It is true that the United States must assure Pakistan of its own safety, but it seems as if Obama is placing far too much trust in a nation that has not only been accused of lacking initiative and diligence on the war on terror, but whose leadership has been highly critical of the United States despite receiving aid and arms from the U.S.

If anything, the United States should be placing as much pressure on Zardari as they are on Karzai.

Also, the diction of Obama's reassurance to Pakistan was quite problematic in that Obama referred to Taliban attacks in Pakistan but made no such distinction of Taliban attacks in Afghanistan.

Over the last several years, the Taliban has maintained common cause with al Qaeda, as they both seek an overthrow of the Afghan government. Gradually, the Taliban has begun to take control over swaths of Afghanistan, while engaging in increasingly brazen and devastating acts of terrorism against the Pakistani people.

As this address was to the American people, Obama had to reassure them that the United States would not be in Afghanistan for an extended period of time. However, his 18 month timeline is extremely problematic for a nation that has been ravaged by 30 years of war, occupation, warlordism, narcotics trade, terrorism, and insurgency. Unlike Iraq, the 30 years of war have left Afghanistan almost entirely devoid of even the most basic infrastructure and to say that the United States troops will put out in 18 months puts the United States and Afghanistan in a precarious situation.

Though the United States does not plan to engage in state building, leaving Afghanistan without restoring both order and basic services could prove highly dangerous for both nations. As Dr. Ashraf Ghani pointed out on CNN, stability in Afghanistan without a properly function nation that can provide basic goods and services is nearly impossible.

After all, if Afghanistan does not have the basic infrastructure and services that Iraq currently has within the 18 month window, whose to say the Taliban will not bide their time and then attack Afghanistan ideologically and violently once again? It would not be difficult for the Taliban to engage in a propaganda campaign accusing the United States of abandoning Afghanistan again without restoring order and civil society to the nation.

The Afghans who have reluctantly turned to the Taliban in the past 8 years have done so because of an on-going propaganda campaign by the Taliban alluding to the lack of development coupled with mounting civilian deaths in Afghanistan over the past years. Whose to say that in 18 months time if Afghanistan is not substantially more secure and developed, the Taliban could not engage in a similar propaganda campaign?

After 18 months, our troops will begin to come home.

If I did not think that the security of the United States and the safety of the American people were at stake in Afghanistan, I would gladly order every single one of our troops home tomorrow.

So no I do not make this decision lightly. I make this decision because I am convinced that our security is at stake in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This is the epicenter of the violent extremism practiced by al Qaeda. It is from here that we were attacked on 9/11, and it is from here that new attacks are being plotted as I speak.

It is extremely important for Obama to put increasing pressure upon the Afghan government, but again, what of the Pakistani government? Obama himself admits in the speech that Pakistan is receiving aid and resources from the United States but never quite puts any real pressure upon the Zardari government to take a proactive effort in the war on terror. What are the consequences of Pakistani inaction in the war on terror? Again, Obama himself admits that Pakistan is a vital piece of the puzzle in thwarting global terror, but he never places any real consequences on the Pakistani government for inaction.

But it will be clear to the Afghan government and, more importantly, to the Afghan people that they will ultimately be responsible for their own country.

Second, we will work with our partners, the UN, and the Afghan people to pursue a more effective civilian strategy, so that the government can take advantage of improved security.

The statement to the Afghan people was well-worded and crucial, however, that brief statement cannot take the place of Obama addressing the Afghan people separately in their own media. The people of Afghanistan, who are reluctantly turning to the Taliban for security after 8 years of mounting civilian deaths and stagnation, must be assured of the United States' commitment to their nation. With this address, Obama has officially begun the campaign to re-win the hearts and minds of the American people but what of the Afghan people?

The people of Afghanistan have endured violence for decades. They have been confronted with occupation by the Soviet Union, and then by foreign al Qaeda fighters who used Afghan land for their own purposes. So tonight, I want the Afghan people to understand America seeks an end to this era of war and suffering. We have no interest in occupying your country. We will support efforts by the Afghan government to open the door to those Taliban who abandon violence and respect the human rights of their fellow citizens. And we will seek a partnership with Afghanistan grounded in mutual respect to isolate those who destroy; to strengthen those who build; to hasten the day when our troops will leave; and to forge a lasting friendship in which America is your partner, and never your patron.

In the past, we too often defined our relationship with Pakistan narrowly. Those days are over. Moving forward, we are committed to a partnership with Pakistan that is built on a foundation of mutual interests, mutual respect, and mutual trust. We will strengthen Pakistan's capacity to target those groups that threaten our countries, and have made it clear that we cannot tolerate a safe-haven for terrorists whose location is known, and whose intentions are clear. America is also providing substantial resources to support Pakistan's democracy and development. We are the largest international supporter for those Pakistanis displaced by the fighting. And going forward, the Pakistani people must know: America will remain a strong supporter of Pakistan's security and prosperity long after the guns have fallen silent, so that the great potential of its people can be unleashed.

Disproving the Vietnam comparisons once and for all proves a clear blow to Obama's detractors and critics of the U.S. mission in Afghanistan, especially given the basic, yet highly important fact that separates Afghanistan from Vietnam.

And most importantly, unlike Vietnam, the American people were viciously attacked from Afghanistan, and remain a target for those same extremists who are plotting along its border. To abandon this area now and to rely only on efforts against al Qaeda from a distance would significantly hamper our ability to keep the pressure on al Qaeda, and create an unacceptable risk of additional attacks on our homeland and our allies.

In all Obama delivered a solid speech that laid out what he hoped to achieve in Afghanistan with a fairly clear plan (though some points could have used greater elaboration), a much needed step for winning back support among the people of the United States. As to how Obama's detractors and the critics of the U.S. Mission in Afghanistan were impacted by the speech we will have to wait and see, but this address is a solid step in the right direction nonetheless.

There was of course one crucial point that went glaringly uncovered in Obama's speech - airstrikes. Obama made no mention of the mounting civilian deaths in Afghanistan from the air strikes. Though he did mention Taliban attacks on Pakistani soil, Obama did not address the air strikes that have driven many distraught Afghans back into the arms of the Taliban out of despair and aggravation. Obama will have a hard time winning back the support of those Afghans, as well as the confidence of Afghans in general, until he can state how the 30,000 extra ground troops will reduce the civilian deaths from air strikes. In fact, Obama makes no mention of the civilian deaths throughout his entire speech.

Of course, this speech was meant to win the support of the American people so mentions of such egregious mistakes by the United States may not have helped regain American support for a U.S. presence in Afghanistan. However, air strikes are still an extremely important point - a point that many Americans may not be entirely clueless to.

In the end, though Obama's address lived up to his reputation for oratory and rhetoric, he must continue to work hard to regain the support of both the American and Afghan people. This was a good initial step, but it should not be the only statement on the issue of Afghanistan, especially to the people of Afghanistan.

The Idea of Control

2009-12-01T16:21:00.002-05:00

There is an apparent continuum in our readings this 'week'. From Singhal to Corman & Tretheway to Fisher to Dutta, in which you return to where you began: the idea of population control.
Singhal takes the agenda for granted, focusing on how research on education-entertainment and its effects should be more diverse. He talks about various resistances as an issue to be addressed, a stumbling block.
Corman & Tretheway begin to shake up that dynamic, discussing how communication is simply not one-way. They go into a more complex model that takes into account how meaning is co-created, rather than fosted upon the receiver.
However, it is Fisher in his discussion about the Cathedral and Bazaar that pushes into the gray areas, the real world - that beyond meaning, the framing is not sending a message. The frame is a discussion, a dialogue, wherein both sides are the senders and receivers. This de-privileges the original sender and put them on equal ground with those they wish to communicate to.
Ah, but that brings us to Dutta, whose point is that you do not communicate to, but with others. He applies this practically to the issue of population control. The Western media is acting paternalistic, trying to change other societies for the better - but convinced of their viewpoint, they have set the agenda and only engage publics in order to co-opt them into supporting their projects. They have not stopped to listen to local populations, to stop and consider their concerns and resistances as legitimate, rather than 'backward tradition' that impedes development (invariably a positive concept.) Dutta is look to apply Fisher's negotiation concept to a projects of a national nature, that have been pre-determined as necessary and the essence of civilization by the Western world.
Honestly, when I first read Singhal's piece, I was a little taken-aback by the clear motives of education but it took Dutta to make me realize how deeply this population policy is controversial. There are so many implicit assumptions - it seems so common-sense, but it's not and we have failed to realize this.
This whole controversy, that the West has failed to realize even is a controversy for the most part, is symptomatic of the West's still-prevailing sometimes-invisible superiority complex.
"But we just want to make life better for them!"
Admirable motives, I still think, but if we fail to listen as well as talk, we will fail to realize 'better' is so very complex.

Subaltern Education Entertainment

2009-11-30T13:54:00.000-05:00

One of our readings for this week was Mohan Jyoti Dutta’s “Theoretical Approaches to Entertainment Education Campaigns: a Subaltern Critique.” The reading used a subaltern studies perspective to analyze entertainment education campaigns, particularly in the realm of health care. Dutta begins by stating that E-E campaigns are the most used health care communication campaigns aimed at the Third World, and that E-E is a currently a hot topic in international communication scholarship, but lack a critical and interrogative approach.

Dutta argues that E-E campaigns are implemented under the guise of altruism, but really are created with the core countries’ values and ideologies in mind. Dutta extensively uses USAID as an example, citing the national security mission statement in several of USAID’s documents. I can see how this example supports Dutta’s claim that most E-E campaigns are implemented with the core countries’ best interests in mind. The USAID example surprised me since I guess I just always assumed that USAID was trying to do some good in other parts of the world. Then again, it’s not like the USAID documents that Dutta cited were hidden. USAID doesn’t seem like it is attempting to cover up any of its motives.

Dutta extensively discussed population control as a major area of a core country’s way of “fixing” a problem in a periphery area. While the examples Dutta discussed were, of course, extreme (like forcing black schoolgirls in South Africa to receive a contraceptive injection or performing a sterilization without the woman’s consent), I think Dutta made population control out to be more evil than I think it actually is. I think that everyone, whether in a core or periphery area, should have the right to use contraceptives and the availability of family planning education, as long as they give their consent.

When I first started reading about E-E campaigns, the idea made me a little nervous. Since the message (or “education”) is embedded with the entertainment, consumers are not really aware that they are consuming a strategic message complete with the ideologies and values of the sender’s culture. But then again, every message is like that. And while I completely agree that E-E campaigns should be looked at more critically, I also feel that we should not stop promoting health care education in periphery areas; we should find ways to do it more responsibly.

An Open-Source Approach to Afghanistan

2009-11-27T14:54:00.002-05:00

In "Music for the Jilted Generation: Open-Source Public Diplomacy," Ali Fisher speaks a great deal about new approaches to public diplomacy which are more inclusive of a collective group and take into account how much each culture can learn from one another.

As Fisher points out, the critics of the traditional idea of public diplomacy as a "cathedral" run by a very insular, hierarchical group of elites who formulate their own ideas of success, speak a great deal about interaction openness among different cultures. The critics of the Cathedral emphasize the importance of cultures listening to one another, what can be learned as a result of said listening, and the value of interaction with other groups in general.

To Fisher, public diplomacy goes far beyond the traditional notions of warfare and hearts and minds. In fact, Fisher's most important statement outright refutes all of those traditional notions. "Public diplomacy is not necessarily merely about persuading people to adopt your goals. It is about achieving your goals through helping others achieve theirs," says Fisher.

This statement reminded me a lot of what many, many Afghans have been saying about the U.S. Mission in Afghanistan. Whereas Secretary of State Clinton recently said that the United States' sole goal in Afghanistan is to disband and disempower Al Qaeda in the nation, former Afghan Presidential candidate, Dr. Ashraf Ghani went on CNN to state outright that, that goal cannot be achieved without creating a safe, stable Afghanistan.

“In the process that threat cannot be eliminated unless Afghanistan is made stable. And it cannot be made stable unless a process of state-building is made in earnest“

To Dr. Ghani, current Afghan Ambassador Jawad, and many others, the United States cannot reach its goal in Afghanistan without first giving the Afghans the safety, security, stability, jobs, education, and basic infrastructure they have been waiting 30 years for.

In fact, when I appeared on the AU Observer web show a couple of weeks ago, the other panelist (a PHD student in International Relations at AU) agreed with me that the primary goal of the Americans should be to ensure the Afghans a functioning nation that meets their basic needs:

If the United States were to act properly in Afghanistan in giving the Afghans the basic things they want, it would prove Fisher's statement that "it is action that has an impact on the international environment" true.

Fisher also talks about the importance of information in open-source diplomacy, " it is important to consider information alongside other pillars of power, but also to consider a shift in the development of public diplomacy initiatives," says Fisher of open-source diplomacy. Fisher later compares this idea to Linux challenging Microsoft and the Wikipedia challenging traditional encyclopedias like the Britannica.

Of course, this idea notion of an inclusive and collective public diplomacy only works where access to information is readily available. Though even the United States' foreign policy can be seen as a giant cathedral, the people of the United States (for the most part) enjoy great access to unlimited streams of information. But what of the people in Iran, China, and North Korea where there is both censorship and government spying of information flows? What of Afghanistan where there is true pluralism in terms of media (over a dozen public and private owned TV stations, hundreds of radio stations, and dozens of newspapers operating fairly autonomously with little government interference). but the literacy rate is only 28%?

Also, as many people have noted, including Senator John Kerry, the United States has not done an adequate job in communicating its mission to the both Afghans and Americans - despite the various media outlets in both nations.

Chuck Hagel on U.S. Foreign Policy

2009-11-17T18:35:00.002-05:00

When I worked at the Center for American Progress I used to do even highlight reels, and Senator Hagel's statements were the best I heard:

http://www.americanprogress.org/events/2008/05/senatorhagel.html

Creating Credibility

2009-11-17T14:45:00.002-05:00

"Plenty of information leads to scarcity of attention... Editors and cue-givers become more in demand, and this is a source of power for those who can tell us where to focus our attention." - Glassman

This is the paradoxical nature of personalizing news flow. People search on the Internet, flip through a plethora of TV channels, self-selecting where, when and how they receive news. Yet exactly because there are so many sources, there is an even greater need for trusted mediators to make sense of the chaos. (Which raises the interesting question of whether the journalism profession will change to fill this void as news and information becomes ever more easy to obtain.)

But how do people know what to trust? The wars of perception are based on opposing forces of credibility - if no one trusts a dissenting voice, it has little power. Therefore media politics, the idea of selling character rather than substance (or the fact these two are inextricably linked), creating and destroying credibility, becomes a key part of general political behavior.

Nye builds on this by pointing out that the forms of public diplomacy cannot produce soft power if the message behind it is not appealing. He also adds the fact cultural attractiveness must be matched by admirable, proveable political values as well as legitimate foreign policies.

But this really hints at a deeper issue. One of the objectives of public diplomacy is to convince others that all of our interests coincide. Or: "This soft power —getting others to want the outcomes that you want— co-opts people rather than coerces them."

The real problem is that these outcomes are varied and sometime can contradict. For instance, Al Jazeera promoted internal critical review of Middle Eastern regimes and cultural practices, a laudable Western value, but in turning this view on the West, it became a threat to the U.S.'s (in particular) foreign policy objectives. We want to encourage our values abroad, but we want to own the enaction of them.

Glassman acknowledges that governments are rigid in this way, but simply states that it is impossible to do so in today's day and age. To maintain such rigidity, runs the risk of being ignored and losing credibility as a relevant voice.

He instead envisages an engagement of foreign publics that would operate by conversation versus dictation, supporting consideration of our values and culture while facilitating interaction.

But then what about Al Jazeera? It has taken certain cultural values or forms from us and used them to their own ends. How engaged should/can we get involved with them without compromising our foreign policy objectives? Will we go as far as to allow foreign publics to shape our foreign policy?

Nye writes that the impact of soft power lies in co-opting people. But that is still a framework of using people, drawing them into your understanding. Glassman's pointing to a negotiated framework - where people are not so much co-opted as cooperating in construction of understanding.

But does this change the foundation of soft power?

Identity crisis and the shortcomings of “Ice Age” Diplomacy

2009-11-17T08:37:00.007-05:00

No, I’m not referring to global climate change here. I’m talking about the cartoon, Ice Age 3, which, according to Amb. Glassman who spoke at SIS on Nov. 5, can do a far better job in getting the foreigners to like America than many other traditional PD techniques (the cartoon is said to have got into the top five record-breakers in terms of worldwide market revenues). I cannot really see how Sid or Scrat are promoting the American image and values abroad… especially to the more conservative of the audiences. And still, it’s better than Britney Spears. That’s for sure.

Image courtesy of All Movie Photo.

In a recent article, R. Reilly, former director of VOA, says the shortcomings of the American PD can primarily be attributed to “lack of clarity about what the West stands for” and the over-reliance on advertising . The first major issue Reilly identifies is the loss of American credibility due to its embrace of pop culture and promotion of “tolerance based upon moral relativism.” He also takes an issue with the fact that the current main objective of the US – the promotion of democracy – requires “the primacy of reason over passion,” while advertising, which is extensively employed to achieve that end, does not appeal to reason or rational calculation, but rather to desire and “emotional impulse.” The result? Lack of clarity and inevitable confusion.

This all in light of the new media environment, the rise of non-state actors, and the boom (at least in the developed world) of the so-called iDiplomacy. Last year, Glassman talked of Public Diplomacy 2.0, network building, and its potential for engaging foreign publics in a conversation: an innovative and effective way of conducting PD and achieving national security interests. But that’s according to the Ambassador. Not only do I agree with Hayden on that it is questionable whether an “open source PD” can ultimately translate into improved public opinion abroad, but I also think that it can further undermine the American message

Both, Nye and Hanson point out that the lack of attention and of credibility are major issues currently impairing the American PD effort. By flooding the foreign publics with PD 2.0 attempts and iDiplomats, the US runs the risk of not only losing the attention of its target audience, but also making further damage to its cause through the haphazard “free market” noise that will only undercut the message AND its credibility. Nye cautions against leaving the PD endeavor completely to the free market, stating that is can project an image of the US that is “too facile.” I could only add that coupled with “open source PD” it might completely confuse the foreign audiences about what the US really stands for and what are its true objectives.

But well, the US itself is unsure as to what its message is. There are national security interests, and there is certainly a need to persuade foreign publics. But when there is no proper argumentation and overt “relativism,” the US is seen as attempting to make others “believe without knowledge” – essentially the definition of “moralist” propaganda (see J. Brown’s discussion on the subject); and well, when recognized as such, propaganda undermines credibility by default.

Reilly says that in order for PD to function, “there must be a recovery of purpose and this purpose must be related to justice.” I think the message would also benefit from abandoning relativism and what can be seen as “double standards.” Certainly, all these cannot be incorporated into the purpose without a proper understanding of the audience and their view of matters. While when it comes to defining a purpose, there should be a core power that can clearly formulate the message and deliver it through multiple channels. PD 2.0 and iDiplomacy MIGHT be able to do a good job in delivering the message and providing feedback about its perception. However, to have an effect the process should be well organized, otherwise the result is havoc. To quote Reilly again, “in order to fight a war of ideas, one has to have an idea.”

American PD seems to have entangled itself in the ambiguity and the unmanageable plurality that it, itself, has created. There has to be the realization that no matter the channels and the ways of projection, the American image is still largely perceived by many (particularly in the Middle East, where there are many counter-messages that DO work) as fuzzy and devoid of real substance, at best, while immoral and nihilistic, at worst. This is especially so when there is a multitude of contradictory sources conveying multiple vague underlying promises of freedom, peace, and gradual prosperity that, for some reason, keep failing to materialize.

Image courtesy of Rising Powers.

Whose responsibility it is, then, if not the government’s (that is, just by the way, entrusted with leading the nation and promoting its interests) to make sure that the process of message formulation and delivery is properly administered? Certainly, there has to be input from all the levels of the society, especially from those who manage to think outside the box; however, at the end of the day, the government is still the one that has to deliver on the promises and live up to the cultivated expectations. For all these reasons, without an effective government oversight, there is the risk of further ambiguity and loss of American credibility.

I couldn’t agree more with Nye on that “developing a long-term relationship is not always profitable in the short term.” Leaving PD entirely to the “market” – be it the private sector or the self-branded citizen diplomats – will not only “lead to underinvestment” in what is currently considered a primary concern for American national security, but can also hamper all future attempts to regain what was lost.

Public Diplomacy 3.0?

2009-11-16T22:56:00.002-05:00

Overall, I really enjoyed the Glassman speech. It was incredibly refreshing to have someone from government actually say, "Wait a sec... maybe we as government should take a step back. Maybe we should actually trust the people to do this public diplomacy stuff, and not just force it down their throats." (A tactic which, as Joseph Nye notes, often backfires).

It's interesting to see web 2.0 being touted as the future of public diplomacy, and the philosophy upon which America should build its public diplomacy efforts. Glassman makes a strong and cogent argument that the interactive nature of a public diplomacy 2.0 approach will ultimately edge out the top-down, rigidly controlled, hierarchical communications systems of Al Qaeda. He argues that by having the government work more as a facilitator for public diplomacy interactions, rather than setting its own agenda, people will respond more favorably because they themselves will be in the driver's seat. One can see at work the application of a communications philosophy largely mobilized by the private sector (while it's ostensibly the "users" who drive these web activities, it's the private interests, or start-ups hoping to eventually cash in on their ideas, that are putting it in action), onto government policy -- perhaps not the worst thing in the world.

That said, in the internet world, 2.0 is already passe. Even as Twitter and Facebook, the epitomic models of web 2.0, still struggle to find a reliable revenue model, internet movers and shakers are already at work on web 3.0, or the "semantic web". This internet model is about intelligent searching, personalization, how the vastness of the world wide web matters to you as a unique individual, rather than as one of the masses. For the government to be putting their eggs in the Public Diplomacy 2.0 basket would be to invest in something that will likely feel dated and irrelevant by the time it comes to full fruition.

This is not to say that Public Diplomacy 2.0, simply as drawing a link to a particular philosophy of the internet evolution, is not a worthy model. To say that government policy should simply mimic internet evolution would make the government just another enterprise trying to ride the coattails of innovative success. However, we should remember that the revolutionaries of closed societies rarely follow institutionalized patterns. That is, it is often on the fringes of the mainstream, in those places where people have no alternative but to think outside the box, that we find an opening cleft, a crack to exploit. Thus, if the government wants to stay in tune with these people, those that have the open mindedness to think beyond their own closed society and constructed images, they should probably focus on the cutting edge, rather than trying to play catch up to private industry.

Soft Power and the American Image

2009-11-16T20:48:00.001-05:00

One of this weeks readings was “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power” by Joseph S. Nye, Jr. from the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. Nye begins the reading by defining soft power as being attractive rather than coercive or bribing to influence others into getting your way. The article described the negative aspects of America’s cultural image as coming from unpopular war efforts and popular culture. Nye extensively used Hollywood films as examples, describing how Hollywood worked closely with the Office of War Information to produce and distribute films that were patriotic and presented America in a positive light.

I think that America’s negative image not only has to do with our government and our foreign policy (although when I went to Europe a few years ago, people kept asking me whether I voted for Bush, even though I was, at the time, way too young to vote), but also our more everyday “cultural” image. It’s hard to say whether or not there is such a definitive thing as American culture, but one of the stereotypes is the overweight gun-toting white guy you might see on www.peopleofwalmart.com/.

I did a google image search of “American stereotype” and most of what came up on the first page was guns, fat people, food, and bikinis. I think a lot of this has to do with international corporations like McDonalds and Walmart. A few years ago, I went with my parents on a trip across the United States. The tour was hosted by an international travel company, so there were a lot of visitors from abroad on the tour. One of the big “sites” we visited in addition to places like the Grand Canyon, the St. Louis Arch, and the Hollywood sign was a Walmart. The tour guide actually gave us free time inside the Walmart, and many of the tourists from abroad went crazy buying things and taking pictures. It’s really scary to think that Walmart is considering one of America’s important sites.

'Obama should speak to Al Jazeera'

2009-11-16T14:54:00.006-05:00

On the very same matter that made up the core of our readings this week. Very fresh: published today...

Richard Grenell, director of communications and public diplomacy for the US permanent representative to the UN in the Bush administration, in an AJE interview.

(Image courtesy of Al Jazeera English)

"Like it or not, the most popular network in the Arab World is Al Jazeera and we have a golden opportunity to speak directly to 200 million Arab households through Al Jazeera.

I don't think that this conversation should be just one interview by the Obama administration or by President Obama; I think it needs to be the beginning of a constant flow of information both ways so that the 200 million Arab households who watch Al Jazeera on a regular basis can hear a variety of US policy goals."

Read the interview HERE.

The Listening Post (AJE) on the media situation in Eastern Europe

2009-11-16T14:35:00.001-05:00

Yes, the Berlin Wall fell. Some of the countries that used to be on the other side are EU members now. And yet, freedom, and especially media freedom, is something much more difficult to achieve: certainly requires more time and CONSTANT re-invigoration (just as the cases of Italy and France show).
Another great piece from The Listening Post, and yet, far from being comprehensive...

Just last week two bloggers were given 2.5-year prison terms in Azerbaijan for criticizing the government. Read more on the case from Reporters Sans Frontières here.

Burn Down Their TVs, Turn Their TVs on to Teach 'em and Move!

2009-11-15T13:00:00.004-05:00

"Our audience actually expects us t o show them blood, because they realize that war kills .. .If we were not to show it, we would be accused by our viewers . . .of perhaps hiding the truth or trying to sanitize the war."

These words of an Al Jazeera spokesman describes the real difference between Al Jazeera and the Western media. The audiences of Al Jazeera (and to an extent Al Jazeera English), have actually seen war, violent political battles, and terrorism first hand. Though, like Americans, the Arab audience can tune out by watching Star Academy, they also must live under regimes that inhibit democracy and free speech - hence all of these nations cutting off ties with the Qatari government. Watching coverage of a war is very different when your own nation or a neighboring nation are involved and for this reason, media sanitation is ineffective and disingenuous. The spokesman is correct to state that to his audience, trying to hide the realities of war would be tantamount to lying. In reality, all Al Jazeera is doing is serving its audience. As the article stated, Al Jazeera's offices in Kabul was what set the network apart from all other international stations in the outset of the U.S. mission in Afghanistan (its not an invasion and its not an occupation). It was also Al Jazeera's offices in Gaza that set the network apart during the Israeli airstrikes of the Gaza strip earlier this year.

The reading gives a litany of examples of Arab leaders' anger towards Al Jazeera, but again, in regimes like Mubarak's that inhibit democracy (as Obama said, elections alone do not a democracy make) that is to be expected. In fact, the West should be happy that a network is willing to challenge the official government statements by such corrupt regimes. As for the references to Al Jazeera's airings of past interviews with Bin Laden after 9/11 and reading of statements by Al Qaeda on the air the question is not why would they, but, as a news station, why wouldn't they? Al Jazeera is a media outlet and Al Qaeda is an international organization that was at the epicenter of the news cycle at the time. Why not give their statements air time? If nothing else, to try and get a sense of how an organization like that thinks and operates? Also, the 'specter' of Al Qaeda is a very real thing in the Arab world - so why wouldn't they show these things on the air?

If anything, that is a shortcoming of the Western media - its need to de-sensitize and unwillingness to give real air time to unfavorable and threatening figures. They can give air time to the ridiculous vitriol of birthers, tea partiers, Lou Dobbs, and Glenn Beck but never to those that actually prove a serious threat or are guilty of truly heinous and criminal activities. If 60 Minutes were to do an interview with members of Al Qaeda there would be an uproar among American audiences about a 'liberal bias' or 'un-American' activity by CBS. In reality, however, simply not addressing the statements of bad people does not make them go away. It is more challenging to de-mystify them and to hear their twisted logic, not to justify them, but to try and understand (not sympathize) what leads people to such actions.

It seems as if in discourse about the International media there is the BBC, CNN, VOA and then there's Al Jazeera. It is never truly mentioned in the same breath of those other media outlets, it is always seen as the other, or somehow more of some kind of special force than those other media outlets. With that sort of diction, Al Jazeera automatically becomes the other, the different, mysterious figure, creating pre-conceived notions for people who have never actually seen the network.

For the rest of the world, where war, poverty, famine, terrorism, and corruption are an everyday part of life simply not showing something does not make it disappear nor does it make it any easier. In fact, it is nothing more than disingenuous.

Spinning a National World

2009-11-10T12:03:00.005-05:00

Siochru & Girard focus on how media is the cusp between industry and culture; Waisbord looks at how media normalizes nationalistic feelings, providing shared concepts and history uncompared to other forms of communal identity; Dewey points to a ritual perspective of media, which serves to renew nationalism continually.

Hafez furthers Siochru & Girard's examination at how 'internationalism' has not filtered down to content level. Instead regionalism abounds, with inordinate emphasis on a negative, violent world with spotlighted politics and elites. The most damaging part of this is the process of decontextualization: "there is communication about, but not with, the countries involved... They cement the interpretative sovereignty of the particular national media system. In the 'global' world, the cross-border flow of information, does indeed increase - but the mechanisms of local cognitive appropriation and domestication remain...The ethnocentric apparatus informing most people's conception of the world has survived even in the age of globalization."

This is outright dangerous - the whole point of news is essentially to inform. But now the task is to make the mass information intelligable. However, if media doesn't serve as a place for more open interpretation, cultural conflict will be merely reinforced and the link of public diplomacy, as Brown argues, is thwarted. Mutual understanding goes nowhere. Especially as Hafez goes on to pinpoint a failure to present structural problems in international relations. Overarching problems that involve media itself or require a more in-depth understanding of superstructures are not well represented or seemingly understood by specifically American media.

Brown, delves deeper into content, to give the precise phrasing by President Bush, pressed for comments right on 9/11, led to an entire discourse and framing of 'war' instead of 'crime.' The media scrambled and "it is not so much that governments actively influence the people. Rather, through their belligerent behaviour, they set the scene for the triggering of defensive instincts among members of the public, who come to see themselves as a defensive community. The informational raw material of the news may come from outside, it may contain correct (and incorrect) facts and reports from countries such as Iraq, but the 'story' of the war is a domestic production." The media stoked the flames of war instead of acting a mediating force between different understanding, due to the fact media is still a national enterprise and cultural maintenance mechanism.

As Brown wrote, "the way in which the mass media represent the conflict is part of the conflict." As long as the media is predominated by national interests, more broad interpretations will continue to be stifled.

And the rest of the world will continue to be spun by each nation's media.

The failure of the “diplomatic” argument

2009-11-10T07:57:00.035-05:00

“And I call upon the Iraqi people to reject violence, band together to insist that the country move toward a peaceful tomorrow. Iraq is changing for the better. I mean, look at the soccer team.”

– G. W. Bush, Interview with Al Zaman, May 20, 2004

Ethos. Pathos. Logos: the three Aristotelian pillars of successful argument still very much relevant today, but, for some reason, also very much neglected by several major states in their international affairs.

Modern-day conduct of foreign affairs heavily depends on communication, especially when it comes to public diplomacy and non-traditional warfare. After all, it’s about perception management and “manufacturing consent,” be it domestic, or within a foreign public: control over info. That’s the key.

A government cannot purge all unfavorable discourse from the public, excommunicate all “unorthodox” thinkers, or, for that matter, hunt down and burn all their writings: fortunately we have been out of the Middle Ages for a while, now. Yet, governments still get entangled in their attempts to literally control information, spin it to work in their interest, or improve their “international ranking” in terms of appeal. This is especially true when the government is also desperately trying to win a war of ideas, which essentially constitutes multiple communication battles.

To continue with the over-abused example of the American “War on Terror”… It indeed has a major ideological component. Yet, again, the US ended up in a situation where it had to learn the hard way. You cannot bomb ideas. You have to bend them, or you might even have to disprove them altogether. To do that, you need persuasion. Persuasion requires argument; cohesive argument. The US has been trying to persuade the Middle Eastern public for most of the last decade, and yet, its persuasion tactics have been far from even resembling a true Aristotelian argument (rather, they involved military invasions, consequent humanitarian crises, attempts to clamp down on the local media, and disaster cases such as the corruption in the “Oil for food” program or the Abu Ghraib controversy). So what is wrong, exactly?

Ethos: the ethical appeal, i.e. credibility. - The Western arrogance towards the region, and the invasion already established a “bad name” back in 2001. The outburst against Al Jazeera (and other “uncensored” media, which freely covered the TRUE nature of the war) and the support of corrupt local regimes provided further proof that the US was unable to practice what it preached. Not to mention the constant negative framing of the Muslims and their culture by Western media – at least as perceived by the Muslims themselves. There goes credibility, down the drain.

Pathos: the emotional appeal, i.e. sympathy and compassion. - I don’t think it is fair to expect many people in the Islamic world to feel enough compassion towards any of the coalition forces in light of the Afghanistan or Iraq invasions, and the events that followed. The local media – successfully providing counter-frames that worked – undermined all American effort to make a “sweeping victory” over the hearts and minds of the population.

Logos: the reasoning of the argument, including cohesiveness and supporting evidence. - In this case, the initial rhetoric was that of hostility, and although it changed later on, it was far from being cohesive. As in the case of ethos, the US and its coalition partners showed, time and again, that they were unable (or were simply unprepared) to follow the very principles they were supposedly promoting, giving rise to many alternative explanations, that (at least seemingly) made more sense, especially to the local public.

This all in light of an incompetent speaker as president and a new media environment, where there is an abundance of alternative sources of information, as well as multiple channels of access to it. The US had apparently forgotten to take good note of that, and assumed that just like in the good-ol’ Cold War times the people would unquestioningly internalize whatever they were told, as long as it was coming from America. The flowers and cheers for the “liberators” were not there for the American troops. Did the US fall victim to its own rhetoric and information campaign?

Whatever the root causes and the real reasons behind the “War on Terror,” it is certainly not perceived as a war of “liberation” by the ordinary Iraqis or Afghans, or by most of the people in the region. The US attempts to promote the “democratization” rhetoric have fallen short of actual evidence to support it, while political and economic dealings get increasingly more dirty in both, Iraq and Afghanistan (and the US is conspicuously involved in most of these cases). And certainly, the most prominent example of the US not keeping to its own values is its very attempt to overtly control the flow of information: bashing of “unorthodox” (in American view) media, embedding reporters in the military (thus successfully hampering their chances of some true reporting), and sometimes even preventing journalists from reporting altogether (references can be found in all of this week's readings).

Basically, the Americans have failed to deliver; and even where they have, the means to these achievements were largely disastrous. Given the situation as well as the context, the US might not have many options left. The most promising one, however, remains true understanding of and sensitivity to the local cultures (and figuring out what is that they really value at the time, unlike "soccer," for example), as well as a better demonstration of the true American values through more effective communication and palpable evidence. Yes, openness and true freedom of choice for the people of the region might mean that in the short run the “coalition” might not see friendly governments there (but that’s just the way a true democracy works, right?). And yet, the picture might be different in the longer run, if these governments are engaged and better integrated in an international cooperation system. In the end of the day, despite the importance of communication, it’s not only about words, but deeds as well.

Courtesy of Natural Born Citizen

How much spin can one take?

2009-11-09T00:21:00.000-05:00

The Hanson chapter and its discussion about the various US public diplomacy efforts got me thinking: how much "spin" can you actually put into convincing a person (or persons) to accept something they just don't agree with? I mean, at some point, regardless of how many ways you try to frame the war on terror or American ideology, however many different media outlets and formats you use, if someone is just fundamentally opposed to the core beliefs or ideology that drive these efforts, they're just not going to accept it, right? And what then?

I suppose the real targets of public diplomacy are not the extremists in the same way that political candidates aren't so much campaigning for their core party voters as the moderates and swing votes. But given what seemed to be some pretty extensive efforts on the US government's part to "get in front of the story" and frame the war on terror and its actions in a pro-American light, the failure of these public diplomacy efforts seems to be indicative of something deeper than simply not having reached out in the right way, or to the right people, or with the right message.

This is not to say that I think the US government has done all it can in the realm of public diplomacy. Indeed, Hanson's chapter suggests that a return to Cold War-era focused public diplomacy, both in terms of range of efforts as well as government spending on such programs, might be more effective. Thursday's conference on cultural diplomacy also highlighted weaknesses and shortcomings in our current public diplomacy strategies that could be improved upon (though it did appear that most participants were former USIA staffers and/or Cold War diplomats who might be nostalgic for the olden days...).

But maybe what we really need is a more structural approach to winning over hearts and minds. Perhaps we should be targeting our public diplomacy efforts less on getting people to like or love America, and more on getting them to tap into the ideas and beliefs already present in their culture that underscore social and institutional structures that are in line with American ideologies. For instance, more conservative cultures often criticize American media as being too violent, too racy, too commercialized. But what really drives these representations is our belief in freedom of expression. Thus a new conception of public diplomacy efforts would focus on mobilizing people's valorisation of personal and cultural expression. Our government already incorporates "democracy building" into our foreign policy, with the belief that democratic countries will by nature be sympathetic to American interests. Maybe it's time for us to expand those efforts into the realm of soft power and latent rather than salient influences. America as an icon comes with so much baggage as it is, we should focus on the promotion of values that support American interests, but detach them from the messy behemoth of America itself. Hanson notes that media framing needs to find culturally resonant messages in order to be effective. What better way to resonate with a culture than to draw from that culture itself?

At the heart of this is the (potentially Pollyana) belief that we are not so different in the end. While our cultures express our ideals in different ways, we're essentially all working towards the same goals, aren't we? Peace, love, and happiness? Sovereignty, a meaningful voice, independence? The basic resources for survival? Understanding the specific cultural context that frames these universal values might be the difficult part, but the rewards would be more lasting than just getting a "most popular" vote in the yearbook of nation-states.

Inter(national) Reporting

2009-11-08T19:40:00.002-05:00

In the article, “International Reporting-‘No Further than Columbus,’” author Kai Hefez defines international reporting as the journalistic coverage of realities outside the home state. Hefez makes the point very early on in the article that international reporting tends to reflect the interests and cultural values of the country doing the reporting instead of the country being reported on. International reporting also tends to “Otherize” the area and people being reported on.

The article takes its title from Meg Greenfield’s comment in the Washington Post about the American media’s lack of understanding of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in the late 1970’s. She wrote that American media are ‘no further than Columbus’ who presumed early Native Americans were Indians, in breaking through cultural stereotypes and assumptions.

I feel that Hefez’s example of the Olympics really illustrated how world event coverage really becomes a nationalized event. It is especially obvious with the Olympics, because it is a competition between nations. In terms of television broadcast news, I think a lot of it has to do with the limited amount of prime time in which to air the coverage. It is impossible to give every nation equal time on every single event. Most Americans are rooting for the United States to win, the US games are aired during the times most Americans watch television. At the same time, I think a lot about culture could be learned by watching Swedish curling and Syrian handball (as boring as they may be).

I’m going a little off topic here, but I think that a nation’s popular sports say a lot about the culture. For example, American football, a comparatively violent sport, is huge in the US because we like to watch violence and spectacle. Football is rather expensive- the padding and equipment cost money. Professional football players in the NFL make huge amounts of money. We give full scholarships for students to play football and other sports. On the other hand, football (soccer) is the most widely played and watched popular sport in Central and South America. Soccer requires only a ball and two goals. Poorer nations gravitate towards soccer because it costs less and it is less involved with money.

International Media and the Framing of Tehran and Kabul

2009-11-05T15:11:00.002-05:00

Robin Brown begins the 'Spinning the War' piece with a quote from Karl Von Clausewitz that perfectly embodies both the Brown and Hafez pieces on global media "War is nothing more than the continuation of politics".

As both readings prove, much of the way the people of the world see the 'War on Terror' is based on the media. According to Robin Brown, "as Politics and society change so does the nature of war," thus, since we live in a multimedia world with a 24 hour news cycle the portrayals and framing of the 'enemies' and 'enemy nations' have a lot to do with how the 'War on Terror' and issues framed around it are perceived.

For instance, in class I made the statement that though Twitter played a huge role in Iran's Green Revolution, to present it as a revolution made possible by American companies (let's not leave out the roles that Facebook, Youtube, Google Maps, and Flickr all played as well) makes it more of a novelty, a one time phenomenon. In reality though, the power of the Green Revolution was that it gathered together masses of people in Iran. This was an important development as many critics have cited Iranian apathy with Ahmadinejad's original rise to power. Iranians of all ages, sexes, and classes were marching in the streets. Whether it was mullahs marching in the streets, Ayatollahs dissing Ahmadinejad, declaring fatwas or calling the election illegitimate, the Green Revolution brought people from all spectrums of Iranian society to the streets both in favor of and against the government. It was more than the Event-Centered definition of news that Hafez points to.

There was little talk of the significance of a movement in Iran that engages all people, not just students (as in 1999) and that harkens back to the original revolution of '79 (calls of Allah hu Akbar). It also went against the traditional geographic tropes that the media uses to break down the world. As Hafez says, spatial representations like the 'The West' and 'The Islamic World' rarely define the central themes of very real places. Mousavi was not calling for the overthrow of Iran's theocracy, in fact, it must be asked if many people in the West truly knew Mousavi and his possible Administration would have stood for. The Green Revolution was not the traditional idea of conflict represented in the international media - Democracy vs. Islam. These people felt robbed of their vote for a man who by all Western standards was probably not too dissimilar to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in many ways, but more important the candidates, the people of Iran demanded that their voices be heard. This was not Al Gore vs. George Bush in Tehran, this was a vocal outcry for their votes. For the Iranians to prove that they do have a voice.

To further complicate these spatial definitions, when Ahmadinejad and Khameini both reverted to the red herrings of Zionism, Israel, and Imperialism, the people of took to the streets shouting “No to Gaza, No to Lebanon, I‘m giving my life to Iran.“

Brown goes on to talk about how the media shapes perceptions of supporters, neutral groups, and opponents influences whether someone will become involved in a war and how they will participate. This notion of shaping a conflict plays very well into the U.S. representation of Afghanistan. Much has been said about Afghanistan being a land of cultural turmoil, constant war, and oppression but very little is ever said about the time between the 60s and early 80s that many people refer to as Afghanistan's 'golden age.' The Western media only presents the post-Taliban Afghanistan of death and destruction but rarely reference the period in which there was development, stability, Afghan professionals, education, safety, and professional educated women. Yes, this may have only existed in the larger cities and the nation still faced many problems, but it is important for the people of the United States in particular to know that we are more than just bombs and burqas and yet that is never presented in the mainstream Western media. Why?

Does it make it easier for the U.S. to fight the war and imply that they must bring advancement, development, education, and success to Afghanistan? If anything, the United States is doing themselves a disservice because now many anti-war activists are using a 'cultural difference' as reasons why the United States should pull out of Afghanistan. In reality though, these things existed in Afghanistan before the U.S. and before the Soviets - a fact that both Afghans in Afghanistan and the American people must be reminded of.

The International Justice Mission

2009-11-03T12:14:00.008-05:00

We're part of this. Our class level, education, technology, even interest level - as signified by our participation in the International Communication program at American University in Washington, D.C. almost in essense garuantees that we are part of this interest group.
So what does that mean? How does this impact the future?
Castells etc., Bennett and Juris all examine the underlying framework of 'global justice movements', with some looking more particularly at actually how these movements have impacted society. They discuss the mobilization of various diverse groups into a 'hydra' model of global movements.
However, I suppose my question is, is how does this relate to McChensey's pessimistic view of the global media encouraging political apathy? Is this transformative mobile, online political networking a reaction to the saturation of commercial media with under or overpoliticized content (which leds to a sense of detachment) or is it simply the outgrowth of politically driven youth and interests mobilizing new technologies more aptly than said other media?
On one hand, this is a moot point, but on the other, it speaks to the goals of citizen education and whether media itself needs to be transformed (absorb these differences as part of a realization on alternative consumerism - that people do want more diverse news) or this form should supplant current forms.
Getting back to my main question, Juris is very optomistic about these networks being the 'labortories' for a new form of democracy. But Castells etc. make a very valid point about the limited reach of these networks, particularly in speaking about the impact of mobile phones. There are a diversity of goals, missions and populations, but they tend to share a similiar socio-economic status, with the values that tend to inform that class. Even experts are starting to make the observation that socio-economic status is more fractitous than racial differences. (This is of course influenced by cultural context to a lesser or greater degree.)
Castells et co. illustrates this divide in the divergence between the PP II and the Poor People movement - the corruption charges by the PPII are disputed by the Poor Peoples as patronage. (There's a very similar situation going on in Thailand - the urban areas are claiming the rural aren't educated enough to make correct political decisions, even though the rural are the majority.)
Are we sure enough that we are looking out for their best interests? How do we deal with this lack of representation, especially when 'they' have different even contrary concerns? How do we prioritize our own goals even as we are 'liberated' from ideological conformism? Is this another form of the 'white man's burden' - the educated liberal person's burden?
Is our 'international justice mission' righteous enough to deal with this pressure?

EMPIRE - The Long War: The US and Al Qaeda (Al Jazeera)

2009-11-03T09:53:00.003-05:00

Noömanagement Crisis, continued...

Marwin Bishara and notable "panelists" discuss the problem on Al Jazeera English.

The second part of the program touches upon "glocalization" of Al Qaeda's ideology, and the implications of this for the general "War on Terror."

Highly recommended...

Dictator’s Dilemma and the power of The Cell Phone

2009-11-03T09:40:00.004-05:00

The statement that “new ICTs empower the individual and non-state actors at the expense of the state (of course)” seems to have become quite a cliché by now. Yet, although not arguing against it, this week’s readings provided an alternative understanding of the situation as well: one where the state not only retains its power, but can also use the ICTs to enhance it.

Hanson summarizes the usual argument that the modern ICTs, especially the Internet, facilitate communication, information exchange, and coordination of activities, thus providing “the physical means of building coalitions across great distances, connecting local groups with international allies and enabling them to frame their claims in global terms.” This, of course, undermines the state and particularly its role as a core international actor. A counter-argument claims that despite being a powerful globalizing force, technology can “amplify political and/or social fragmentation by enabling more and more identities and interests […] to coalesce and thrive.” But then, this is not news.

What I found more interesting was the “Dictator’s Dilemma”: the desire to have the benefits of the Internet without the threat of political instability. How can a government give its people access to all the new technologies and information for purposes of health care, education, and commerce (for example) while blocking political information? This inevitably reminded me of Gorbachev’s “dilemma,” and his very honest attempts of reforming the USSR from within, essentially through glasnost and perestroika. The system was under extreme pressure: externally (the Reagan administration made sure of that), economically (it was turning into a starved state), militarily (Afghanistan has always been a big headache and a major waste of resources for any invader), and domestically (all of the above started making it increasingly unpopular among its own people, finally). It just needed another decisive factor to face its end. Apparently openness and (relative) freedom of information played this role, even if initially intended to serve the opposite purpose (at least, supposedly).

Again, how does one benefit from the advances of technology (Internet and other new ICTs) if the system is BASED on oppression, absence of freedom, and no real tolerance of reform? Hanson says that although the Internet generates political change (be it in the long or short-run; directly or indirectly), it does not necessarily result in democratic institutions. The people, as well as non/sub-state actors can have the illusion they have more freedom, and the expression of unorthodox ideas that are considered to be harmless can be tolerated for a while; however, states, particularly some states, learn very well how to “channel” this flow and thus ATTEMPT, at least, to manage the situation without obvious oppression (China’s flooding of the Internet with its own info in addition to the attempts of overt control, or Russia’s “Spinternet,” are good examples here). Very much like the "mainstream" media management attempts in the good old days…

Well, perhaps the cell phone, with its mobility, person-to-person platform, and real multi-modality can truly overcome all attempted limitation or “management” by the government? Castells sees its strength in being a tool that enables a personal network (i.e. trusted and having no room for potentially hostile external members), which can easily move one into action for change. Coupled with the fact that cell phone use is spreading with inconceivable speed around the world, it can indeed stand the chance of being the ultimate “empowering” tool in the coming decades (we already saw how such networks work in Iran, Moldova, Belarus… even Ukraine and Armenia, to an extent).

But such an argument ignores factors such as the need for state “permission,” if a provider is to operate in a country, cell phone viability (can the local population afford buying the phone and, later, paying for the services?), as well as its cultural applicability as a primary tool of politically unorthodox communication. In any case, it is still very much a developing issue, deserving close attention as it unfolds.

Culture Matters!

2009-11-02T23:32:00.001-05:00

Whenever people herald mobile technology and texting as the social revolution tool of the future, I feel like a grandma. Despite having had my own cell phone for several years, and even recently adding a texting plan to it, I've yet to become fully comfortable with texting as a meaningful medium of discourse. While my best friend regularly maxes out her texting inbox with everything from serious conversations with her boyfriend (10-20 texts back and forth) to quick, casual observations (1-2 texts), I'm still struggling to figure out when and how I'm supposed to respond to the most insignificant of messages. If a friend texts, "Such a gorgeous day today!", is it for me or for her? As in, is she messaging me to let me know that it's a beautiful day, or does she want me to participate in the experience with some kind of text back, perhaps a "Yes!" or ":)"? Whereas others seem to send and respond to texts without so much as batting an eyelid, I'm sitting there staring at my phone, typing a response, only to delete it and start over again three or four times, or maybe re-reading the message a few times to figure out just what the best, concise, yet not overly trivial response might be.

That said, I'm not entirely anti-texting. I, too, can see the utility of texts as a convenient and efficient way to convey simple, direct information. "Meet me at 6 pm." "I'm waiting outside." "Want to see a movie?" It's especially effective for someone like me who doesn't always have the energy to sustain the social niceties of an actual phone call. I've also found that it's good for proposing plans with less of the awkwardness associated with rejection. No need to assume a cheery bravado despite the fact that no one wants to go to dinner with you. No need to intone a feigned disappointment in shucks, just not being able to make the monster truck derby this Saturday.

Personal use (or non-use) of texting aside, what especially struck me about both the Castells and Bennett readings were their balanced tones. Both acknowledge that mobile and new media technologies have facilitated grassroots communication and extended democratic political participation in the form of protests and demonstrations to levels previously unseen. Yet rather than proclaim the death of significant personal relationships and traditional methods of communication, they note that these new technologies must still navigate the social structures and cultural contexts that have always defined personal communications and political participation. Use of these new technologies alone is not enough to guarantee success; rather, as with any other technology, the benefits of the technology must match up with the goals of the message in order to translate into an effective campaign.

The failures of mobile technology to captivate a population explored by Castells provides a nice counter to our previous reading, "Convergence Culture in the Creative Industries," wherein Deuze's admiration for viral marketing campaigns seemed a little too optimistic for my taste. Castells's anti-technological determinism stance is a welcome rational voice amidst the flurry of centralized interests (usually corporate companies) trying to jump on the "viral" bandwagon. Every large company (and increasingly government agencies) is creating a Facebook page, setting up a Twitter feed, enticing you to sign up for their text alerts, download their iPhone app, etc. Yet half the time, when you actually look at the service they are trying to provide, it's just the same information in different packaging. They are not actually harnessing the unique characteristics of these technologies so much as trying to recapture the "viral-ness" that they observe in other campaigns. Obviously to some extent these efforts are simply the new business standards for "keeping up with the times". But as mobile and new media technologies continue to transform our every day lives, it's improtant to remember that social structure and culture still matter.

Texting and Social Movements

2009-11-02T15:46:00.003-05:00

The Manuel Castells reading, “the Mobile Civil Society: Social Movements, Political Power, and Communications Networks” discusses how mobile communications can be used to facilitate social movements and political change. Castells cites several examples mobile communications used for social and political change around the world, including how the People Power II protest in the Philippines used texting and mobile communications to help over throw the corrupt Erap Estrada. While texting played huge part in organizing and mobilizing the protest, Castells makes it very clear that there were other forces at work including the Catholic Church and several anti-Estrada blogs.

I really enjoyed reading this article. I think that texting is often over-looked by academia and older generations as an obsessive fad for teenagers and 20somethings. My parents (who have probably sent a combined total of maybe ten text messages in their entire lives) always ask me and my younger nephew and neice why we don’t just call each other instead of meticulously typing in text message. We keep trying to tell them how ideal texting is for brief messages when you don’t want to be overheard. Of course, we utilize these qualities for talking to our friends during work or class, but texting is a really great way to quickly communicate a short message to a large group of people.

Some parents may not get it, but the media definitely have picked up on it. Texting is made out to be a secretive way to get information. I’ve also noticed that texting and mobile communications are used a lot in action movies for characters to quietly convey clues, tips, and messages to each other, though usually this functions more as a product placement than as a crucial plot point.

Texting has also been added to MTV’s Room Raiders 2.0, the “high-tech” improvement of the original Room Raiders where a young single goes through the rooms of three potential dates without actually seeing them. A texting phone and a lap top were added to the Room Raiders’ “spy kit.”
I’ve also seen commercials on TV for the newest version of the board game Clue: Secrets and Spies where players can get additional clues delivered via text message to their phone.

Image from mtv.com and Amazon.com

Estrada, Karzai, Ahmadinejad and the Mobile Phone

2009-11-01T14:11:00.002-05:00

In his piece about the new 'mobile public sphere,' Castellls uses Filipino President, Joseph Estrada, and the People Power II mobile protests as a case study for the phenomenon mobile technology aided political movements. In fact, Castells points to it as the first time a sitting President was ousted by a movement largely organized around mobile technology.

Castells also points to weak state, with highly corruptable governments as nations where mobile technology really takes hold among the population looking to find a communication method that is somehow removed from the government and their corruption. The Philippines under Estrada serves as one example, as does Iran during the Green Revolution, Afghanistan - where nearly 25% of the population is mobile enabled.

In all three nations, mobile technology was used to varying degrees in major political events.

In the case of the the Philippines, the 'People Power II' movement was successful because as Castells points out, Estrada was a movie star who felt sure of his star status and had no real political experience on a national level. In Iran however, since the time of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, the nation was run under the grasp of a single leader with a very defined character as the leader of the nation. Though, since the Revolution of '79 there have been semblances of 'democracy' in Iran - a Parliament, a judiciary, elections, etc. the great majority of the power is still in the hands of the Supreme Leader. Unlike in Estrada's case, even if the President of Iran is not seen as particularly effective given their platform (Khatami), the people still know that there is a Supreme Leader with the characteristics usually associated with a national leader (regardless of popularity). In spite of this, government media blackouts, and government mobile spying technology, the Green Revolution was effective in that it was able to give the people of the world a glimpse into what was happening on the ground in Iran even as the government was cracking down and expelling foreign media outlets.

During the August 20th elections in Afghanistan, however, there was a much smaller mobile movement. Even though the Afghan election was just as contested (if not more) than the Iranian election of two months prior, unlike the Filipinos and Iranians, the people of Afghanistan today are largely illiterate and impoverished. The people of Afghanistan may have considered Karzai to be ineffective, illegitimate, and corrupt, but the Taliban threats coupled with lack of education kept the people from engaging in the election and its aftermath the way their Iranian brothers did. What little mobile reporting did come from the Afghan election either came from foreign media outlets and NGOs in Afghanistan or Afghan media moguls like Saad Mohseni.

Therefore, though all three nations were in the midst of unpopular regimes, the purported public opinions of the rulers, literacy, and security all worked to complicate the notion of the 'mobile public sphere' and its power.

JS keeping it simple (as always) :)

2009-10-28T00:28:00.002-04:00

The Daily Show With Jon Stewart

Mon - Thurs 11p / 10c

From Here to Neutrality

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Hand in Glove Political Economy

2009-10-27T16:32:00.002-04:00

I find this blog difficult to write. To be perfectly honest, I don not consider myslef a very politically or economically savvy person. I'm much more of a culture, history, society, psychology person.

But this reading was very enlightening. It's one thing to say that certain companies or organizations can manipulate governments into supporting their intersts, that the large financial gifts they can give influence politicians to be generous or sympathetic to their interests. It's quite another to have economic factions scrutinized and then put into perspective with political parties' agendas. For instance, "Democrats listen to consumer groups that equate traditional copyright with anti-consumer tendencies, but no Democrat can win the presidency without carrying New York and California, the two largest content-creating states. And there are large numbers of congressional Democrats from states
and districts with high tech aspirations that support strong IPR."(p.124-125) It reminds me that once again, geography does matter and that industry interests are mirrored in their regions, that interests do compete and conflict.

We talk about the tyranny of the rich, but we have failed to recognize the flexibility of America's nouveau rich scene - that as interests and technologies have changed over time, so have those who triumph the new come into conflict with the old. The hegemony, at its roots, is fragmented.

There's also been cynicism that our political parties are becoming too alike economically. Yet, this reading clearly shows the rivalries and party wooing that occurs in our political landscape. It reads almost like waves or cyclic contraction and expansion. I was reminded once again, that policy is in the hands of the government, which in itself, is a mass of goals and objectives that here align with some market interests, and there depart from that group.

An inflection point - Personal Network Platforms - concepts I find so hard to coalesce in my mind...

Democratization of the Internet

2009-10-26T22:36:00.003-04:00

Sounds ironic, doesn’t it? Apparently, the medium which was thought to be one of the greatest (if not the greatest) agents of democratization has started going through a process of real democratization only recently. What was it before, then? To me, it seems to have been leaning towards more of an authoritarian structure, although very decentralized, and as the system could not handle this decentralization anymore, it had to reform itself (authority of the government is in its power, after all). Hence, the ICANN “liberalization.” ICANN is only about “name control,” of course, but then naming an object ultimately gives one authority over it (was it the Bible that said this?).

Yes, Cowhey and Aronson put forward several arguments – quite reasonable – suggesting that the US is there to stay, at least for another decade or two, as the “pivotal” power in the net-o-sphere. Seems like it might not last that long, though. Just last month ICANN completed the Joint Project Agreement with the US, ending its “final say” over the “international” private organization that oversees the Internet’s naming system. And whatever debate on net-neutrality was taking place within the US, seems to had taken a slightly different form at the international level… although, structurally, it ran roughly along the same lines: freedom.

Despite being somewhat ignorant of the tech aspect of it all, I still find it difficult to comprehend the arguments against neutrality. Seems like no matter what the content, as long as there is an element of regulatory involvement, a motion is considered to be necessarily bad by some; even when regulation is meant to ensure freedom (supposedly, at least). This is worrisome. After all, we consider the Internet as the ultimate tool of empowerment of the post-modern individual. Yet, it seems that it’s running the risk of falling to corporate interests. Again.

So, what does this have to do with ICANN?

We have been talking about globalization and the power of the networks for two months now. If we are to have a truly democratic global system of “Internet governance,” the major powers would have to give in, eventually, no matter how hard they find doing that. But then, it would allow genuine plurality, as well as true glocalization of the Internet: be it through domain names in one’s own alphabet, or local (i.e. non-state) TLDs [top level domains], such as .nyc for New York, for example. More freedom; more neutrality; more democracy.

Yes, the Internet gives power to the global network of both, state and non-state actors (as the latest ICANN ruling suggests). It is obvious by now that we cannot have a truly democratic global governance system in the real world (not yet, at least). Virtually, however, there seems to be more hope, and the first steps are just being made… perhaps?

The Need for Transparency

2009-10-26T14:32:00.001-04:00

As Cowhey and Aronson explored the various forces at work that shape ICT infrastructure and its distribution in society, the overarching theme I took from the reading was the absolute need for transparency in these processes. Cowhey and Aronson make a clear case against technological determinism (and by extension, then, an "automatic" process of governance), showing instead that the political economy surrounding ICT infrastructure chooses winners and losers and has a significant impact on the market. That politicians and government parties with specific ideologies and "brands" to uphold, and that ICT companies and technology firms have a vested interest in what policies get passed, underscores the fact that the most powerful decision makers in these matters have priorities that might not actually correlate with the interests of the public good.

And yet, while conscious of the constructed market created by policies and government decisions, the public, through the market, can still assert a voice in these processes. The difficulty, of course, is that a public response must reach a critical mass before it can have any impact. Thus, regular Joes (or Jackies) like you and me can feel disenfranchised from policy-making if we don't agree with the mainstream opinion, even though the process maintains a place for individual agency.

It is here, then, that the hows and whys of legislation, policy, and governance must be transparent. While I'm no technophile up to date with the latest technology debates, having these processes open to public scrutinization is where the public can make sure that their interests are represented in the winners that get chosen. Overall as a society, we need to recognize that the technology that makes it to the market does not always represent everything that is actually available. In the same way that media literacy is necessary to help people deconstruct the hegemonizing forces of the media, we need technical literacy to understand the processes that construct our choices as consumers.

What Could be the Downfall American ICT Leadership? Net Neutrality

2009-10-25T23:36:00.004-04:00

The readings this week took on criticism of those who say that the dominance of the US in ICT is on its way out because of China's new prominence, less spending on ICT, lack of real broadband access or some combination of all three.

However, what the critics did not see as a limit to the American dominance in ICT is the net neutrality debate. In this video featuring some of the greatest Internet innovators and thinkers (including a cameo by Lawrence Lessig), they all refer to the ultimate victim in a system where the Internet is no longer 'neutral' - American ingenuity and creativity.

The evangelist from Google Vint Cerf, addresses this exactly when he speaks about how the inhibition of Internet access will allow for other nations with more open systems to innovate beyond America.

This video uses the insights of some of the most innovative and intelligent people in digital technology to show that one area in which the open markets have really allowed for small companies to flourish into market and cultural behemoths is digital technology. As the video states, eBay, Google, Yahoo! all started in a basement somewhere and are now international brands that have come to change global vernacular - you don't search, you 'Google.'

To put a barrier on the access that let the minds behind these corporations revolutionize several industries would only set the United States very far back in terms of ICTs:

ICT Infrastructures

2009-10-24T14:26:00.000-04:00

Our readings for this week were sections from Transforming Global Information and Communication Markets: the Political Economy of Innovation by Peter F. Cowhey and Jonathan D. Aronson with Donald Abelson. In the introduction, the authors describe their perspective as an optimistic and “upbeat” one, contrasting to the “gloomy” world view about international communication and global governance that seems to have pervaded the world in 2009. The authors feel that the expectations for governance are too high. They argue that “pretty good” governance should be lauded instead of criticized.

The authors argue that there is now a new inflection point for ICT infrastructure. ICT infrastructure is becoming more modular. The authors give the example of lego bricks. ICT infrastructures build upon each other and advance when they are formed so that they “stick” into one another. I feel like this is one of the main points that I am taking away from all of the readings and discussions that we have had in this class so far. The first few readings we had this semester from Thussu and Mattalart described the historical context of developments in international communication technologies. Both authors described each new development as building upon the last one. Each development was described as a continuation of every previous development instead of a timeline of developments independent of each other. I took away the same sort of concept from when we talked about different theoretical perspectives in international communication. Each new theory or perspective built upon the former’s weaknesses or limitations. For example, modernization theory which argues that communication will lift the third world was criticized for keeping developing nations dependent on the West, and thus developed new perspectives on how trade systems benefit the West.

The chapter really talks about the shift towards media convergence similarly to how Hanson described in her chapter “the Globalization of Communication.” The three major branches of communication that Hanson outlines in the beginning of the chapter, telecommunication, audiovisual products, and computer-mediated communication are becoming increasingly convoluted with new products like Blackberries and Apple’s iPhone which allow for phone calls, e-mails, and videos, straddling all three branches of communication.

Cowhey, et. al. describe public policy as the “critical driver” of ICT infrastructures. Historically, governments and policy have been the most important entities in shaping ICT infrastructure. But now, the authors argue, ICT control is more in the private sector (we also read about this trend in Elizabeth Hanson’s chapters).

The Core - a non-market?

2009-10-20T15:18:00.005-04:00

I actually started to notice this trend in some of our earlier readings. For instance, that Amazon.com didn't make a profit until 2004, that Twitter has yet to come up with a way to make money - that some of the most defining online social communities are really not very commercially motivated. Or, if not motivated, at least without a clear commercial plan.

Benkler actually says that this "individual and cooperative nonmarket production of information and culture, however, threatens the incumbents of the industrial information economy."

Wow. How - anti-capitalist.

I'm also in a Global Knowledge Economy that deals intensely with what drives innovation. Financial incentive is considered one of the most important aspects. However, there is an acknowledgement that other things may drive scientists: prestige, reputation, internal drive, etc. But these are considered more minor.

This is in contrast to the historical understanding of art. In the book "Creative Industries" edited by Hartley, there's a discussion about how St. Petersburg was resisting a conception of art as a good, specifically for consumption. They viewed 'pop art' as a contradiction in terms. Art was supposed to be intrinsically motivated, untainted by the desire to 'please' the masses (basically commercialism), supported by a patron so as to allow an artist to be unfettered by financial concerns. ('Should' being the operative word.)

If this nonmarket emerges as "the core" rather than periphery, will this be a return to that idea? That cultural production will 'once again' be returned to nonmarket pursuits? Or will it just degenerate into a popularity contest? Not to mention, cultural industries would at least partially become free time pursuits, rather than full-time. A good chunk of today's internet creative cultural content by individuals or even small collaborations is done without funding in people's free-time. Therefore it becoming the core may actually be a negative effect as cultural content becomes more dominated by nonmarket interests, the market may be too threatened to continue funding cultural content.

I find this such a provoking idea.

So you say you want a revolution

2009-10-20T11:02:00.001-04:00

Are you ready for a revolution? Benkler seems to be. In this week's readings, he seems to pose nothing less than a revolution of our media institutions from market-driven transactions to non-market activities. For my part, I remain skeptical.

Benkler states that with the networked information environment, the barriers to media production have been lowered such that we can all participate in the production process. However, Benkler doesn't seem to address the issue of how to get over the digital divide. He proclaims the grand potential of the "networked information environment", but overlooks the fact that many people in the developing world still don't have access to basic telephone service or a consistent food supply, let alone computers with networking capabilities.

He also envisions the potential for non-market actors to drive activity. But of the sites that you regularly visit, how many are truly independent, and how many are the sites of traditional, market-based institutions in the hunt for profit? His view of peer popularity taking the gatekeeper function of traditional media also doesn't seem plausible to me. To an extent we've seen this, with the "viral video phenomenon" such that even long-standing corporate institutions are trying to get into the viral marketing game. But where do we go to watch viral videos? Youtube, which is owned by Google, which is a out to make a profit.

Benkler's emphasis on the information that gets passed through networks, however, is something I can get on board with. Even though we're well into the Internet revolution, and using the internet has become a natural part of most of our lives (at least, a natural part of the lives of those of us in class), I still marvel at how Google can help you answer just about any question. When do classes start in January? I could try to navigate through American's website to find the academic calendar, or I could just google, "American university academic calendar 2009-2010". Bam, there's the info.

But while I'm more accustomed to thinking about the internet as a huge repository of information, I rarely think about the people behind that information. That is, I rarely think of the network behind that information. And Benkler's emphasis on the network struck a chord with me. It's true that the glory of the internet is not so much in the information available on it. Because if you think about it, that information exists or doesn't exist, whether it's on the internet or not. Rather, it's the people that bring that information to the internet, those nodes in the network that constantly supply and update and edit that information that makes the internet such a valuable resource. Without those constant connections to people, the internet is essentially just a big, un-dynamic encyclopedia.

I think Benkler captures a lot of the potential for transforming our society heralded by the Internet era. And I think what he proposes should be considered carefully and deliberately, as he notes the potential social implications for such a revolution. But he doesn't actually detail how such a revolution could be achieved, and until he does, I'll remain skeptical.

The Noömanagement Crisis

2009-10-20T08:31:00.015-04:00

That information is power or that the media are the space where that power is decided is not news. What is new, however, is the increasingly near-“perfect” information that can be transmitted and accessed by virtually anyone (at least in theory), unquestionably giving power to those with the ability and shrewdness to manage these flows to serve their interests, be it states, companies, civil society groups, or insurgent movements. What they have to do is just to overwhelm the “info market” with the right information, which will then transform into their desired result (propaganda, advertising, public relations, strategic communication, etc…). As Castells put it, “What does not exist in the media, does not exist in the public mind.” So they key is to put the “right” image in the public mind. But that image has to live up to its promises, even if partially.

As all of this week’s readings pointed out, the new media are changing the structures of information flows, robbing the formerly powerful players of their ability to shape public opinion, and making the latter more malleable and susceptible to “counter-power” influence. This is not necessarily bad, but can be used to serve many not-so-friendly goals, too, as the success of various insurgent movements has come to prove. Networks such as Al Qaeda or Hizballah have utilized new media and the communication space not only for achieving financial sustainability and waging their war of ideas (which are among the key components of Mary Kaldor’s “New War” model), but also for achieving legitimacy outside of their own local communities. They have successfully created a new set of goals and ethics – be it the fight against a hostile foreign nation state (US or Israel, in these cases), or the provision of local support networks vital for the day-to-day survival of the local population due to the total absence of functional societal or state institutions (Qandahar or Southern Lebanon) – and have proved to be consistent in matching their deeds with their promises.

(Although the cartoon makes a "somewhat" different argument, it's still one of my all-time favorites! Courtesy of Cox & Forkum)

   Despite the increasing prominence of non-state actors, the nation state has not lost its status completely – yet – as many states are still attempting to manage the information flows so as to contain the “counter-power” influence over state objectives. Prominent examples of such attempts, to name just a few: the American efforts to embed reporters within military units in Afghanistan or Iraq; Russia (or Georgia and NATO, for that matter) flooding the international media with biased reports on the war in South Ossetia in August 2008; the desperate attempts by the Islamic Republic of Iran to control the web-space in the post-election debacle this June. And when these attempts fail, all the state can do is finding a clearly identified scapegoat to blame: Al Jazeera, NATO, or "The Great Satan."

   As it has become increasingly obvious, addressing Noöpolitik with Realpolitik has not only NOT been successful, but has further discredited the attempts of the state to maintain legitimacy. To use the America example – after the alleged “win” in the Cold War, the US simply stopped its efforts in maintaining its international image, and even the eight years of “War of Ideas” have not brought it back to senses. Just as it is currently being discussed - openly - despite all the fluffy names, such as “public diplomacy” or “strategic communication,” effective coordination is nonexistent and the government has no clue as to what is REALLY being done, how to gauge the efforts and their success, or how to manage them more efficiently.

   The incumbent “powers” in the international sphere will need to adapt if they want to survive; otherwise, the increasing number and influence of the global “counter-powers” will deem them irrelevant in the Noosphere age. Arquilla and Ronfeld say that this would require rebalancing of relations among state, market, and civil-society actors. But then, why not match the rhetoric with deeds, for starters?

Noopolitik and Soft Power

2009-10-19T21:42:00.001-04:00

I thought that “the Promise of Noopolitik” by David Ronfeldt and John Arquilla gave a very interesting perspective on international communication. Noopolitik is an alternative to realpolitik or hard military power. Noopolitik is about how nation-states and non-state actors (Ronfeldt and Arquilla cite Al Qaeda as an example) are using soft or “ideational” power. This shift in the way we view power is indicative of the extent of which we live in an Information Age.

Furthermore, the authors argue that non-state actors like Al Qaeda are practicing noopolitik via the Internet and social media more effectively than states. This reminds of the discussion we had in class about “spinternet”- the ways in which governments are using the internet to “spin” their images. For example, we talked in class about how many governments are editing Wikipedia pages to appear more favorably.

Al Qaeda the Embodiment of Noopolitik?

2009-10-19T13:20:00.002-04:00

Arquilla and Ronfeldt talk about emerging state models and communication tools but while reading their ideas for noopolitik and the noosphere I was left with more doubts and questions than anything else.

Like most theories surrounding the ability of communication tools (in particular digital communication) to create societal change, much of the description of noopolitik and the noosphere were very nebulous and almost 'pie in the sky' visions of what states should act like.

However, states simply do not act like that.

In Iran during the summer Presidential election the establishment went to great lengths to disable both outside communication coming in and on the ground information from Iran reaching the globe. The establishment's success in fighting the information war was marginal at best, but the hard power of the Basij and other state forces did prove powerful. For the most part, people did still come out in droves despite violence, but the state was set on maintaining hard power and for all intents and purposes it still does.

When the state did vie for soft power through communication it was Khameini's Jummah prayer sermon full of red herrings and allegations, a method that has been duplicated by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad himself. Though the civil society of Iran may be vying for a noopolitik ideal for their nation, the establishment is still stuck in realpolitik. The establishment wants to maintain control.

In Afghanistan, satellite television stations have proliferated and 25% of the population is cell phone enabled but even with an illegitimate government, the establishment is set on maintaining and maximizing their power.

The reading does eventually refer to Al Qaeda and it seems like they may be one of the only groups that are successful at using noopolitik ideals for their aims. After all, Bin Laden was ousted from Saudi Arabia to the Sudan for being critical of the monarchy much in the same way as he has been critical of Saddam Hussein and other leaders of Muslim states. Al Qaeda has become very adept at using print, broadcast, and online media to disseminate its propaganda. And in the end, Al Qaeda is all about doctrine. So it seems that by definition they have been the most successful at using this method for advancement of their cause and challenging the power of states for what they believe to be a greater societal "good."

In the end, I found the theory to be very interesting and worthy of excitement but one has to wonder what nation-state would give up realpolitik ideals (even if all they possess is negative sovereignty) for a system that would require true collaboration with the people of the nation and the world for a greater good?

"Nothing new under the sun" and yet...

2009-10-13T00:23:00.005-04:00

Deuze deals with the "Convergence Culture in the Creative Industries" in his article. Having a whole book of articles on Creative Industries assigned for a different class, I was able to appreciate this text in a whole new light. However, it was something simple that stuck with me.

In his concluding discourse, he admits his reasoning "requires partly letting go of some well-established, deep-rooted and arguably valid assumptions about the impact that a mass media-centric culture has had on us." (p.464) These would be the assumptions that mass communications has been obsessing over for the last century, ever since the sudden society-wide propagation of certain philosophies. Nazism horrified us, communism scared us - and we began making attempts to counteract potent forces with the machinations of 'strategic communication.' Surely the one with the biggest, widest, deepest speaker wins.

Yet, we have all noted that this overlooks the role of the individual, the local. In the presence of mass and global, it is far too easy to overlook the small particles that make those two up. Has society always been defined by the top-down? For centuries, the answer has been yes - and thus culture has been defined as the artistic creations and endeavors of the court or nobility or elite. Deuze admits that intense collaboration and exchange is not new, but he only uses examples from high culture. Only belatedly have we recognized that the 'bottom' has had its own culture, its own rituals, beliefs and practices.

But in the case of mass occurences, the generalizations based on tradition - how did they come to pass? In the face of limited or nonexistant written communication, mass loses some of its coherence. Culture, values, practices were transmitted by relationships, word-of-mouth between insiders (parents, elders, friends, innovators) and outsiders (visitors, travelors to capitals or other regions). Thus, culture was both alive and living (growing) in a local, individual context. If change occured slowly, it was most likely simply because there was a lack of outside sources to even suggest the idea.

It was only the creation of mass literate societies that turned culture into a product of education, newspapers, and government policy. And somehow this shift of cultural definers, or more appropriately mediators, went to the institutions' heads. These mediators have never controlled culture, but only served as primary 'suggestors' of culture. The local and individual of course maintained their presence, simply using these outside sources as complements.

And now we are returning to this idea of local and individual influence, realizing that these factors have not been lost in the 'global' revolution. Deuze remarks on the 'end of the persuader-as-manipulator', (p.463), without acknowledging that the very concept of such was flawed even as it was imagined. People and localities have always been in a flexible constant flux of enforcing or resisting, or even both in different ways, power schemas. The idea of a personal information space is merely the externalization of inner workings of someone's mind. We take in media and always tend to remember some parts, discard others, read, skim or skip - the only thing that's changed is our sheer forced exposure. And yet there are people among us who don't own TVs, don't use social networks, take in media only very selectively. Yet these are always glossed over by the idea of the 'mass' or 'majority'. (The whole argument: what is the norm?) Now those muttering, partial resistors have a more visible, transparent voice that can broadcast natural responses on a global scale.

It seems now that global sources and contacts have joined individual and local contacts in the 'work' of building identity, community. If we are now networked individuals, surely we have always been, but now on a much more visible and global scale. The commercial media world is treated with far more skepticism and distrust (we are not fish, we swallow all parts of the bait), thus leading to this new avenue where commercial interests want to be our 'buddy.' Shall they succeed? Can producers and consumers merge into such a level that they truly are a community? 'A new humanity'? (Though sad in that it deals only with consumerism.) Perhaps we shall move into a new era where ideas of elite are qualified - and the center merges with the periphery. (But granted who the 'mass voices' belong to, it won't be anytime soon.)

The Japanese West and Western Japan

2009-10-12T20:48:00.001-04:00

I was very interested to read Koichi Iwabuchi’s article, “Taking Japanization Seriously: Cultural Globalization Reconsidered” having studied abroad in Japan. The article discusses the significance of the rise in Japanese cultural exports to globalization and cultural power. Iwabuchi identifies several areas in which Japanese cultural exports have permeated American culture including toys, television, comics, film, fashion, electronics, and industrial organization models.

I feel that Iwabuchi emphasized the Japanese products coming into American culture, but did not really address the influence American/Western culture has had on Japan. I think that cultural exchange still goes both ways despite the concept of American and western hegemony that Iwabuchi wrote about.

I studied abroad in Japan two summers ago as part of a research grant to study traditional Japanese theater. I visited Osaka and Nara, but I stayed mostly in Kyoto for over a month. I had never been to Japan before this trip and I learned a lot about Japanese culture. What really struck me about Japan was the mix of traditional Japanese and “modern” Western culture. One of the most striking examples of this was seeing people walking around on the streets wearing traditional kimono next to people wearing Western-style business suits. Busy modern skyscrapers were built next to ancient centuries-old shrines and temples.

Youth fashion in Japan was very interesting to observe from a cultural perspective. Remember when shirts, jewelry, and tattoos with Kanji characters that supposedly meant “love” or “peace” or “friendship” were really popular in America in the ‘90s? It is very fashionable in Japan to wear tee shirts with English phrases written in large letters. Only the English phrases don’t really make a lot of sense. For example, I purchased a tee shirt that reads in English, “I am now absorbed in dream wings.” The phrase doesn’t exactly make sense in English, but it’s the idea of displaying something Western that appeals to Japanese youth. It really makes me wonder how many Americans are walking around with tattoos, tee shirts, and jewelry with nonsensical characters...

Cold turkey for a Facebook addict

2009-10-12T11:39:00.000-04:00

A great piece with a [cheesy] personal touch on BBC to go with whatever I have been talking about in my latest post.

Enjoy.

Glocalization

2009-10-11T20:08:00.000-04:00

After reading Iwabuchi's piece on "Japanization" I'm starting to see how the forces at work in the mediasphere have evolved over time. We started with nascent national industries, media as bastions of national culture and identity. Then came globalization with Western-dominated media flows spreading out around the world. This raised concerns about cultural imperialism, positing media as potentially threatening to national culture and identity. In this context then, "glocalization", which Iwabuchi to some extent frames as Japan's answer to America's consumerist dominance, is a clear response to cultural imperialism, aiming to work with national cultures, rather than define them. The glory of glocalization, from a corporate standpoint, is that it still allows companies to pursue global dominance and capitalize on economies of scale in international markets, yet it also maintains consumer interest by not offending nationalist sensibilities.

I wrote earlier about the two-sided nature of glocalization. On the one hand, by softening the foreign origins of a product, it furthers transnational corporate interests, thereby supporting media conglomeration and power in the hands of the few. Media conglomeration becomes less transparent to the ordinary consumer, and its hidden nature, couched in local adaptations, takes on an insidious quality. On the other hand, the fact that media companies are recognizing and catering to consumption patterns unique to each audience, and the realization that globalization does not ipso facto lead to a single global culture seems like something to be lauded. Recognizing that audiences prefer homegrown entertainment that speaks more closely to their own experiences, and then accommodating those preferences within a larger scale media production process should be a win for the consumers.

As you can see, I'm still struggling with whether I think glocalization is a good thing, a moral thing, if you will. Does it empower the consumer, and allow for a more cosmopolitan reading of media texts? Or does it saliently reinforce nationalistic tendencies while covertly supporting a global oligopoly?

Facebook taking over...

2009-10-11T15:44:00.001-04:00

This Saturday I spent an hour online that cost me a fair share of my weekly stress allowance, observing (and, perhaps, participating in) an event in a way I would never think possible even two years ago. (By the way, this event will most probably change the fate of my nation for the decades to come, at least.)

I had just logged on Facebook when the news broke: “The signing of the Armenia-Turkey protocols delayed indefinitely for unknown reasons.” And that’s how it all started. A large part of my Armenian “friend” population suddenly came to life with status updates and shared links, discussions and comments… I tuned in, and within seconds I was reading tweet and news updates on Facebook from reporters in Armenia and “on the ground” (i.e., Zurich, where the event was taking place), going through articles hastily put together by the wires, having protracted discussions through comments on friends’ Facebook/Tweet statuses and shared links… simultaneously watching (rather, listening to) two TV news live streams online, while skyping with a friend on the same issue. By the end of the hour, when the foreign ministers of Armenia and Turkey finally signed the much-debated and controversial agreement, I had updated my Facebook status five times, shared some six-seven links, and made dozens of comments and tweets… When I actually stopped and looked back at it all, this week’s readings started making more sense than ever. Within an hour I had probably communicated with more than thirty people, consumed and shared multiple media, smoothly fitting in the Armenian wave that swept the information sphere that day... all that without even leaving my chair.

Engagement and convergence: the key words this week. The digital media have indeed transformed the relief of the information sphere, not only flattening the industry hierarchies and empowering the reader to get active in the interpretation and discussion of the issues, but also indirectly making them participate in the entire production process. The beauty of it, however, is that anyone (given they have the means, of course) can take part, basically controlling what gets “out there” and connecting with people from virtually anywhere around the world. The trend seems to have started with mIRC, forums and blogs, but the boom of the social networking sites and various widgets gave it a whole new dimension. Of course, we cannot really measure the actual amount of consumption around the world, let alone its impact, but taking Facebook as the most successful and well-known example one can get a fair picture. Here are some of the official statistics on Facebook use:

- More than 300 million active users
- Average user has 130 friends on the site
- More than 6 billion minutes are spent on Facebook each day (worldwide)
- More than 2 billion photos uploaded to the site each month
- More than 2 billion pieces of content (web links, news stories, blog posts, notes, photos, etc.) shared each week
- More than 70 translations available on the site
- About 70% of Facebook users are outside the United States
- More than 15,000 websites, devices and applications have implemented Facebook Connect since its general availability in December 2008
- There are more than 65 million active users currently accessing Facebook through their mobile devices (and these users are almost 50% more active on Facebook than non-mobile users).
- There are more than 180 mobile operators in 60 countries working to deploy and promote Facebook mobile products

Revealing, to say the least. And that’s just Facebook. Web pages have started making active use of the “share” tool, many providing some 90-100 different share options and widgets (Facebook, Twitter, Digg, Windows Live Favorites, Yahoo Bookmarks… to name a few). So if you’re “connected,” it is basically impossible not to get involved, especially when sharing a valuable/interesting piece of information with friends is just one click away. And with the increasingly mobile global population, where despite the distance people can stay connected – virtually – means that the explosion in consumer digital technologies is here to stay (for a while, at least).

So what is left in the industry for the traditional media content producers? Singer is right to suggest that their roles are transforming from reporters and filters to monitors and managers of information flows. This basically ties in well with Toffler’s “prosumers,” whose product mainly aims to engage consumers and thus, induce further content creation. Consequently, despite transforming professional functions and tremendous shifts in the trends, approaches, and means of production and advertising, profits are there to be made as the industry has proven to be fairly resilient in adapting. As for the consumers… they run the risk of becoming tools themselves, just by engaging, acquiring virtual lives and identities, and, ironically, becoming ever more alienated despite being increasingly connected.

Analysis Question #2: Is regulation outdated?

2009-10-09T22:28:00.001-04:00

Drawing on my previous blog post, ruminating on how we, as the Western dominant players in the mediasphere lose out by not having access to contraflows of information, I feel the issue of global governance should be raised to address the dearth of this kind of programming. That said, I don't actually think that global governance would help. For one, the death of the nation-state has yet to occur. As such, there can be no truly GLOBAL governance of media, no international regulation on what countries show how much of what content from where. This means that the power of regulation still resides with the government of the nation-state. And nation-states being what they are -- that is, perpetually working to ensure the continued dominance of the nation-state itself -- no nation state is going to willingly open its doors and say, yes, we need to make sure we have X amount of foreign programming coming into our households.

For non-media dominant states, concern over governance is motivated by concern for national industries. In this sense, too, global governance can't work, at least not regulation alone. Regulation does not ensure investment in media technologies and industry, which is what is needed for non-Western players to adequately compete on the global state. Further, international governance cannot dictate that national governments invest in local media production. Hopefully without sounding too much like a "pick yourself up from your own bootstraps" preacher, nation-states have to WANT to produce their own information flows and communication technologies in order to do so. Our readings have touched upon the success that India and South Korea have seen in these regards, with media industries, especially in the latter case, coming to prominence as a result of national investment in these sectors. Given the inequalities of production values at work on the global level, protectionism alone cannot make a minor player into a global competitor. The Davids of the media world need real incentives to take on Goliath.

On the one hand, I can sympathize with Siochru and Girard's assertion that because of media's intimate relationship with culture, we cannot leave it entirely to the whims of the free market. On the other hand, there is something to be said for the merits of competition and how the free market, aided by the right incentives, spurs creativity. The last thing we need is to have new barriers of access erected due to government regulation.

I think concerns about media ownership and rights of information and communication continue to be relevant. Yet governance and regulation seem, dare I say it, somewhat antiquated models with which to deal with these issues. The cynic in me questions if regulation would even achieve much difference from the current model, given what we know about relationships between business interests and politics. Perhaps, given the times and political climate that we live in, what we really need is a strong, powerful advocacy/lobbying group to apply pressure instead.

Analysis Question 2

2009-10-08T14:06:00.002-04:00

Question:

As journalism faces difficulty in a time of global economic crisis, should nation-states think seriously about revising the global governance of media systems? We know that some markets have exploded into many different channel offerings, even while media conglomeration continues to accelerate. Given what we know about the role of media in culture and conflict, is it time to revisit the older concerns about media ownership and rights of information and communication as discussed in the previous readings?

The answer to this question is quite complex because media conglomeration has had a few different effects on International Communication. On one hand, it is simply a startling fact that in Britain 90% of the newspapers in circulation are controlled by one of five firms as McChesney points out. At the same time though, Jeremy Tunstall points out that in 10 nations where the population exceeds 100 million, less than 10% of the audience's viewing time is spent on foreign. Cottle and Rai further that point by saying there are very few global media forces (CNN, BBC, Al Jazeera, and Fox News) whereas, more regional or local media companies are widely watched in much of the rest of the world. These ideas work well with the Jenkins says about new media, namely that it makes it much easier for the audience to pick and choose what they view, hear, and forward on. This is a similar notion to what Carey calls the Ritual view of communication which is much more about association and fellowship, much more akin to a sacred ceremony of shared beliefs than about the imparting of knowledge.

Essentially, new media and media trends in the mainstream Western models make it very easy for someone to watch nothing but Bill O'Reilly and Rush Limbaugh all day, because they identify with and "trust" those people who espouse similar ideological views. There is little room for challenge or information without bias. So even if the governments of the world were to try and regulate media conglomeration at this point, the proliferation of ritualized media has already taken hold both in the more traditional and new media sense.

At the same time, as these 9 corporations have grown so large through their engagement in horizontal and vertical integration it may be more difficult to regulate them. Especially since past attempts have shown the West largely controlling the talks surrounding these issues as well as contention between nations who disagree with the presence of 'civil society' at such talks.

So what can be done? For one thing, there needs to be a system for teaching young people about media consumption and how to analyze the quality of information or any hidden bias within it. The fact is that many Americans do not know where to look for news and information outside of CNN, MSNBC, FOX, et al. This means that whether the information imparted has an agenda or bias, it does come from a Western gaze which inherently sets it apart from coverage of the struggle between the people of Nigeria and the Royal Dutch Shell corporation presented by the Nigerian or African media.

Also, a demand for plurality wherein the media corporations are required to provide for as many technological outlets as possible. Giving people the ability to access the information on television, on the radio, on the Internet, on mobile devices, and in print also allows more opportunities for people to interact with the content and present varying points of view on the issues.
During his presidential campaign, Dr. Ashraf Ghani said that though a large number of Afghans are illiterate they are not uninformed because they listen to 3 or 4 radio stations a day and watch just as many television stations (if they have access to it) where they can express their opinions.

Also, plurality can mean engaging with more local media makers to tell the stories of their people. The 1/3 of nations who do not produce any films are perhaps the most in need of an outlet to tell their stories than anyone in the globe.

The hope for a better-informed global media consumer -- Analysis Question #2

2009-10-07T11:39:00.001-04:00

We have been discussing the global media, and particularly its socio-political implications for the past couple of weeks. And the only agreement we could come to – “we” as a class, as well as the authors of the readings – is that there is nothing much that can be done about the current system of global media ownership and flows. Yes, it’s always easy to criticize and point out the faults; and yet, none of us can do that constructively, suggesting viable improvements or ways out. But then, it’s not just us. It’s also the “people with power” who could do something about it, if they knew how to approach the matter.

But they don’t. Is it the system? Fair enough. Even if we go blaming the system, we could at least try thinking of some bottom-up means, which are usually said to work against the “oppressive regimes.” On a global scale, the nation-states would be the “local” players, acting from the “bottom.” But that power was taken away from them by the transnational conglomerates, and the nation states seemed to have given it up fairly easily. Or at least they had to, given the current global economic trends and integration.

So where did the power of the individual go?

The concept of liberty, when discussed by the philosophers of the Enlightenment, was not meant to be conferred upon the mass of the people universally, at least for so long as there was no universal education on the proper use of this liberty. Giving liberty without the appropriate limitations on it could lead back to chaos, oppression, and the eventual loss of the liberty itself.

People worldwide are increasingly gaining the “liberty” to access information and consume media from literally around the world (that is, given they have the means and make the necessary effort). And yet, the increasing availability is not matched with a similar rate of education on the use of that media and the need to approach it critically, in all respects. Mostly on purpose – and yet, sometimes not as much – people can be easily “socialized” into the consumerist and apathetic mindset, without any realization of the need for alternatives. And the ultimate questions, time and again, are “WHO makes these decisions?” or “WHOSE interest does this serve?”

Given the current global political and economic circumstances, nation states or even representatives of the so-called global civil society cannot overtly oppose transnational media giants, their interests, and programming/production that often takes away the individual’s right to true liberty. And yet, the former can make the effort of conscientiously and regularly investing in awareness campaigns and education on media and news consumption. Only thus can the vicious circle of media production and audience demand be broken, as well as an increased awareness of the true world around them be achieved. Then, if the demand for a more “informed’ and “un-distorted” media culture appears, one would hope that the global giants would step in to meet that demand.

Thus, although the current prospects are bleak, the global civil society, as well the nation states, can play a role, and do have the moral responsibility of doing so, being the representatives of their people. Yet, when it comes to profits, unfortunately many ethical considerations tend to be forgotten…

2009-10-06T16:40:00.005-04:00

The Iwabuchi reading talks about cultural export using Japanese cultural and technological exports as a case study. Iwabuchi refers to Hoskins and Mirus' statement that Japanese cultural exports have a large "cultural discount." Essentially that programming made for a certain culture has little appeal outside that culture because the intricacies displayed in that content unique to the culture of origin often has little relevance to the viewers outside. For this reason, Hoskins and Mirus point to cultural export being limited to those things that are 'culturally neutral' - exports whose origins have nothing to do with the uses said item or the satisfaction derived from it.

Again, Iwabuchi points to video games, comics and cartoons as proof of his statements about cultural discount, cultural odor and cultural neutrality. In the case of video games, many titles made in Japan feature characters with highly caucasian features in situations that are not entirely relevant to any given culture. There may be elements of orientalized Japanese culture thrown into Final Fantasy because media with foreign flares tend to be considered less boring, different, and exciting. Also, if the cultures displayed (enhanced, orientalized) are not too similar to that of the West then they are not seen as threatening.

The analysis that Iwabuchi presents of the Sony Walkman and the video game industry brings me to two thoughts.

First, everything the article says about the Walkman can now be applied to the iPod, an American designed (Korean manufactured) device that no other company in the world has been unable to replicate the success of. In fact, Sony had been trying very hard to re-invigorate and bring new life to the Sony Walkman brand since the late 90s but has yet been unable to come near the success of the iPod.

The iPod which can be described in much the same ways that the Walkman is said to represent Japaneseness:

•The iPod is miniature and keeps getting bigger (even the very first model was considered fairly small considering its capabilites)

•The iPod is considered so sophisticated that the original model sits on permanent exhibit at the NY MOMA

•One reason for the continued success of the iPod is that many people believe the product's high quality and ability to always be at least one step ahead of the competitors makes it very difficult to replicate with a cheap knock-off

So what does this mean when a distinctly American company is able to thrive thanks to a product line (much of the same can be said about the iMac, MacBooks, and OS X) that very closely follows the model set by a Japanese company for their landmark product? This is especially pertinent when one considers the hard times Sony has been having for quite some time now, even when in competition with Nintendo and Microsoft with the Play Station 3. Again, Sony was once the king of the video game crop but now its Japanese and American rivals have far surpassed Sony with sales of their next generation consoles using many methods that Sony was once known for.

Do these American products (and in the case of Nintendo, other Japanese products) have the cultural odor of Sony's Japan or have the methods utilized in developing consumer electronics become so culturally neutral that nothing is truly Japanese or American anymore?

What can one make of this video that brings up the issues of race and representation in video games, while bringing up the 'caucasianness' of Japanese video game characters?

Educated Self-government

2009-10-06T15:02:00.003-04:00

I found McChensey's article disturbing, most likely because it's pessimistic and yet scarily accurate.

He starts with stating on page 189 that "in my opinion, the general thrust of the global commercial media system is quite negative- assuming one wishes to preserve and promote institutions and values that are conducive to meaningful self-government."

He takes this further by stating that this is not just pointed at non-Western countries, but at every country, including America. In fact, he says that America is proof of this fact, citing voter apathy and cynicism. This may be a hard case to make in Washington D.C., where politics dominates the social and economic environment, but I've lived elsewhere. I've experienced life in both liberal New York and conservative Indiana. In New York, politics were stigmatized and treated with cynicism. Cynicism is actually quite easy, it frees you to be critical without making any commitment to actually change what you're criticizing. In Indiana, there was more hope, I suppose I could say, but also a lot of apathy. Government is seen as such a big issue, the responsibility is lobbed off on someone who 'knows what they're doing' or 'is interested in that stuff.' (I must confess, I am guilty of this.) At my college, in a rural environment, keeping up on the news was a low priority and one of the reasons for the accusation of a college 'bubble.'

Some could say this is simply a product of the sophistication of our government, but for me it does spell a declining trend in democratic involvement. Politics are controversial so they're sidelined in conversation. Dialogue, where no one is expected to change their mind or even contemplate changing their opinion, leaves both sides with only common ground instead of addressing deep, divisional interests. By stifling debate, we run the risk of ending up with two parties that are actually far too similar to provide new or different approaches.

Going back to the 'bubble', we've come to value education so much in it's own right, that we neglect or trivialize the fact it is supposed to equip us for civic life. My graduating high school class was given a citizenship test. The number who could pass it was disturbing. The Founding Fathers were rather non-democratic on this point - many believed only the educated could be trusted to vote, thus why mandatory public education was so important, for both men and women. (Even though women couldn't vote, they were considered the carriers of civic values for children.)

Unfortunately, we have come to an age where parents and other institutions really feel like the global commercial market is more influential than they are. After all, how many hours of TV and other media do (particularly American) children take in a day, a week? And uncritically at that? This is what McChensey and other macro-view writers often overlook. Global media is not alone in influencing people's values, beliefs and ideas - and yet what we are now facing is a weakening of the traditional influences in modern society. Areas that still have strong families, strong social institutions and stable lifestyles are changing in far more shallow ways. They accept products without buying into all the baggage. But how far can you go, especially as stability is threatened world-wide?

In Thailand during my study abroad, the Thai king 'introduced' the idea of sufficiency: that everyone would be satisfied with what they have and only acquire what they need. It was hailed as 'revolutionary', but it's really as old as the philosophy of Buddhism itself. What was apparently the 'revolutionary' part was the application of 'old' philosophy to economics, in opposition to unfettered capitalism. This is just sad, considering monotheistic religions, which dominate the world today, would all agree with this economic advice.

But who would advertise his policy? Even though benign, it's still antimarket. McChensey states that commercial media implicitly marginalizes or denounces antimarket activities, as well as political activity and civic values. But here, I agree more with Prof. Hayden's idea that there is no back room with men and cigars plotting to take over the world. I think it's just the media following the trend of the simple and easy. It's easier to produce a slapstick comedy than a deep drama, simpler to have one-dimensional characters than to use shades of grey. Political activity, civic values can then be sidelined as too difficult, too complex, too confusing.

But here we hit a counter-trend. Despite the cycle of culture and media - the media producing the stereotype of the frat brother, exaggerating reality or using outliers as the norm, where it is reflected in reality (chicken & egg) - some tastes do run deeper. And some branding can be connected with complexity. For instance, some bemoan the set of crime shows such as Law & Order, that have spawned so many shows and episodes. Yet these shows regularly pick apart difficult issues and present various sides - SVU (special victims) regularly deals with sexual issues that probe cutting-edge technology and research. Inevitably tied with law, they can serve a rather bizarre educational function - intentionally leaving shows open-ended and unsettling, rather than giving the convenient half-hour closure.

The global media culture is more complex - and reflects both the values/considerations of those at the top as well as the consumer. For one, it's moving beyond 'American commercialism,' which McChensey points out limits culture to a static product and often equates American culture with corporate consumerism. America is richer than consumerism and so is the rest of the world - so the really question is, can this depth be maintained, replicated and stored by global media? (Going back to Carey's idea of ritual communication) In some part, this depends on the producers. How diverse are they themselves? How will they adjust to globalism - continue localizing or cultivating a simple 'global' culture? Will they take the steps need to go beyond cultivating simple tastes and satisfy deeper needs? (Diasporic media springs to mind.) Will niche markets maintain diversity in content? Will pluralistic views be articulated on a large scale? On the other hand, we the people need to make sure we maintain an interest in what we're not being served. Here, the Internet with its citizen 'journalism' empowers organization and advertising of unaddressed causes and criticisms of mass commercialism. We can make a difference - strengthening our values institutions, being counterculture, forcing global media to respond to our interests instead of relying on them to present uncritically.

I suppose, in the end, I have hope.

Are we missing out?

2009-10-05T23:29:00.001-04:00

In our readings and discussions of cultural imperialism and global media so far, there has been a focus on the lack of indigenous media from non-Western countries, and how the lack of such cultural production means puts these populations at a disadvantage. Reading Cottle and Rai, and having it pointed out that one can watch CNN most anywhere in the world, but one would be hard pressed to find ZEE TV in the United States, it suddenly struck me, "Wait a second -- doesn't that put us at a disadvantage as well?"

I'm not trying to play the "woe are us the rich, media-dominant country" card in light of obvious inequalities in the global mediasphere. Rather, I think it's sad that our own media is dominated by, arguably, a single cultural perspective. Given what we discussed in class last week about needing a consortium of sources in order to arrive at our own opinions, if you think about it in absolute terms, we are at a disadvantage for only having Western media available to us compared to, say, India, which has access to both the Western dominant news programs as well as "contra flow" broadcasting.

There are development issues at hand when we talk about Southern countries lacking production resources to tell their own stories; these are obviously a crucial and urgent aspect of our current mediasphere. I would not try to impose an argument that one should extend the reach and availability of non-Western media for the benefit of the Western world at the expense of overlooking the significant impact such action would have for the global South. But I think it's a worthy perspective to consider in addition to issues of cultural and national empowerment, that the Western world also needs to be exposed to these views, and that we are missing out by not currently having these made available to us.

Our everyday lives are increasingly globalized, and success on the world stage is going to depend on a nation's leaders and changemakers ability to navigate a host of cultural milieus. To take the view that American/Western ideals will dominate, eliminating the need for cultural literacy, would be shortsighted and self-centered. It seems that stakeholders in the new world information order might not be limited just to the global South, but might include ourselves as well.

The recurrence of the “gramophone mind”

2009-10-05T23:13:00.001-04:00

I may be “biased”. I admit. But that gives me a better reason for writing this post. So please, bear with me for a while.

I’m sure most are well familiar with the concept of socialization: the process through which one acquires the norms within their culture through social institutions. Well, this process does not only include family and friends, but also the educational system, the media, the political system, etc… and it was only last week that we discussed the significance of the media in “shaping us.”

As much as it is true, it is also very worrisome. I’m sure the stereotype of the “assembly-line-produced Soviet person, who is not even an individual per se” is still well-stuck with many, just as the case of the “madrasah-idoctrinated zealots out there.” Well, these images may carry some degree of truth, especially when we consider the circumstances in which these “non-individuals” were “produced” by their respective systems.

Yet, as much as we would not like to think of it, a similar tendency seems to persist – though in a significantly different form – in most of the “developed world” today, and both, McChesney and Thussu attest to that. Isn’t a prevailing standardized message, centered primarily on entertainment and driven by sensationalism a threat to societies which hold their diversity and liberties dear? How different is then McChesney’s “populace that prefers personal consumption to social understanding and activity,” or a “depoliticized citizenry… [which is a] mass more likely to take orders than to act,” from the (hopefully) obsolete images mentioned above?

Orwell’s “never-published” preface to the Animal Farm makes this point precisely (So what if he was talking about WW2 Britain? The piece still makes a lot of sense, today). To quote him directly: “Unpopular ideas can be silenced and inconvenient facts kept dark without the need for any official ban.” It’s all about mainstream public opinion, and the unwillingness to go against it.

Not so? What if “national security” is at stake? Well, at Orwell’s time the wording was a little different: democracy was the principle of the day. “If one loves democracy […] one must crush its enemies by no matter what means […] [even if that] involves destroying all independence of thought.” Don’t we see that happening now? Especially after 9/11…

Yes, much has been written and said about the politics of fear. Or rather, we heard the part that was generally tolerated. Yet, there was a part that was not. For example, none of the American TV networks would air Adam Curtis’ “The Power of Nightmares”. Too controversial? Yes. And although a little over-stretched at times, it still makes a very strong point, which could have been regarded as just another prominent political-historical documentary had it provided an acceptable perspective. But apparently it was too unorthodox. (By the way, I really recommend watching it. Just for fun.)

The problem is kind of similar in the case of Al Jazeera or any other non-Western TV network (especially when it comes to news). They are extremists, terrorists, communists, nationalists, fundamentalists… you name it! Why? Well, they are simply talking in their own terms: something that becomes increasingly unacceptable by the mainstream. However, given that there are practically no true media contra-flows, the mainstream in the West becomes the mainstream everywhere else, too. Gradually.

Improvement and progress cannot happen without the realization and a true acceptance of a problem. While without the freedom and room for “unorthodox” ideas, the true realization may never come in the first place. Just as Orwell put it: “If liberty means anything at all, it means the right to tell people what they do not want to hear.”

Well, the American officials are increasingly trying to open up to the world and understand where the problems in their approaches lie (just today I attended a panel discussion on the subject). And yet, at a larger scale, they do not have much influence even over their own public opinion, precisely because they do not have any power over the profit-driven transnational media corporations. Free journalism, which supposedly had to perform the role of the “unorthodox thinker” and of the true “agenda-setter,” is now completely distorted by the commercial, 24-hour “breaking news” and “get-it-the-first” cycle, allowing no room for any substantial analysis, debate, or the “unorthodoxy” that would kick-start a change for the better. Cannot resist quoting Orwell here, again: “The enemy is the gramophone mind, whether or not one agrees with the record that is being played at the moment.”

Analysis Question #2

2009-10-05T17:44:00.000-04:00

Question: "As global journalism faces difficulty in a time of global economic crisis, should nation-states think seriously about revising the global governance of media systems? We know that some markets have exploded into many different channel offerings, even while media conglomeration continues to accelerate. Given what we know about the role of media in culture and conflict, is it time to revisit the older concerns about media ownership and rights of information and communication as discussed in the previous readings?"

Maybe?

I’m still not really sure how I feel about media ownership and rights of information, especially after watching the Disney Copyright Laws video in class last week. On the one hand, I can understand why individuals and companies want to keep what they created to themselves. A lot of time goes into media production, and it is not fair for someone to profit off of something they did not put the time into creating. On the other hand, is it fair for large media conglomerates to make millions of off filing lawsuits against unsuspecting individuals for using their ideas?

I’m still debating that issue over in my head. One issue, however, that I do feel very strong about is media literacy.

As communication technologies advance to allow citizen journalism in the forms of blogging, social networking, etc. traditional objective journalism is on the decline. People of the world should be permitted to say (write, blog, post, comment, upload, etc.) what they want, but we should be encouraged to do so in an original, educated, and respectful way.

Governments globally should advocate for media literacy and media production education. People need to learn at an early age how to determine reliable sources, identify where or from whom a message comes from, and evaluate the effectiveness of a message. People should also learn how to produce media responsibly so there won’t be as much out there to have to weed through.

Global governance of media systems is not something that can have just a one time fix. As Elizabeth C. Hanson discusses in her chapter “the Globalization of Communications” in the Information Revolution and World Politics, media is always converging and changing. The global governance of media systems must be constantly updated to allow for changes and advances in communication technologies.

Global Media and Disney's Planned Community

2009-10-05T15:19:00.003-04:00

Robert McChesney’s article, “The Media System Goes Global” discusses the rise of the global media system and the companies that made. McChesney also lists and discusses the holdings of the three biggest media companies at the time: Time Warner, Walt Disney Company, and News Corporation. Since the article was written, the four largest media conglomerates are Disney, AOL/Time Warner (which merged in 2000 and may split again soon), Viacom, and News Corporation. McChesney also examines how global media and hypercommercialism affects neoliberal democracy. McChesney concludes that the people of the world should participate as active citizens instead of just passive consumers to combat media conglomerate take-over.

I was particularly interested in one part of Disney’s holding that McChesney briefly mentions:

Disney has even launched its own planned community near its Disney World resort in Orlando, Florida, replete with Disney-run schools and social services (204).

I find this absolutely terrifying.

I was unaware this existed, so I did a little bit of research. The community is Celebration, Florida. According to Wikipedia, Celebration is an unincorporated master planned community in Osceola County Florida.

Downtown Celebration Photo from Wikipedia.

The community was spear-headed in the early 90’s and the first residential area was built in 1996. Celebration is very Disney- there is even a road that connects it to the Walt Disney World Resorts.

I couldn’t find much information on how the schools are run, but McChesney suggests in his article that Disney itself runs them. It seems completely outrageous for any corporation to run a school. The lack of a media literacy class is one thing, but when a corporation runs a school, children will be taught to buy Disney. Children will grow up with an alliance to Disney, because that’s where they live. Talk about brand loyalty.

Media and Museums

2009-10-01T11:24:00.002-04:00

Just wanted to share an interesting column by Jeff Yang about identity and interactive engagement issues at the newly opened Museum of Chinese in America in New York. He touches upon a lot of the things we've been talking about in class and in our blogs, and ties the debate about how museums engage participants to similar debates in media.

The Living Museum

If you don't have the time to read the whole article, here are some quotes that I found especially pertinent:

- "Nevertheless, there are those who find that resonance elusive. In an otherwise positive review, New York Times museum critic Edward Rothstein outlined his concerns that MoCA, like other community-based institutions, offered up a "celebration of hyphenated existence" that alienates outsiders by using the first-person plural, rather than the good old-fashioned third-person -- a literal "us" versus "them" argument."

- "Though masked in a concern about scholarship, Rothstein's argument is really part of a larger attack against what the establishment sees as a frightening rise of pluralism, a new democracy that challenges their sole-gatekeeper role in the depiction of past and present.

To have many voices in a discussion means that the dominant one is in danger of being drowned out; the obsession with the "objective" narrative voice in fields like museumology and journalism is less about quality and accuracy than it is about power."

- "Chew notes that this emphasis on collaboration -- every Wing Luke exhibition is created in open partnership with community advisory boards, who bring both resources and opinions to the table -- runs parallel to the transformative revolution taking place in journalism as well.

"You could call it the 'wikifying' of curation," he says. "It doesn't mean that we shouldn't be demanding and rigorous; we have to dig deep to get insights, we have to strive for accuracy. But museums as institutions are moving toward embracing the 'we' -- it's inevitable, in museum work as it is in media."

2009-09-30T16:11:00.005-04:00

The readings this week had to do with the power of transnational corporations within the larger context of global media and how mergers, integration, and buyouts are putting much of the world's media in the control of a handful of corporations.

This idea is nothing new to me as I have been learning about this trend since my days at De Anza Junior College in Cupertino, CA, but the facts are no less daunting than before.

The question each of the readings aims to address is what the power of these media conglomerates is and whether or the grasp that these corporations have over transnational corporations can be considered cultural imperialism?

There were a few facts in the readings that struck me most:

• The fact that whole of Africa has produced 600 films in the continent's history

• That 1/3 of the world's nations create no film products whatsoever

• That Nickelodeon has such a strong presence in Latin America and Europe, because animation is so easy to dub with minimal continuity breaks for the viewer as a result of that dubbing i.e.: subbing a Texan accent with a Bavarian one for German audiences

• A statement by a Disney executive that "for all children, the Disney characters are local characters and this is very important. They always speak a local language"

And that is the exact point I find most troubling. As someone who spent a great deal of my undergrad studying the role of representation in media I know that simply having a character speak a local language and possibly donning a more 'ethnic' name does not necessarily make it more relatable to those audiences. Because many of the premises and characterizations portrayed in those translated shows still come from a Western gaze.

If these 9 companies are going to control as much of the global media spectrum as they do, regulation may unfortunately be too difficult (thanks in large part to decisions by Western nations and Western backed/created/controlled international organizations), but perhaps creating clauses where these media makers are required to train the local people in media creation and storytelling may result in a more complete representation of the rest of the world that at least to some degree would veer from the Western gaze and characterizations of nations that have previously been the subject of, but rarely the creators of media.

Perhaps many of the films may not veer too far from Western ideals and representations or maybe what results could resemble Brazil's Cinema Novo or the Iranian film industry - which finds hidden metaphors in simple aspects of everyday life - but it would be interesting to see what could result.

On regulation and artistic choice

2009-09-29T10:39:00.000-04:00

I found this week’s readings on the nature of media regulation much more interesting than I originally expected, such that as I sit down to write this blog, about a million thoughts (mostly in the form of questions, rather than conclusions) are going through my head. I’ll try to parse it out into some coherent strands…

Discussions about access to media production resources and broadcasting for developing and undervoiced groups make a compelling argument for regulation. That is, we need regulation to ensure equitable access for anyone who desires to air their views. It is not so much diversity as an inherent good that needs to be propagated as it is making sure that no one single discourse dominates the media landscape to the exclusion of others, so long as other viewpoints exist.

That said, to what extent does regulation, whether by government or market forces, actually limit the diversity that is represented? Can we trust either the government or market forces (generally dictated by the majority) to know not only what we want to see, but what we should see? Should “what we should see” even be a consideration, or should a concerted effort to show a variety of things and leave the choice aspect to the viewer be enough?

Government governance, presumably working in the greater public interest, can ensure a certain amount of education/Culture (with a capital C!) components to media. It can also ensure that no single interest dominates. Governance by the wrong government, however, can have negative effects on freedom of expression, and can also be susceptible to lobbying interests. Historically, government governance of the media has not spoken to "what the people want," as evidenced by the triumph of commercialized television throughout most of the world.

Government governance also has the effect of dictating a moral code to programming. Moral codes vary by individual, but rather than risk offending anyone, regulation skews towards a more conservative approach. Siochru and Girard mention "prohibitive content regulation" as part of their broader treatment of societal regulation, and note that "normative boundaries are not fixed in the same place in all societies". I would also argue that in a country as large and diverse as the United States, normative boundaries are not fixed in the same place in even a single society. To the extent, then, that representations must adhere to a moral code that may or may not be one’s own, does regulation of things like language or nudity or violence constitute a form of censorship of the artist or producer? And how does that affect the “art” of media?

A personal anecdote: while studying abroad in Edinburgh, my American flatmate and I were in awe of what could and couldn't be shown or said on British television as opposed to American TV. Boobs, butt, curse words -- all were readily available on TV (though generally only after a certain time). In my opinion, liberalization from these content restrictions enhanced these programs because the use of certain language or nudity became an artistic CHOICE. When anybody can show some flesh, the viewer is better able to analyze how and to what effect it is or isn’t used in a way that can’t be asked if there is no choice involved.
When I step back and think of media less in terms of journalism (dominant discourses of FOX vs. MSNBC, New York Times vs. The Economist, etc), and more in terms of cultural entertainment, the freedom of expression advocate in me balks at the idea of regulation, whether by government or corporate interests, or even some kind of civil society board presumably acting on my behalf. Siochru and Girard talk about the "public sphere" as an open, transparent forum where people can be "convinced by reason" rather than by propaganda or through "suppression or distortion of information." They discuss the public sphere in relation to democratic ideals, but I think it relates to access to art as well. I balk at the idea of someone else telling me what is art and what isn't, or, to put it less polemically, what is entertainment and what isn't. I'm sure we've all had the experience of having a favorite show cancelled based on either not enough people appreciating it the way we did, or by suits in New York and LA who take issue with some part of it. I want to make my own decisions about entertainment, not to have someone else, not even another consumer, do it for me.

I’m not sure I entirely agree with Siochru and Girard’s assertion that media products require some amount of regulation because “in important respects they also ‘produce’ us”. While they are not strictly cultural imperialists, noting that media has the ability to empower the viewer towards participation and to effect change in society, this comment seems to draw upon the idea of the viewer as passive and without any media interpretation skills of one’s own.

I think it was Judy who pointed out the need for media literacy last week in class, and it is to that that I draw my conclusion from this week's discussion of regulation. Regardless of who controls the media and who produces it, we as a civil society need to understand its processes so as not to get absorbed in the propaganda or the glitz and the glamor. We need to understand in what ways regulation, by government or by market forces, constrain what we see. We need to understand that Fox News (to take the often-cited case) is propelled both by its conservative viewership as well as by Murdoch's own political views. From the small level of understanding the concept of product placement to the larger understanding of the complex conglomerates that currently dominate the media landscape, we need to have a better grasp of the forces behind the escapist entertainment that we consume.

2009-09-28T18:21:00.002-04:00

For the past two weeks, much of the reading has had to do with ownership of the media, government control of that media and how the globalization of Information Technology has played such a large role in creating advancements throughout 'the world.' In reality though, much of these advancements don't make it back to the nations that need it the most.

The Siochu and Girard reading begins with a lot of statements about the role that media plays in society as well as in the development of the people of that society.

In listening to, watching, and reading media we do not just consume, we interact. We interact with other people and through them with society in general

Thus, according to Siochu and Girard, the media plays a large role in the development of a nation or ideal (just ask Quentin Tarantino) meaning the media plays an extremely important role in the world. So given the importance of this role, should media be regulated?

The answer is not quite as simple as one may think. When we let Societal Regulation take too strong of a stance we end up with endless talk, debate, and coverage of a Super Bowl Halftime show and Clear Channel dictating that after 9/11 Somewhere Over the Rainbow could not be played yet Bombs Over Baghdad could. On the other hand, if we do not have proper Industry Regulation then we end up with the likes of NewsCorp, Bertelsmann, Viacom, and the aforementioned Clear Channel owning everything from magazines, TV stations, billboards, film studios, recording companies, newspapers, and service providers.

Perhaps the better idea would be to regulate for Plurality which is meant to encourage as much diversity in media interaction and content presented as possible, so that many different audiences can be reached through the media. Of course, that is not something we see in contemporary mainstream American media. Perhaps some people call the dichotomous choice between Rachel Maddow and Keith Olbermann versus Bill O'Reilly and Glenn Beck a plurality, but in actuality it is just promoting the continuation of the ubiquitous two-party system in America. So that we are not only divided into two political parties during elections but also two ideological parties in our daily lives. Of course this means that there is very little room for third party thoughts on mainstream American television - other than as a token thrown in from time to time (more often than not as a caricature or for shock value).

Of course, the other side of the coin are nations like Iran or Afghanistan. In Iran, all methods of communication were quickly shutoff in the immediate aftermath of the tenth presidential election and what they couldn't turn off - newspapers and magazines - the authorities quickly dealt with through violent means.

Afghanistan on the other hand, has a burgeoning Television media system with 5 different television stations - 3 broadcast from Afghanistan itself and two from the diaspora in California. Though Afghanistan claims to be at least somewhat democratic, a commentator on the nationally owned Television station was imprisoned for allegedly speaking negatively about President Hamid Karzai (has the Karzai Administration never seen the stations broadcast from California?)

Democracy in peril?

2009-09-27T22:57:00.010-04:00

As Aldous Huxley very rightly put in his Brave New World: “Words can be like X-rays. If you use them properly, they'll go through anything.” I find this a fair illustration of the significant role that language plays in the transfer of ideas and in shaping the society, the culture, and… the entire world we live in. So, should an unregulated flow of words and media products – ultimately, ideas – be allowed, given all their power and influence over people, who then (attempt to) decide how things function? This question becomes even more significant when put into the modern-world context: we see a “chicken or the egg”-type debate about media content and gradually shifting patterns of demand.

Siochrú and Girard point out that media products are special because they are essentially the tools of “society production.” In order not to get back to the discussion of the media shaping identities, suffice it to say that their statement is in itself a powerful argument for a cautious regulation of the media market, especially as it is increasingly privatized and taken over by commercial interests.

A free media market essentially implies equilibrium. This can work perfectly well… in theory. In reality, many times people forget to ask about how that market demand is created. A second question that needs to be urgently addressed is whether, given the above-mentioned special status of the media products, the mega-corporations should be given the unlimited freedom to create that demand. I see the matter as an ethical issue (especially when it comes to news reporting and journalism), unless, of course, the sole acceptable morality is that of profit-maximization and instant gratification.

The traditional “mainstream” approach in the US seems to have been very critical of the European (as well as other governments’) attempts to regulate or, at least, carefully monitor the media market. Well, perhaps justly so. After all, a true democracy cannot function without freedom of speech and a free flow of information. However, I still find it hard to understand how a system that took such great care to create a meticulous structure of checks and balances can be inclined to completely overlook a fundamental threat to its very existence. With the increasing trend of privatization and liberalization of the media markets, which gave way to the rise of the large transnational media empires, the very democracy that freedom is supposed to facilitate is being jeopardized, as the corporations start to acquire and exert political influence.

Yet, their influence – acquired through large profits channeled into active lobbying and “support” campaigns, in expectation of favorable policies and treatment – is not limited to the political sphere. It is no secret that media ownership affects content and that through carefully directed programming, media companies can potentially cultivate the demand for specific “products”, create and promote ideas and social movements, and even kick-start revolutions. The first example that jumps to the mind is the claim made by the Iranian regime about the June presidential election. However, why go there? Let’s look at the US and Obama’s healthcare plan debacle.

Of course, Al-Jazeera, being the channel that it is, is NOT unbiased, but still it provides a very good alternative insight into the recent 9/12 demonstrations and the role Fox News played in all that. Needless to mention, of course, that Fox is one of the central pillars of Murdoch’s empire, and that there is absolutely no coincidence in the fact that he had recently begun voicing his concerns about Obama’s approach to the economy, calling him “dangerous.”

Freedom of speech and information, whether in the national realm or in the global sphere, was meant to serve as a vehicle to ensure plurality and diversity of opinions, as well as best possible access to the best possible information. Being fundamental to democracy, these were also supposed to improve governance AND effectively check the government’s power. Thus, the media were meant to be the “domain of information” and supposedly assumed the responsibility to act as the fourth estate, in the public’s best interest. And yet, the recent trends of conglomeration, privatization, and deregulation have resulted in a situation of decreased competition and domination by aggressively profit-driven corporations that gradually become the very power that was meant to be contained. And so it happens that by “using the words properly” the transnational media corporations are spinning the idea of freedom to serve their own ends, defeating the very purpose of the much-cherished First Amendment.

Did you know?

2009-09-27T00:38:00.010-04:00

An interesting summary of many facts on the Info Revolution: co-produced by XPLANE and the Economist.
Enjoy!

Media Regulation and Global Governance

2009-09-26T12:44:00.000-04:00

I was excited to see global governance on the syllabus this week because it’s something I’ve always wondered about in the back of my mind- if cultures across the world are so different, how can we all agree to make laws about issues that affect all of us? Part of our reading assignment for this week was three chapters from Global Governance: a Beginner’s Guide by Seán Ó Siochrú and Bruce Girad with Amy Mahan.

The authors begin the first chapter by asking if media is another kind of “product” in a free market, why should it be regulated? The authors continue, arguing that media is different because it “produces” us. Culture must be learned, and we learn culture by reading the newspaper, watching television, and consuming media. Media are outlets through which culture can be streamed to us. Media is so important to our development that it must be regulated.

The authors also argue that even no regulation is a kind of regulation. With no regulation, the control of media outlets would fall into the hands of a few, similar to having no economic regulation. By allowing media access to only be a privilege a few can afford, a statement is being made.

The chapter makes a distinction between industry regulation versus societal regulation. Industry regulation views media as an active part of the economy and regulates intellectual property rights, breaks up media-based monopolies, and attempts to provide universal access to media outlets. Societal regulation recognizes media’s impact on the production of culture and seeks to regulate the cultural, societal, and political facets of media, advocating for free political debate and differences of opinion.

The second chapter begins by asking the question, what does governance actually mean? The chapter provides a brief historical context of global governance and gives an explanation of how the United Nations system works. The third chapter is another historical context of media communications.

The issue of media regulation reminded me of an interesting discussion we had in other class this week. We were talking about how a reader can determine whether an internet news source is credible or not and how one can filter through all of the bias on the internet. Furthermore, should bias be censored from the internet or would that impede upon our first amendment rights? Since the internet provides complete anonymity for its users, hate, bullying, and bias can run rampant. Should users be have to provide a name so that they will be forced to own up to their comments or is anonymity one of the defining aspects of the internet?

Globalization and Realism

2009-09-22T00:52:00.000-04:00

It is funny how ideas and paradigms get their names and retain them, even after becoming supposedly “out-of-date.” A perfect example would be Realism, which, despite being dismissed as obsolete, still retains its name and its sense as the most “down-to-Earth” and “assumption-less” approach to analyzing affairs. With the emergence of all the complexities of the globalizing world, particularly, Realism might provide a very limited view on the “real” state of things. But when circumstances get down to the “real” things that really matter, no one can deny that self-interests and cost-benefit calculations are the ultimate determinants of decision outcomes. I see this idea as the very essence of the arguments pushed by globalization pessimists, who view globalization as perpetuating the existent inequities, while the “agents of change” as pursuing ulterior motives. In a sense, they are right, as there can be no development or progress unless there are substantial incentives driving those, particularly if they involve large costs. Multinational corporations are trying to maneuver the international space looking for profit maximization, and it is only rational of them to pursue their goals in a Realist manner. The same can be said about states, with a slight change in wording: substitute “profit maximization” with “national objectives.”

That said, it is important to note the OVERALL outcome. Globalization that brings with it the intensification of resource flows and a greater interdependence of nations can ultimately result in an increase in general output: i.e. overall increase in affluence and in the standard of living. What is more, one cannot overlook the fact that the more the states are economically interdependent, the less willing they will be to engage in any conflict, which, in turn, can lead to further stabilization and sustainable economic and political development (even in cases where the interstate, or the state-corporation relationship is regarded as asymmetric). Therefore, potentially, globalization can bring the greatest benefit to most people, and all the readings this week touched upon this matter in one way or another.

Nevertheless, they also pointed out the fact that the benefits are not as equitably distributed as most of us would like to hope, which gives further ground to the pessimists. Even more relevant in this matter is the fact that the nation state seems to be among those to lose out most in the globalization process, as its sovereignty and self-determination are gradually eaten away by the post-modern tendencies. Together, the groups that fall behind in this intense global competition (be it on the international, national, or sub-national level) can present viable evidence to prove the selective advantages of globalization and its deficiencies. And certainly, the Marxist argument of “the rich exploiting the poor” is ever present in any such talk, be it concerning nation-states, or MNCs. Perhaps it may sound rudimentary, but one only needs to look at the current international sphere to see that these arguments might really be making a GOOD point. International structures such as the G8 and G20, despite all their altruistic mission statements, are essentially serving the interests of the select few – those who are IN the club – and even if the attainment of their goals might involve the development of the other parts of the world (well, being interdependent will allow more international stability and better business), they are still motivated by their very same self-interests. Fair enough. But that is where Morgenthau and Realism come creeping back in.

And yet, the end result should not be overlooked. Development and “progress,” especially on a global scale, can take many decades, if not centuries, to achieve and instant gratification is not something one should expect. Even if all the “agents of change” are ultimately driven by their self-interests, they can still play a significant role in dragging the “laggers” along. It is then up to these laggers to make sure they are included in the process, by proving their potential and getting involved – sufficiently and on time – instead of merely complaining and waiting for benevolence. If one looks at world affairs as a game, then there are rules by which it is played, and each player should make the most out of them, apparently, without expectations of altruism from others...

Media Convergence

2009-09-21T21:57:00.000-04:00

The chapter “The Globalization of Communications” in the The Information Revolution and World Politics by Elizabeth C. Hanson provides a brief history of communication technologies including telecommunication, satellites, computers, and the Internet, in a global context. Hanson also discusses vertical versus horizontal integration. Vertical integration is the control of the production and distribution in only one medium whereas horizontal integration is control across several mediums.

The three communication branches discussed in the chapter are telecommunications, audiovisual, and computer-mediated communication. As soon as these three categories were brought up in the reading, I immediately began thinking about the convergence of these media and specific products like the iPhone and Skype (which were both briefly mentioned later in the last section of the reading) that transcend the three branches. I was slightly disappointed that Hanson did not discuss the convergence of media and media branches until the last section of the chapter entitled, “The Revolution Continues.”

Apple’s iPhone3G (and some other devices offering a 3G or third generation network) is probably the best example of the convergence of media branches. The iPhone is a cell phone, mp3 player, video player and recorder, camera, digital compass and GPS, game console, internet device, and messager, not to mention the hundreds of applications available consisting of everything from calorie counters to money managers to mobile piano keyboards.

Skype is another example of a technology transcending boundaries. The chapter discussed Skype in terms of facilitating telecommunications, but Skype is well known for its video conferencing abilities. This medium combines telecommunications with both computer-mediated communications and audiovisual products.

"[This] is not a borderless world"

2009-09-21T18:58:00.005-04:00

I stopped short at this phrase in Hanson's book, page 158: "Although cross-border exchanges have reached historic proportions, and the globalizing technologies that facilitate them know no boundaries, it is not a borderless world."

So many globalization papers, seminars, discussions take for granted that mass communications have made borders immaterial or at least soon to be obsolete. The ease by which to cross them has been equated with the negation of the very idea of borders. After all, what caused borders are an artifical concept. They are an organizational tool, an abstraction and the imposition of borders on territories outside of Europe (even internal) have led to turmoil that persists to this day.

Borders were constructed through the Peace of Westphalia, to indicate physically the idea of the national sphere, where the nation is sovereign. (For instance, the idea of 'spheres of influence' in China, where European countries staked out actual territory where their law was applied.) Places such as Southeast Asia and Africa had territories or realms of control, but there existed no man's lands, undefined areas. These areas, in terms of control (absolute vs. local), still exist to an extent.

Therefore, the argument runs, when border-crossing comes so easy, nations falter in their soveriegnty in the face of supranational, multinational and micronational organizations; don't borders become immaterial?

No. Because it's only the physical sense of borders that is being trespassed. As our other readings have discussed, nations, despite the threats/impediment to their sovereignty, they still exist and even more so, continue to exist in people's minds.

It was national leaders that aided this process - globalization did not occur despite it. Therefore, Hanson says on page 158, "There remains a broad area for national legislation to shape the impact of the globalizing economy....Economic globalization is not necessarily diminishing state power," but it is rather transforming its conditions.

As long as the system that uses borders exists and the ideological understanding/acceptance of it continues, borders will still be significant. And disregarding them is nonsense.

Can ICT Save the Developing World? Using Afghanistan and Iran as Examples

2009-09-21T18:27:00.002-04:00

Towards the end of Chapter Five of Elizabeth Hanson's book The Information Revolution and World Politics, Hanson begins to explore what role bridging the digital divide can play in aiding the advancement of the world's developing nations.

The reading uses India as an example of a nation that has the most greatly benefited from the proliferation of IT products and services while still being victim to the largest domestic digital divide in the world. The reading presents the point of view of what it calls 'pessimists' of the digital divide who ask what good can increased communication technology be in aiding people who are lacking clean water, food, clothing, shelter, and security? This point of view is contrasted by the 'optimists' who believe that the increased access to knowledge can help the people advance their economy and possible find ways to challenge the rule of despots (which the reading doesn't address).

In the recent election and subsequent 'Green Revolution' of Iran, Twitter, Facebook, Flickr, Youtube and Blogs played a large role in circumventing the foreign media blackout the Iranian government imposed shortly after millions of Iranians took to the streets. Of course, these people were still held back by the censorship, control, and spying of Internet activities by the Iranian government. In a nation like Iran with a seventy seven percent overall literacy rate, the bridging of the digital divide is really only useful if the limitations on access and fear of government intrusion on activity is put to an end. Iranians had to work very hard to get the information out there as the days following the highly contested tenth presidential election went by. They had to constantly create proxy servers, find ways to get information to foreign websites to broadcast, and try to discern the spies and fake government accounts from actual news sources.

Therefore, though the majority of the nation is literate and the educated, more well to-do people of the cities have considerably good access to technology, that access is worth nothing without the freedom to find and broadcast what you will.

In contrast, the August 20th election of Afghanistan, which has seen vast accusations of fraud on all sides was almost exclusively broadcast online through foreign sources on the ground. There was very little online activity among the people of Afghanistan itself. Unlike Iran, Afghanistan has a literacy rate of just twenty eight percent, in fact, the literacy rate is so low in Afghanistan that the majority of ballots had to have graphics next to each candidate's printed name so that the largely illiterate people of Afghanistan could vote. Afghanistan, as the fourth poorest nation in the world, is like the slums and villages of India where access to information technology is of little use without clean water, food, shelter, education, and above all security. Unlike Iran, no website in Afghanistan is blocked by the government and twenty five percent of Afghans have cell phone access, and yet the people of the nation are largely illiterate and thus have little use for Internet technology. In the case of Afghanistan, the people are in need of life's necessities before they can be given unrestricted access to the vast knowledge of the world offered online.

What these two nations prove is that there is more to the argument than just the increasing or reduction of the digital divide - the Internet is useless in the hands of a largely literate populace if their access is controlled by a government and on the other hand, unrestricted access to the information of the world is of little use to a people who by and large can neither read nor write.

Again, this vision of the widen or reduction of the digital divide presents a Western slant on an important international issue that affects millions of people around the world. There is far more to consider than whether or not the people of the world have access to the information of the Internet, because that information is rendered powerless in the hands of deprived peoples.

The Flip Sides of Globalization

2009-09-21T12:06:00.000-04:00

Sinclair's discussion of global culture as a more complex process that recognizes the agency of individuals to navigate their own identities was a refreshing, though perhaps slightly unsatisfying, read. On the one hand, it was nice to read about globalization from a laudatory, rather than critical, perspective. Often, when reading about issues of cultural imperialism, I find myself saying, “Yes, but there are also benefits to globalization!” I find globalization to be a fascinating process (hence entering this program), and see incredible benefits in the exchange of social processes, language, customs, traditions, food, etc., of various cultures. Is there the danger of losing one’s “authentic” culture to globalized, commodified products? Yes, absolutely. But in the same way that you have to let a child enter the big bad world on his or her own at some point so that they can grow stronger through their own mistakes, you can’t just protect a culture “for its own good” by closing it off to any outside influences.

Weaver posits that it is through exposure to other cultures that we most recognize and define our own cultures. To this end, exposure to foreign media/products and globalization would actually reinforce one’s own sense of culture and national identity. As it relates to foreign media and consumer goods, I think the greater danger towards a diverse and yet unified global culture lies in the obscurity of a product’s true origins. Hidden behind complicated chains of ownership and conglomerates, one hardly knows where any new product was conceived, tested, manufactured, marketed, etc. It is here that media and product literacy – an ability to critically analyze the media, manufacturing process and marketing that goes into these products – is key towards recognizing globalizing forces and how an “authentic” culture might be impacted. The danger is in assuming a local nature for any product, as the strengths and benefits of global culture, in my opinion, can only be realized with a consciousness of the various cultural influences at play.

To this end, the effort by companies to localize their products to national markets represents both a new hope and new dangers in supporting global culture. On the one hand, companies are recognizing that consumers favor that which is local and speaks to their own experiences. Unique cultural tropes and adaptations are then mobilized in order to localize the product for each market. Producers make an effort to understand the local culture and to adapt to it, rather than trampling a local market with a foreign product in the vein of cultural imperialism. A certain respect for culture and differences, though motivated more by the bottom line than by any idealistic notions of world peace, is thus implemented.

The danger, however, is that efforts to localize a product further obscure the variety of influences that make up that product. A cynic might say that the bully has not stopped bullying, it has just found a more subtle way to exert its influence. Here is where the Sinclair reading leaves me somewhat unsatisfied. He seems to take an idealized vision of global culture that doesn’t fully acknowledge or reconcile the real negative impacts. While it was refreshing to have the benefits of global exchange and exposure to a world of influences touted, some critical analysis is needed to gain a full perspective.

A new era for nationalism?

2009-09-15T11:49:00.006-04:00

Diversity is one of the “virtues” of post-modernism, many would claim. We LIKE celebrating diversity, hoping that a clearer understanding of each culture’s idiosyncrasies will help to bring us closer and reduce the probability of conflict (or, at least, intense conflict).

To a degree, it might be true. But my personal experience tells me that the actual “celebration of diversity” can often lead to the very opposite: re-emphasis of the differences. This can be easily observed at International Festivals/Fairs, just to give an example. Although there are many nations and/or cultures presenting their “specialties”, each one of them goes out of its way to make sure theirs are better than the others', particularly if there are “historical enemies” (internal, external, imperial, etc…) among them. The banal objective of the event is to boast about the “harmony” of so many representatives of different backgrounds within that institution (be it a university, an organization, or a country), but inevitably it leads to a break in that harmony – even if only temporary – as each group goes searching for that which separates them from “the others”.

Interestingly enough, I found this phenomenon in line with what Weaver had suggested (last week’s readings): the idea that one understands and learns more about their own culture through interaction with others. I see this usually happening when people leave their country/culture, as they find themselves in an alien environment and try to define their own identity based on the differences from others that they can recognize. Indeed, it is very difficult to understand, know, and appreciate your own culture while you are immersed in it, as you take it for granted (Weaver). Coming back to the international fair example: the event allows one to ponder more on what is that defines the identity of their country/culture, and makes them emphasize that difference, not bringing them closer to the others, but rather taking them further away.

This theme is ever-present in the nationalism-diaspora discussions, as diasporas have become the space where nationalism (and should I say, chauvinism) is pretty much intact, and is even encouraged, while the “homeland” nation-state (if such exists) undergoes the transformations Castells referred to. They LIVE among “the others”, experiencing the differences between cultures on a day-to-day basis, which constantly reminds them of the need to focus on these differences, in case they wish to retain their identity. These communities are much more “imagined” than the territorial nation-state-based communities, as they do not have the degree of formal institutions for “socialization” that are usually available within the nation state. Thus, they keep emphasizing the “mythical” and idealized image of their homeland, which at times results in cultural rigidity and distortion of the real “essence” of the homeland (i.e. of what it has become over the years they were away), at least among the core members of the community.

Over time, this causes a break between the diasphoric community and the homeland, as each one develops separately, and as interests and understanding of “the national objectives” begin to diverge. This is particularly so, when the diasphoric community(ies) have the ability to exert any palpable influence over international affairs, without serious regard as to what is the perspective of the homeland. This is clearly evident in the case of my own “nation”. The Armenian Diaspora has developed a significant political presence in many parts of the world, making the issue of the Armenian Genocide as CENTRAL to “Armenianness” (quite naturally: because it is the central pillar of their identity, and the major reason they ended up in such a big Diaspora in the first place). However, the government of the Armenian state has been trying to improve the relations with the Turkish state over the past couple of years, and is currently facing much more pressing issues, such as economic hardship or the problem of Nagorno Karabakh, which are not given sufficient importance by the mainstream Diasporan discourse. Rather, many in the Diaspora view the Armenian government and the Armenians of the homeland as “traitors”, which, in its turn, fuels their Diasphoric chauvinism further. And just as discussed in all of this week’s readings, the modern communication technologies make this “debate” more heated, and at times, extremist.

This relates to a third point that needs to be made. Although there have been so many arguments pointing out the declining relevance of the territorially-based nation-state, nationalism as an “imagined” phenomenon is still very much alive, as the craving for identity and a sense of community is a natural need for the human being (yes, we are social animals, and we want to live in our communities). Even if the nation state is slowly disintegrating, the ideas that held its community together are not, especially when the changes come too fast. Ideas and values take a long time to transform, and newly introduced ones require years, if not decades or centuries, to be internalized and accepted as their “own”. The modern media and IT have strongly accelerated the process of “modern idea dissemination” (multiculturalism, freedom, human rights, etc…); however, they do not allow the time required for the internalization of these ideas, resulting in an inevitable resistance from the “local” cultures. And when this resistance gathers up momentum and enough support, it starts its way towards a gradual relapse in the opposite direction: re-emphasis of their own “specific” cultural idiosyncrasies and, later, fundamentalism. Therefore, at least in the short-run, the rise of new communication technologies does not help to smooth the process of 'cultural globalization', but rather makes it more tumultuous by galvanizing nationalism in this sense.

Thread - What beyond nations?

2009-09-14T23:26:00.003-04:00

All of the readings this week at least brushed the issue of structures beyond nations. As globalization continues at its breakneck pace, will nations fall to the way-side or be transformed.

Catells seems to take a rather lofty view of a global government or rather an intergovernmental institution. "The increasing inability of nation-states to confront and manage the processes of globalization of the issues that are the object of their governance leads to ad hoc forms of global governance and, ultimately, to a new form of state." (p.42) This new form will require collective decision-making between nations, subject to the mediation and feedback from the global civil society. This society, by the way, has "now has the technological means to exist independently from political institutions and from the mass media." (p.42) (How many would this society encompass then? Because I can think of at least five countries off-hand that can just shut down their nation's Internet on a whim.) He makes an odd statement soon after that therefore public opinion should be "harnessed" through the media, despite having stated basically the opposite pages before - where the public 'harnesses' nations in order to maintain social change. Finally though, he makes this final statement: "Public diplomacy is not propaganda...It is to induce a communication space in which a new, common language could emerge as a precondition for diplomacy, so that when the time for diplomacy comes, it reflects not only interests and power making but also meaning and sharing." (p.45)

Like I said, lofty.

However, Castells fails to extrapolate how to adequately transition from our current system to this grand global scheme. He wants states to stop thier petty emphasis on their own self-interest, taking the next step toward real democracy - a government with the people's human lives interests at heart. I have a hard time imagining that just spontaneously happening. Likewise, this 'new, common language' - who determines it? Does it just somehow magically come into existence? Someone is going to determine those meanings and that means power is going to be a key factor in this development.

Karim and Waisbord take a different approach, examining the idea of new identities taking over rather than some mystical global brotherhood.

Waisbord considers it the most extensively. Nations introduced the idea of larger institutions based on cultural bonds instead of basic economic or political control. Media played a key part in spreading this common culture and constructing an 'imagined community.' It made media make national feelings 'normal' and provided a national context or lens for everyday events. We should not underestimate this influence. Karim points out that the West has succeeded in exporting this idea of nations as 'natural' to every part of the world, reinforcing it through foreign-initiated education, despite the fact it was not until the Peace of Westphalia that national exclusiveness was established.

Now today, in today's globalized world, media has a two-fold effect. On one hand, it stifles local cultural creation in favor of big, rich cultures, perpetuating long-term Western ideas. At the same time, new technologies eliminate old barriers to information and communication beyond communities. Now here Waisbord comments that there are arguments for national media. But is it cultural self-expression or politically sanctioned culture (where the government takes the place of the colonizer), which belongs to the time of 'cultural sovereignty?' (Each writer agrees that that time has passed.)

Waisbord turns from this issue to focus on the self-expression that is occurring, transnational identities and cultures. For one, there are the globalist perspectives of Castells. Waisbord does not believe this will supersede nationalism as it is devoid of common history and cultural bonds that could unite movements under its banner, nor does it demand exclusive loyalty. (Again the issue of motivation.) Global media helps open up the world, but it is still very limited, again lacking the emotional grip of common symbols, history and a possibility of socio-political rewards.

Karim agrees. Nations are becoming more accepting of multiculturalism, uniting the people with a set of civic values, but the majority still dominates. Therefore transnational groups spring up, but "they do not replace nation-states but locate themselves within and across them..." (p.406) Transnational, faceted global identities and cultures add layers to national cultures, but so far have not supplanted them. "Nations have a future as long as human groups require a basis to establish unity and difference from others, and group identity is based on inclusion and exclusion." (p.384)

There will always be inclusion and exclusion in my mind. I have not as rosy glasses as Castells. But will that mean that nations will be the winner? The world faces both unification and disintegration forces - we have the EU and now Kosovo as a country. Will EU become more unified or Kosovo more divided? Or will we remain in this tension for that much longer? I honestly don't know.

Cosmopolitanism and Nationalism

2009-09-14T22:38:00.001-04:00

Given my background in both media and ethnic studies (I did my undergraduate degree in Radio-Television-Film with a minor in Asian American studies), this week's Waisbord reading was particularly fascinating to me. His unpacking of the roots of culture and how media shape -- or create -- culture particularly intrigued me. By Waisbord's account, the media are both gatekeepers and creators of culture, selecting and perpetuating the canon by which we identify tropes of our own nationalism. Waisbord makes a compelling argument that media as a social institution reinforces our concepts of nationalism by being the means through which we share experiences larger than ourselves. However, what I found lacking in his discussion of media as selecting the images that define our cultural narratives is the human agency element: the editors, writers, producers, etc. of these narratives. In these contexts, media is not just a social institution, but is driven by individuals with great power. Ultimately their power comes through faceless programming boards, newspaper mastheads, a record label, etc, but behind all that, conscious decisions are made about what images to use, what narratives resonate, what motifs might convey the right feeling. I think a discussion of media as creators of our culture needs to consider these personal elements, and how individuals act as institutions to create institutional memory. (There is also something to be said for how cultural diversity amongst these people with power might also change the narratives and representations we see!).

I also found personal resonance with his discussion of cosmopolitanism posed against nationalism. Several different aspects of my life have contributed to my having a sense of identity informed more by my unique combination of world experiences than the American culture proclaimed by my passport. While my experiences aren't shared by the average American, I still, to some extent, self-identify and find most concordance with my American identity. When I travel abroad as an American, I feel the need to disclaim any impressions one might make of me with these explanations of the various influences on my sense of identity. Yet, at the same time, I defend this multitude of influences as a component of my American identity; no influence has had an effect on me to the exclusion of others. That is, I incorporate my non-American experiences into my American, primary identity, and defend it as American.

Where, then, does my nationalism come into play? By certain people's accounts, the views that I have, and the pride I take in my global experiences are distinctly un-American and tantamount to burning the flag. Yet, doesn't it speak to a certain ultimate homage to American culture that I eschew a nationally untethered cosmopolitanism in favor of uniting my global identities into a singular American identity?

That said, I also wonder if Waisbord's doubts for cosmopolitanism as a viable alternative to nationalism might not be because of a lack of a conscious critical mass. I used to think that my life experiences living and traveling around the world were unique, but I've come to find many other people with similar experiences, and shared world views even without similar experiences. One knows where to go to find Americans, Canadians, etc. But where does one go to find like-minded cosmopolitans?

Analysis Question: Culture and Political Economies

2009-09-14T17:58:00.001-04:00

“Do you think the "political-economy" concerns that have driven much of the debate in IC research over the past decades are still relevant? If so, why? Or, do you think that other kinds of questions should be the focus of researchers and policy-makers?”

When I first applied to American University’s Masters program for International Media, I was not really thinking about International Communication in terms of “political-economy.” I have no background in political science, international relations, or economics. My background is in film and media studies, and sociology/anthropology, so when I think of International Media, I think of culture.

Culture is what draws me to international studies, media studies, as well as travel. I like learning about different cultures around the world, what makes us different in addition to what makes us all the same. The readings we have read so far have definitely addressed culture as a crucial aspect of international communication, but maybe not to the extent that they should. I think that when we discuss the differences between different political economies across the globe, what we are really discussing is differences in culture. The way I see it, culture creates the political-economy, and it is therefore that we should be asking questions in terms of culture and cultural differences, not in an ethnocentric way, favoring one culture over another, but as cultural relativists judging cultures by their own standards.

While I personally find culture to be one of the most relevant (and for me the most interesting) concerns in International Communication research, I still think that political economy is relevant and important. A part of the political economy concern that keeps coming up in our readings that really interested me is the notion of “empire.” Many of the international communication scholars that we read about last week like Innis, Carey, and Thussu describe communications as a way of maintaining control over an empire. The word conjures images of antiquated ruins, old statutes of emperors, etc. When I think about the posed analysis question, “are these concerns still relevant?” my first answer is that empires do not really exist anymore. But wait, do they? Are global super-powers like the United States and China considered empires? Is democratization a kind of empire? And if empires are really a thing of the past, what about the effects of post-colonialization?

Communication or Culture?

2009-09-12T19:19:00.002-04:00

My field is cultural studies. So I looked forward to reading Carey's "A Cultural Approach to Communication." Half-way through reading, I thought it seemed very familiar and it finally hit me - "things can become so familiar that we no longer perceive them at all" - he is describing communication the same way we do culture.

He defines culture as: "a symbolic process whereby reality is produced, maintained, repaired, and transformed." Usually, culture is relegated this role. It dictates our mindsets, worldviews, values, beliefs, ways of expression, dressing, manners, eating, - both how we perceive the world and what constructs the world around us. (Thus why it seems invisible until one is thrust into another culture.) Communication could be seen as the or an instrument of culture, but Carey pushes it a step further.

As a postmodern, he easily makes the claim there is no ultimate reality, rather that communication itself constructs and perpetuates reality, that is is through understanding and using of symbols. However, what are these symbols? Here, he seems to have left the idea of communication as an oral or visual construct. Does anything that conveys meaning then fall under this purview? If clothing conveys a message (and surely we in America know that well), does that make it a piece of communication instead or as well as a cultural artifact?

While yet later playing it down as usually a simple set of daily activities, this mundaneness yet highlights the sheer vastness of his claim. Everything can denote meaning or contribute to a perception of reality. As Prof. Hayden said in class, even a TV demonstrates political influence. Does this mean everything is therefore communication?

When I took Intercultural Communication in undergrad, there was a story related in my textbook. A young couple wanted to marry, so their parents had a dinner together. When they left, they knew the woman's parents didn't agree with the marriage. Yet they didn't discuss it at all. The answer: they were served a food combination that didn't match, indicating the parents found the couple a poor fit.

Communication is not always explicit, but it is intentional. This would be my key. As a Christian, we talk about how nature proclaims the glory of God. Yet this is a different form of communication - it is neither human-initiated or controlled. Carey would disagree with me as we (Christians) are the ones giving that meaning, but rocks 'communicate' that they are hard and sharp by breaking skin. The labels or words we use to explain this are communication. The fact of it in and of itself is not. Correspondingly, when and where and why we go to places and look at things and think thoughts, yes this says a lot about us, but I would not call it communication unless we try to turn around and perpetuate it.

Still, Carey had a very valid point about communication - in that it teaches/informs what it is meant to display. This is because knowledge is not neutral - the very act of transmission/perception colors the knowledge. Americans find this idea repugnant, with a very great insistence that objecivity is not only possible, but somehow easily attainable. (I agree with Carey that culture as a concept is weak in America, but rather because of its elusiveness. America has so many diverse markers, it is far easier to make out sub-cultures than the overarching culture, which is more prevalent in values and beliefs that are that much harder to see.)

America sincerely believes in today's world that increased communication, dialogue, is the answer to all problems. But until it realizes just how deep communication penetrates, the lens that shape even the shades of meaning we attach to words, this communication will go from blind eye to untuned ear and be mere babble.

Afghan Diaspora & the Media

2009-09-11T14:48:00.002-04:00

What role do diasporas, a nation-state itself, and the media play in an increasingly globalized world where the idea of a 'nation-state' as defined by the Treaty of Westphalia is finding itself increasingly at odds with international developments? That is the central question that binds all of these weeks readings.

As a member of a diaspora who had a brief stint at a diasporic, global media company and studied diasporic culture in undergrad I will address these questions based on my own experiences all the while trying to create connections between statements in the readings.

As Abdul Jan Mohammed stated, the people of a diaspora subject the "cultures to analytic scrutiny rather than combining them." In this sense, I as an Afghan immigrant living in a democratic nation with strong ties to Afghanistan do not accept a single culture over another. Rather than rejecting either Afghan or American culture, I am able to look at Afghan culture through the lens of democracy and American culture from the point of view of a nation that has suffered greatly as a result of poor American foreign policy decisions.

For instance, when I hear about cries for American withdrawal from Afghanistan I see it from the point of view of someone who knows what an abrupt US departure after the fall of the Soviet Union did to Afghanistan. On the other hand, as an Afghan, I do not see America's presence in the nation as a hostile takeover, imposition, Western propaganda, or a Jewish/Christian takeover of a Muslim nation. I inherently understand the importance of what America can bring to Afghanistan if it stays while still knowing that if America simply pulls out of Afghanistan it could reap dire results for both nations in the future, as it did after the Cold War.

I am not willing to accept either Afghanistan or the United States as religious nations because I have seen what Conservative dominance has done to the United States (steered the people away from focusing on the important political, economic, and social issues in the name of religion) and how the example of Afghanistan's closest cultural, historical, and linguistic neighbor - Iran can serve as a warning call to the amount of power that the Afghan people can lose in a top-down system based on the religious views of a certain group. I would have none of these viewpoints had I not lived my life as an Afghan immigrant growing up in America.

Castells talks about the public sphere as a place where people can come together as citizens to challenge the dominant political institutions of a society. Unfortunately, a public sphere like that has not existed domestically in Afghanistan since before the Soviet invasion (which was ironically orchestrated in part by actors within that public sphere) but with the emergence of satellite television, this public sphere has been created through groups within the diaspora. After all, in an industrialized world, media has become the most dominant manifestation of the public sphere (Castells).

Whereas we in the diaspora can assemble on Fremont Blvd (affectionately referred to in the Bay Area as 'Little Kabul'), the citizens of Kabul itself have very little opportunity to do so without fear of retribution or violence. Of course, with the advent of satellite television such a public sphere has been created in Afghanistan for those who have access to a telephone and a television. On these television stations, people in Afghanistan, Iran, Germany, Pakistan, the United States, Canada, and England can all express their views on the government and the role of the United States and NATO in Afghanistan. Thus, these stations become the 'repository' of cultural and informational ideas (Castells). Of course, in a nation where there are vast crises of efficiency, legitimacy, identity, and equity, and a growing distrust of nongovernmental actors, trying to use these debates for positive outcomes is extremely difficult.

Part of the difficulty comes from the dynamics of the groups interacting with each other through the airwaves. On one hand,you have the immigrants who were the educated, skilled, higher classes who left Afghanistan at the onset of the war to profit in "the new world" (Karim Karim) and on the other you have the poor, uneducated masses who have lived through thirty years of war and see those very people who left Afghanistan and profited in "the new world" returning to Afghanistan as translators, contractors, aid workers to further profit as the ones who suffered through the war have little chance of escaping the poverty and destruction around them.

Another issue facing Afghans in the diaspora and within Afghanistan itself is the idea of nationalism. Like many other states controlled at one time or another by imperial powers, the lines denoting Afghanistan as a nation seem drawn in such a way as to constantly keep various groups in contention with one another (Karim Karim).

The new media of satellite television has tried to create a unity among the various groups through children's programming and a diversity of people on the programming, but by and large the government itself has done little to bring the people together. Thus, you have groups like the Taliban using their interpretation of Islam, rather than a unique Afghan identity (Waisbord) trying to force the people of Afghanistan into supporting their political aims. Like many other criminal groups, the Taliban base themselves in poorer areas and came to prominence by offering a sense of security and order in the lawless Afghanistan of 1996 (Castells).

What all of this amounts to is that the Afghan government and the independent satellite television stations must work to somehow create a sense of national Afghan identity (Waisbord). An identity that is larger than economics, various interpretations of religious ideals, war, and politics.

The Afghans of Afghanistan have lost sense of a civil society in Afghanistan and see it as impositions of Western forces not as going back to something that existed within Afghanistan previously. These media outlets, both governmental and independent must find a way to bridge the gap between the experiences of the diaspora and the up and coming cultural and intellectual thinkers of Afghanistan itself. In this way, the Afghans in Afghanistan can see that engagement within the West does not inherently mean the loss of a religious or cultural identity merely the challenging of it to make said identity more potent and able to keep up with the changing world climate without crumbling under the weight of change.

How I Imagine Castell's Public Sphere

2009-09-10T22:09:00.001-04:00

I really enjoyed the Manuel Castells reading, “The New Public Sphere: Global Civil Society, Communication Networks, and Global Governance” because it gave me some things to visualize. Castells talks a lot about the “public sphere.” He defines it as a place where public opinion is communicated and information and ideas are exchanged, locating it between society and the state. As I read, I thought to myself, what does the public sphere look like? I have no background in political science or international relations, so I visualized a sort of gladiator arena with the government on one side and civil society on the other. In the middle of the arena, a sort of battle was going on. Interest groups and lobbyists were marching around with protest signs. Different civic associations were handing out pamphlets. And of course, the media was there reporting news and opinion in the forms of television, radio, and newspapers.

As I read on, I realized that I was thinking about the public sphere on a national level, specifically the United States. Castells brings to the fore the argument that there is a public sphere on an international level. My visualization of the public sphere expanded to include actors on an international level. The governments and citizens of all nation-states sat around the perimeters of the arena. In the middle, I saw advertisements from multinational businesses, leaders and followers of world religions, world interest groups, and global media.

Castells argues that nations-states form networks of nation-states. An obvious example would be the European Union. The EU is a network of many different countries, each maintaining their own language, traditions, national religion, and other aspects of culture. Castells points out several issues that are truly global concerns including human rights, environmental issues like global warming, terrorism, and the governance of world-wide technologies like the internet. Castells also identifies several problems or “crises” the world faces when attempting to deal with global problems, like not having a global common language, the lack of an impartial global “referee” to judge actions and decisions, cultural differences world-wide, and not having an efficient way to manage all these global issues.

Overall, I felt that Castells did an excellent job of defining the public sphere on both a national and international level, identifying the problems we face on a global level, and articulating the reasons why global governance and cooperation is extremely difficult. The one problem I had with this reading is that Castells identifies all these problems, but does not really give any suggestions of how to fix it or what to do about it.

Communication as Community and American Culture

2009-09-07T22:53:00.001-04:00

Carey presents an interesting view of thought as inherently public and social. That society gives us the symbols and the framework through which we filter our emotions and intuitions, such that it gives us language to think, and in this sense, all of our thoughts are shared and represented by the same symbols and everyone else in the community. It seems to cast Descartes's famous quote in a new light as, "I think -- because society has given me the language with which to think -- therefore I am."

And yet, even as we share these representative symbols of communication (and, according to Carey, build community in the process of such sharing), we talk of breakdowns in communication amongst each other as the root cause of most conflicts. I would have liked to have seen Carey explore this idea further. That while we might share the same symbolic representations of our environment, our interpretations and communication to each other of these representations can vary widely. If, as he asserts, we create our own reality in the process of creating the means by which to communicate about it, and our shared knowledge is what brings us together as a community, how do individual realities play against each other? To bring in another reading from this week, how does the cybernetics systems theory explained by Weaver apply to this concept of communication? Where does the encoding, decoding, and feedback happen if we're all supposed to share the same symbols?

Carey also asserts that Americans lack a unified understanding of an American culture. This seems an interesting position to take, given the neo-colonialism and American cultural imperialism discourses explored by the other readings. To the extent that American culture is often the hegemonic model propagated throughout the world, are we unable to recognize our own culture because we are immersed in it, because it is so rarely challenged, even on a global level?

Of course, I would argue that this isn't the case. While I understand that my background, socio-economic status, education level, etc. put me in a unique position, I can hardly think of anyone that I personally know who really thinks that American culture is the only lens through which to look at the world. I would also argue that most people are savvy enough to take a critical look at the tropes by which American culture is communicated, even to ourselves: American dream ideology, Protestant work ethic, democracy and free markets, materialism, etc.

And yet, while I generally acknowledge that most Americans will probably assume American culture to be the predominant model throughout the world, I have to stop myself. Where is the empirical evidence that this is the case? Does anyone know of any studies where we have empirically studied levels of American self-centeredness? We all reference the ugly American stereotype, especially as it relates to Americans abroad, but on what do we base these assumptions? In my own experiences, I've found it necessary to defend myself from these stereotypes, to point to examples of open-minded, globally savvy Americans who think we have much to learn from other cultures. Perhaps we are doing a disservice in propagating the model of the "ugly American" ourselves.

The Ritualistic Cults of Olbermann, O'Reilly, et al.

2009-09-07T13:31:00.003-04:00

Sections from James Carey and Harold Innis readings for this week reminded me of the proliferation of opinion media on mainstream American ‘news’ channels. When speaking of the Ritualistic View of Communication, Carey calls it a “sacred ceremony drawing people together in fellowship and commonality” and when speaking of Time-Based Media, Innis wrote that they often create or re-enforce social hierarchies. In fact, one of the questions Innis poses about the role of media in society is to ask what forms of power said media encourages. In relation to all of these ideas, the Olbermanns and O’Reillys of the world do not really challenge and encourage intelligent thought among their audiences. Instead, the viewers are simply seeing and hearing what they want to hear. They watch these programs as a form of ritual where they see representations of their shared beliefs. When comparing media to religion, Carey, says the Ritualistic View of communication is less like a sermon which challenges thoughts and incites conversation, and more like a prayer, chant, or ceremony. Thus, watching these programs is less learning and more memorization of the facts and ideas you want, creating a mob mentality to rally around a certain ideology. As Innis and Carey both state, these methods of communication are more about maintaining a social order than about intelligent dialogue. Thus, when Innis asks what power structures the form of media encourages the answer in terms of the cable commentators, is that they encourage the status quo. They encourage the notion of a dichotomous America ruled by one party or another. There is little room for the people in the periphery to create change through the challenge ideas represented by a possible new media. In this way, it can be argued that the American system of propaganda is reverting back to the primitive stimulus-response model that Weaver spoke of.

Empires of Space and Time: Innis' "Bias of Communications and Monopolies of Power"

2009-09-07T12:56:00.002-04:00

I was really excited to see “Theoretical Perspectives” on the syllabus this week, having done my undergraduate work in sociology. I was even more excited to recognize several names (like Claude Henri de Saint-Simon, Alexis de Tocqueville, Herbert Spenser, and Max Weber) from the Thussu, Weaver, and Carey readings this week from my sociological theory textbooks. One name that I did not recognize, but was fascinated with, was Harold Adams Innis.

In the reading, “Harold Adams Innis: the Bias of Communications and Monopolies of Power”, Innis asserts that there is a bias inherent in all media, not always in the physical medium, but in the way the medium allows the messages distributed (specifically the values and the ideas within the message) to conquer both time (ideas or values with longevity) and space (maintaining control of a geographically large empire).

Innis makes a distinction between time-based media and space-based media. Time-based media, he argues, is durable and long-lasting. The article gave the examples of stone and clay. While reading this article, I thought about media in a broad sense and statues and sculptures came to mind. Sculptures contain a message or story in an artistic, creative way that can be easily read by illiterate populations, especially in early Europe. Sculptures can be used to celebrate a particular war victory or display the likeness of a leader. The Arc de Triomphe monument in the Place de l'Étoile in Paris is, I think, an excellent example of Innis’ time-based media that conveys an imperial message. The monument depicts France’s victories during the Napoleonic Wars and still stands as a famous landmark today.

Sculpture can also convey a religious story, like Michelangelo’s Pietà or Bernini’s The Ecstasy of St. Theresa. In addition to sculpture, stained glass windows in churches could be another example of time-based media. The pictures depicted in stained glass windows showed stories from the Bible, and could be understood by the illiterate masses who could not read the Bible themselves.

Innis’ ideas on “the Biases of Communications and the Monopolies of Power” went along well with the readings we had last week from Daya Thussu and Mattelart. Innis’ argues that communication media don’t just appear out of the blue, they are created out of necessity by an empire to enhance and continue its control. Likewise, the readings about the history of international communication from Thussu and Mattelart last week both took care to discuss how new developments in communication were interrelated and how they built upon each other. The three authors also call attention to how nation-state often held sole control over a medium of communication for long periods of time because of the nation-state controls the raw materials necessary to build the medium and keep it running. One of the sources listed in Innis’ “Monopolies of Knowledge” is “control of raw materials.” Mattelart and Thussu both discuss how Britain’s control the telegraph was largely due to owning copper, the raw material required for building telegraph cable lines. Similarly, Daya Thussu’s chapter “Approaches to Theorizing International Communication” discusses the ways in which different theoretical perspectives for international communication developed from each other as a criticism or refinement to the former, not just appearing out of the blue.

Don’t let your mind fool you. Go with the senses…

2009-09-07T10:15:00.003-04:00

I referred to cultural (neo-) imperialism in my first post. This time I would like to take my thoughts in a different direction and look back at the Soviet Union, and what the example can, potentially, show to an observer now.

Being “hegemonic” the USSR did, indeed, try to indoctrinate all the people living in its sphere of influence, and justifiably so: after all, there is no other way control can be effectively retained over a long period of time.

At first, though, control has to be established through aggressive means (be it military or not). Then, there is a pressing need to build a more or less functional economy, accompanied by, just as Gramsci suggested, building of schools, religious bodies, and an effective mass media to relay the message and the “right” culture.

The Soviet regime attempted to do exactly that. First, they had the Red Revolution, sweeping through Eurasia and slowly building up into an empire. Then, of course, the economic plans started to emerge, desperately trying to build some sort of a system that would function “union-wide.” This all was galvanized by the communist propaganda, creation of a Soviet educational system, and of course a religious institution of a kind (religious, yes; not ecclesiastic): religion – Communism; Gods – Marx, Engels; Prophets – Lenin and Stalin; clergy – The Party. And being a very modern religion, Communism made an active use of the modern media – radio and, later, TV – with the sole goal to opiate the very masses it claimed to be saving from the tentacles of religion. And just as the fundamental sociological principle of reality construction states (reinforced by many communication theorists), whatever they presented as symbolically real, eventually became real in its consequence, through psychological and cultural processes, as well as through socialization [i.e. indoctrination] and fear. Although the process was somewhat reversed, the symbols used as a representation for reality eventually became representations of the reality, to speak in Carey’s terms.

Too bad the USSR invested too much in the idea of foreign expansion and the fight of the “Evil Capitalists”, rather than successful internal reform early enough. The Secretaries of the Communist Party apparently had not read Gramsci closely enough; otherwise, they would not have missed the principle of pressing need to continually reproduce the process of communication hegemony, in order to ensure that the “periphery’s” interests are still in line with those of the ruling core in Moscow, and to minimize the probability of challenge. Instead, they were very haphazard in their “reforms”: changes were introduced inconsistently and over-cautiously, and could be withdrawn half-way through and followed by a period of hesitant repression of the very same reform. This process of freeze and thaw widened the cracks in the system, and once in power, Gorbachev made it worse.

Yes, it was not the only reason for the collapse of the Soviet Union and its empire, but it was definitely among the major ones. The policies of glasnost and perestroika shattered the society (fundamentally based on coercion and oppression), and although they were supposedly intended as a reform for further extension of power, I could say they played a critical role in bringing down the Soviet system. In other words, the clergy of the religious institution gave up their monopoly of knowledge and their power to define reality, allowing alternative ideas to be considered as “legitimate”: self-determination, freedom of speech and association, openness, systemic reform… The periphery, meanwhile, did not lose the opportunity. Helped by the very same media that used to oppress them – radio and TV – as well as fuelled by the influx of these alternative ideas through Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (or VoA for that matter), the masses that had been alienated for so long stood up to challenge the empire and played into its demise.

Apparently, the Soviet regime failed to oversee a successful transformation of communication from “transmission” view, to that of a “ritual” and gave way as soon as the cracks got sufficiently wide.

This is just one example, which, I think, shows the importance of “ritual communication” in building a reliable foundation for a strong empire. Nowadays, we would like to believe there are no empires per se. Yet, no one can deny that there is a prevalent ideology [yes, take your pick: “Western,” “American,” “European,” “Capitalist,” “Protestant”…] forcefully spread throughout the world. The very ideas promoted by the so-called international organizations, international civil society, and universal human rights do a great job in terms of ritual communication to bring about a “global” culture. But they cannot be regarded as isolated from transmission communication, as eventually they extend control over time and space, just as in the Soviet example.

No matter how attractive the idea of “horizontal global communication” may sound, it inevitably results in a paradox. For some reason, the ideas accepted in this information flow are very culturally biased and do not seem to be showing real cultural sensitivity. And the result? We end up having the same dilemma all over again: “influence over” [i.e. control derived from universality of values] vs. “hostility” [an inevitable result when strong local cultures meet universality]. I’m still to see convincing proof that a truly “flat world” can actually exist…

The 'Late', The Great, and The Way Inbetween

2009-09-01T15:08:00.002-04:00

Elizabeth Hanson's "The Informationa Revolution and World Politics" does focus more on actual technological advancements. But the sheer impact and uneveness of this impact, testify all the more to how inextricably all the neat categories we use in school: Communications, Economics, Politics, Culture and so forth, are linked.
The first thing I noted was the almost sidenote of the affect of the printing press on language in Europe. The very art of writing has always had an impact on writing, requiring more codification and standardization. But there can also be a significant difference: for instance, 'Chinese' exists as a single written language, yet there are different dialects, such as Mandarin or Cantonese, which can be quite unintelligable to one another. (This is a bit of a moot point as Chinese is a pictorial/ideographic language, rather than syllabic as I'm referencing in Europe.)
The printing press contributed to the codification and solidifying of specific languages. Hanson references "hundreds of vernacular languages" (p. 15), but going back to my Chinese example, these were most likely regional differences and the effects of syncristic contact between different language groups. Thus the press, needing a standardization in order to publish consistently, caused regional dialects became more uniform, leading to a greater identity identification among language groups, which helped build a case for nationalism. This is fascinating to me as so many countries around the world struggle with creating national identities similar to those that seem 'native' to Europe, especially those without set borders. This ripple effect from the printing press is an example of how nationalism grew to its more current form organically. (Which poses the interesting question, is common language really a make-or-break factor in nation-building?)
Second, it seems that the unpredicted side-effects of such new technology interferes with the next, at least at first - and proving that technology hasn't exactly just been 'speeding up' invariably in the last century. Telegraphs had to cross national borders (linguistic borders fostered by the printing press) and therefore countries had to set up arrangements for interconnection. This happens within 20 years of the public debut of telegraphy (though Thussu does remark that different forms of telegraphy appeared earlier). An International Union is formed by 1865, rules of usage are agreed on and monitoring is allowed. Telegraphy quickly goes on to inform business, politics and then even the public.
Now, about 30 years after the telegraph, comes the telephone. Barring technological issues, the telephone becomes relegated to the bottom place on the totem-pole. Even when improved, it lags in connecting Europe. The national borders, crossed by telegraphs, prove imperable to telephones. Countries resist interconnection, put to the way side the connections (diplomatically) that telegraphs have formed and maintain rivalry. The telegraph was to get rid of these tensions - it increased them, especially as the British had the monopoly. And this doesn't change until the 1970s!!! It's simply incredible when compared to the sudden capitalization of the cell phone.

The History of Developments in International Communication: the Intersection of History, Technology and Politics

2009-08-31T20:33:00.000-04:00

Our first two readings for International Communication class were overviews of the history of the development of communication networks across the globe. Both readings emphasized the importance of understanding the intersection of technology, politics, and history when discussing new developments in communication.

Daya Thussu’s chapter, “the Historical Context of International Communication” really made me think of new inventions and discoveries in communication throughout history as a series of interrelated developments instead of just independent events throughout time. This approach recounting the history of international communication implies that events do not just occur, they are the result of political, technological, and cultural changes or advances that build upon each other, constantly changing and improving. I feel that this is a useful way of thinking about communications, particularly for International Media MA students like me who are in a dual program through the School of Communication and the School of International Service.

Another less positive thing that stuck out at me about this article was Thussu’s apparent bias to England and against the United States. This bias is exemplified in her ironic praising of BBC’s objectivity over American news. While I agree with her that BBC does usually portray international news in a more balanced light than most American media (I personally prefer BBC for international news), Thussu’s tone made her seem like she was tooting her own horn a bit.

One of the most striking points from Armand Mattelart’s chapter “Emergence of Technical Networks” was the point that while most of Europe’s early telecommunications were state-monopolized, the United States decidedly began international telecommunications with a commercial focus. I think is a reflection of the United States favoring a capitalist approach which is still very apparent today, especially in comparison with the Europe economic structure as well as European culture.

Mattelart concludes the chapter with a discussion on World Exhibitions of new technologies in communication. While these exhibitions helped to instill a sense of national pride for the nation presenting their technological progress, they also served as a symbol of technological power. Nations not only showed off their new inventions to each other, but also used them as a threat to less technologically advanced nations.

Both chapters really made a point of emphasizing whether the communication network being discussed was publicly, privately, or government owned/controlled. This is extremely important to note because it affects who uses the network, who the network reaches, and what material is broadcast.

Communication and Political Strategy

2009-08-31T15:58:00.001-04:00

Before coming to AU, I briefly flirted with the idea of becoming a marriage and family therapist. While I ultimately didn't go down that path, I still idealize what clear, effective communication can achieve. In coming to the International Communication program, I hope to study communication as a tool for intercultural understanding on a personal level. The readings this week, particularly the Thussu reading, however, highlighted an aspect of communication that I hadn't given much thought to in the past: communication and communication technology as an industry with significant political and economic ramifications.

I found Britain's history of communication and communication technology particularly interesting. That British control of the raw materials for cable manufacturing contributed to its leadership in the cable market, which in turn brought political and economic advantages that sustained its far-flung empire, is a case study for both vertical ownership and world domination. I also find it admirable that, at least as conveyed in the Thussu reading, the British government throughout history has understood the strategic importance of controlling communications and communication technology. It seems that the British state has grasped the balance of benefiting from state ownership of communication technologies (such as with the telegraph), and yet remaining detached enough to also reap the benefits of a free media (such as with the BBC).

The debate and adoption of the New World Information and Communication Order further highlights the importance of a national media as it relates to the international stage. I was particularly struck by the resolution proposing, "respect for each people's cultural identity and for the rights of each nation to inform the world public about its interests, its aspirations and its social and cultural values." In some sense, one might consider the developing world's inaccess to mass communication technologies as de facto exclusion from the world media stage (though the struggle to get the NWICO framed the matter as de juris exclusion). Yet, just as we value the right of an individual to express oneself in one's own terms, it seems only fair that a nation should be able to articulate its own culture and identity to the rest of the world. Components of critical ethnic studies involve the struggle to get self-produced images of one's group rather than having externally produced representations tell the whole story. The same could be said for those countries whose stories are perpetually represented through an international media lens, without an opportunity to frame it according to more national goals.

I should clarify here that I am not advocating state-control of media across the board, so much as advocating broad access to the means of media production, whether through private companies or government-funded projects. Deeper in the resolution, however, one can extrapolate the conviction that a country's public diplomacy should be produced by that country. This brings up an interesting question: to the extent that a country's public diplomacy is driven by a national agenda, do nationally-controlled attempts to manage a nation's public image tell the more complete story, or does a globalized media present a more critical look? What role does a native understanding of culture play in presenting a nuanced picture?

America's Flawed Communication Strategy in Afghanistan

2009-08-31T13:34:00.002-04:00

Much of this week’s reading had to do with the development of international communication methods over time and how they were used by dominant imperialist powers to expand their reach over the developing world. From the printing press to telegraph communication through cables to the expansion of the newspaper industry to radio and eventually television and Internet, the history of global communication can be traced back to its use as a propaganda tool.

In reading about how imperialist powers have used these modes of communications to gain some kind of presence or control in the developing world I began to think of the United States’ role in Afghanistan today. In the reading it stated that where the BBC has been historically seen as more balanced, the US international communication strategies have been seen as much more concerted efforts to transmit a very specific message. In particular, the United States saw the role of the radio in being able to reach the highly illiterate populations of the developing world.

So this makes me wonder why the United States has not invested more thought, effort, and finances into reaching the various Afghan satellite television stations broadcast from both Afghanistan and America? If, “[t]he extent of empire could be used as ‘an indication of the efficiency of empire,’” then the United States’ presence in Afghanistan can neither be considered far reaching nor efficient and well understood by the people of the nation.

Many of the programs on these stations are call-in shows where a talking head commentator pontificates about religious, political and cultural issues. Even the more liberal / moderate figures on these programs often heavily criticize the role of the United States and NATO in Afghanistan, with their callers often following suit.

With so much negativity being targeted at America’s role in Afghanistan from so many sides one has to wonder why the US hasn’t taken a more definitive role in finding ways to express their true goals and intentions in Afghanistan through these media outlets? Yes, there is Voice of America in Farsi (and I believe Pashto) on one of the independent stations broadcast from Kabul but there have to be other ways for the United States to use this form of international communication to better inform the people of Afghanistan on the purpose of the US’ mission in Afghanistan.

After all, like many of the people of the developing world the United States hoped to reach through radio, the majority of the people in Afghanistan are illiterate. It would seem only logical that the United States would use the television medium which has such a wide reach in Afghanistan to try to engage with the Afghan people. Along with being highly illiterate, the majority of the Afghan population is under the age of 35, another fact which would make the use of television so important to the success of the US mission in Afghanistan. If “communication has always been critical to the establishment and maintenance of power over distance,” then why isn’t the United States doing more to reach the people of Afghanistan through various media outlets?

The Need to Make Things Straight

2009-08-30T12:07:00.011-04:00

or How Things Can be Seen in a Different Light

How about the statement: “The US is the empire of our times”? Well, for some (surprisingly) it might be a shocker; for others, it’s already become a cliché. Let me play the devil’s advocate now, and try to look at the above-mentioned observation from the SIS 640 perspective.

Thussu refers to communication as a key tool for control and authority-maintenance. It was true at the time of Darius (5^th century BC), Julius Ceasar (1^st century BC), the Catholic Church in medieval Europe, the British Empire, the Communists in the USSR and Eastern Europe, and… the list can go on forever, but let’s turn to the United States today.

It is an undeniable fact that the Cold War necessitated the propaganda war, but I believe it is important to look at the core reason for the need of propaganda, in the first place. The entire “ideological rivalry” was nothing more than a strategic battle of two superpowers for global domination, while all the shimmering wording was a mere act of public diplomacy, trying to cloak the reality in a well-packaged and easy-to-internalize demagogy. Of course, the superpower battle was waged at many different levels and was manifested in various forms; and yet, its “public face” did not alter the essence of it.

VOA and RFE/RL immediately jump to mind. References have also been made to a state body – IIC – to implement the “international informational activities in support of the US national security policies and interests,” Project Truth being a part of it. (How much more explicit can it get? I bet Orwell was turning in his grave in 1981.) It all seemed to become obsolete by the early 1990s, as supposedly the other superpower was defeated never to rise again. But, as we can see now with the benefit of hindsight, the “end of history” is not that easy to bring about, and there is always an “enemy” to fight out there, especially when you need to maintain internal coherence and unity (hail Orwell and Leo Strauss!). So, the “information war” never stopped, be it against Saddam, Al Qaeda, Ahmadinejad, or even Putin.

Yes, we are all familiar, especially after this week’s readings, with the fact that the culture of independent and private media is very strong in the US, and that it figures as one of the basic principles the American people hold so dear. But then, unlike the majority of other states, the US government is also a true representative of its people and, particularly, its major businesses and other interest groups. The power dynamic is two-way and should be viewed as a cycle: all parties affecting each other. Military and political actions follow certain interests, even if well-cloaked in demagogy (freedom, democracy, human rights, etc…). And even if not directly owned or controlled by the state, the media cannot really counter these interests. After all, given the commercial nature of these organizations, none of the American media would want to be stigmatized as unpatriotic (the gravest of all sins) or to have to deal with the Pentagon. News media, such as the BBC and – especially – Al Jazeera, are largely despised for not playing into the overall American message, and have become targets of the information war themselves (I highly recommend watching the documentary “Control Room” made by an Egyptian-American director, who explores the Pentagon-Al Jazeera tension in 2003-2004). Of course, it is not just the major foreign networks, but at least the DoD can be sure that the strongest patriotic ethos, as well as the supposed “ethical considerations” are resonating among the local media. This, however, cannot be guaranteed among the foreign media, especially if they are owned, controlled, or strongly influenced by their respective governments. Having them privatized (i.e. commercialized), would give the US the opportunity to indirectly influence their message as well, by playing into their commercial interests, which, in its turn, would help to exert political influence.

Yes, the neo-imperialism claim might be a little over-stretched. But having in mind the current political situation around the world and the need to maintain thorough control of its “spheres of influence,” the US cannot afford allowing uncontrolled freedom to any news media, wherever it be located. At least, that is the attempt.

Hello and welcome!

2009-08-25T23:54:00.000-04:00

Indeed :)

Looking forward to interesting posts, virtual discussions, and debates... and a great class, of course!